Wulf, Christoph [Hrsg.]; Qvarsell, Brigitta [Hrsg.]
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The political, economic, and social developments in the European Union pose new challenges to education in Europe, where each country has its own system. Under these circumstances, the relation between national, regional and local traditions on the one hand and supra-regional, transnational aspirations on the other must be conceived. The field of education is seeing the rise of new issues, responsibilities, and research requiring scholars form different cultures to work together.

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Christoph Wulf

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Introduction

At a time of profound political, social and cultural change, one crucial question is how to conceive the relation between culture and education. Understanding this relation is at present all the more urgent as the traditional attribution of education to the charge of each respective European national culture is currently undergoing radical change. Although the educational system still fulfils the task of anchoring young generations within the national cultures that make up Europe, the progressive loss of significance of national states, which is connected to the process of unification and globalisation, is creating new challenges to the various European cultures and to the education systems embodied in their people. It is time therefore to pay closer attention to the connection between culture and education.

Culture is dependent on education just as education is dependent on culture. Cultures are sustained and transformed through the manner in which they communicate with the younger generation; it is at this level that they constitute their particular power and dynamic. Cultures are historical and regional; within them the demands and challenges of transformed social conditions are worked out and the competences required for dealing with these challenges passed on to subsequent generations. The blanket term "culture" comprises so many heterogeneous elements and aspects that it makes no sense to attempt to form them into a unified definition which could never do justice to the complexity of what culture is. Thus, not only does a culture consist of a particular language and a range of imaginary, literary, artistic and musical creations, but also social structures, values and attitudes as well as social forms of living and their everyday enactment and performance.[1]

The multitude of various realms of life and knowledge in modern societies requires that one understands the spread of "culture" not according to an insular model whereby self-complete cultures are seen to exist separately, side by side. This metaphor does not even describe the nature of European national cultures in the nineteenth century. At that time too intensive exchange occurred between European cultures. In the face of current Europeanisation and globalisation processes this conception of

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[1] Cf. Paragrana. Internationale Zeitschrift für Historische Anthropologie 10 (2002) 1: *Theorien des Performativen*, Berlin: Akademie.

culture is ultimately overhauled. More than ever before heterogeneous cultural traditions can be seen to overlap and merge, resulting in the creation of manifold transnational cultures and culturally hybrid formations. A variety of cultural traditions are involved in these processes. This results in new cultural forms, which are limited neither nationally nor regionally and which are often organised into network structures.[2] Cultural densities of considerable complexity have thus emerged, which suggest that we conceive culture as a dynamic process that constantly creates ever new figurations and life forms.

To distinguish between the societies of "amusement", "media", "learning" and "knowledge" is of little analytical value when it comes to understanding a civilisation in its entirety. In the same way, we regard with scepticism the distinction between high culture and popular culture as well as the practice of expanding the concept of culture to include companies, businesses, schools and high schools. Although considering the high level of complexity within contemporary societies, such conceptual distinctions may seem helpful, there is a danger that the concept of culture loses something of its intricacy as a consequence. This danger is all the more real insofar as in this context the concept "culture" is likely to be understood according to the epistemologically outdated island model.

The word "culture" must not serve like the former notion of "capital" to reduce our age to a single concept in order to create a unity and social identity. For current social, cultural and educational forms of organisation are unquestionably plural. It is accordingly all the more difficult to define "objective" points of reference for culture, science and education. Instead of pursuing causal or final connections in knowledge, cultural science is increasingly aware of the role of contingency. This means that cultural developments are seen less as necessary than as possible developments and that cultural knowledge about these developments is accompanied by the view that things could always have turned out otherwise. This perspective allows one to consider more clearly the limitations of planification and the possibility of determining cultural developments. This leads to fundamental revelations regarding the limitations of possible planning, realizing and evaluating education.

As a result of European integration and globalisation, technology, the media and the market play an important role in the production of hybrid

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[2] Cf. Castells, Manuel: *The rise of the network society*, vol 1, Malden: Blackwell Publisher 1996.

culture forms. Thus, technology and the media have become ubiquitous and the limitations of human control over them have become apparent. Technology and the media constitute an important part of a culture's unconscious which pre-structures the possibilities of perception, experience and action. These processes are closely connected to the marketing of nature, society and self. Nowadays people are defined by technology and the media which assign them consumer identities and incorporate them into the networks of power. In this situation people's minds are increasingly programmed, their imagination shaped, their desires structured and bodies normalized[3], in an ongoing process which a critical understanding of education must always strive against.

In many European countries, cultural science – which differs significantly in content and method from American cultural studies – can be seen to have gained importance. What "cultural science" stands for, however, varies widely according to context: some use the concept to refer to a modernization of the "social sciences"; others take the concept more broadly to encompass various branches of social science. Yet others speak of cultural or human science, including within these terms parts of science and technology. In all cases the concept expresses the modernization and self-reflection of social and human science in the face of profound changes occurring within the scientific landscape. Cultural science is characterised by an inter- or trans-disciplinary orientation and inter- or trans-national cooperation. This orientation leads to new approaches to scientific questioning, research and knowledge. It involves a more detailed contextualisation of scientific work and a pluralisation of epistemological and methodical positions.

Historical anthropology[4] and its relative, historical-educational anthropology[5] are central fields within the realm of cultural science in Germany. Both are characterised by attempts to inquire into the phenomena and structures that define that which is human in the aftermath of the collapse of reliable abstract anthropological norms. Historical anthropology and historical-educational anthropology are located at the junction between history and the humanities. However, they are neither to be reduced to the

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[3]   Cf. Wimmer, Michael (2002): Pädagogik als Kulturwissenschaft. In: Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft, pp. 109-122.

[4]   Wulf, Christoph (ed.) (1997): Vom Menschen. Handbuch Historische Anthropologie, Weinheim/Basel (French and Italian translation 2002); Wulf, Christoph/Kamper, Dietmar (eds.) (2002): Logik und Leidenschaft. Erträge Historischer Anthropologie, Berlin: Reimer.

[5]   Wulf, Christoph (2002): Anthropology of Education, Münster/Hamburg/London: Lit.

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history of anthropology or to the anthropology of education as disciplines nor to the relation of history as a discipline to anthropology or to the relation of a history of education to educational anthropology. Their purpose is rather to relate the historicity of their perspectives and methods to the historicity of their subject of study. This involves embracing the results of the humanities, but also taking into account a philosophically and historically grounded criticism of anthropology in order to formulate new paradigmatic questions. A certain unsettledness of mind which cannot be put to rest is fundamental to this pursuit. Historical anthropology and historical-educational anthropology are limited neither to certain cultural spaces nor to separate epochs. In the reflection of their own historicity they are able to overcome the traditional Eurocentric orientation with the humanities as well as a rather outdated interest in history in order to give precedence to issues of the present and future. As within the framework of *educology*, the task is to connect cultural-scientific knowledge and educational-scientific research.[6] Education is understood as a constitutive part of culture. Among other things, it concerns the relations between child culture, school culture and media culture within processes of socialisation and education as well as the role of space and time in education.

This book is the result of a German-Swedish collaboration and is a first attempt to present some of the connections between culture and education on the basis of a range of examples. The subject is dealt with by the different authors in accordance with their respectively diverse traditions of research. With regard to methodology a variety of different approaches are represented. They reach from the more traditionally philosophical and historical approaches to ethnographic procedures which are particularly well suited to relate anthropological and educational perspectives.

The first part of the book deals with the central problem of conceptualising the connections between culture and education. The second part concerns the use of ethnographic methods to investigate important fields in education and the development of innovative approaches to educational action.

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[6] Cf. Qvarsell, *Birgitta* (2002): "Children's use of media as transformed experience. Educological and psychological dimensions". In: Van den Berg, B. & Van den Bulck, J. (eds.): *Children and Media: Multidisciplinary approaches*; Loeven, Belgium: Garant; Qvarsell, *Birgitta* (1994): "Quality of educational intervention in childhood". In: B.Qvarsell & B.L.T. van der Linden: *The Quest for Quality. The Evaluation of Helping Interventions*, pp. 63-80. Stockholm and Amsterdam Universities.

The first part opens with a study of the use of "culture" as a construction for educational research. The usefulness of this approach is illustrated with examples from the realm of childhood activities (Qvarsell). Whilst from an empirical perspective the first article aims to reduce the concept of culture as it is relevant to one side of the spectrum of what "culture" encompasses, the second article emphasizes the other side of the spectrum of possible concepts of culture, where it is more difficult to narrowly define. This article questions the role of religion today. It investigates the forms of religiousness that have emerged in contemporary culture and the way in which they relate to rituals and ritualized activities (Wulf). This relates to considerations regarding the relation between morals, education and culture. They define the central role played by ethics in culture and education (Zirfas). In the subsequent study, the concept of culture is again limited to the use of "culture" in education following the example of Mary Parker Follett and her efforts to determine the difference between management and education (Althans). This is followed by a case study on the problems of "being Latino" abroad, which examines the difficulties of constructing a Latin American identity. Discourse on the "body and corporeality", "spontaneity", "seduction", "gallantry/flirting" and the "other/foreign/exotic" all play a role in this context (Runge). This *is* followed by an article that sketches a further "alternative" to European culture. Here too the extent to which different cultures create different understandings of education becomes clear (Goldstein-Kyaga). This relates to the subsequent piece entitled "SurFacesInterFaces", which explores the extent to which expression and perception of the body and in particular the perception of faces is culturally conditioned. How is a human face to be interpreted? What does it reveal and conceal? What role does it play in educational interactions (Lichau)? Whilst a person's face always expresses something of the self and of the other, the subsequent text considers how self and other are expressed in computer-mediated communication. The important role of computer-mediated communication in our culture is seen to bring about new experiences for education. The chapter closes with an essay on the events of September 11th in New York. The "collapsing towers" are interpreted as a profoundly mediatic and cultural event (Bausch).

Taking up a range of aspects already discussed, the second part of this book presents examples for research in the central areas of education using ethnographic methods as well as innovative perspectives for educational action. Reference to culture and research in cultural science is relevant

here too. The section opens with an article concerning the "institution in-side" and how with regard to education the relation between individuals and society is defined differently according to cultural context *(Högberg)*. This is followed by a related article on education and culture in families. This is based on observations of family rituals that reveal how families deal with issues of "authority" and "recognition" (Audehm). Since dealing with time constitutes one of the most difficult social tasks in western cul-tures, communicating competences in time management plays an important role in education. The subsequent study compares traditional and mobile schools with regard to the freedom children *and young people* have to de-fine their own management of time (Balldin). This is related to a further ethnographic study on the management of difference at school, in particu-lar between pupils (Göhlich/Wagner-Willi). When observing "differences" one soon comes across the example of "children dealing with racist name-calling". Most often such name-calling is playful. The other is marked as a stranger in an attempt to de-play the status of the "other" (Tervooren). This text is followed by a study on the meaning of culture which points in the same direction. It investigates how *children* understand ethnic culture and peer culture, how this understanding influences everyday school reality and to what extent these relations can be shaped pedagogically (Löfberg). The final contribution analyses the ways in which IT courses can support marginalized youths by helping them to make multi- and intercultural con-nections and acquire new learning experiences (Lindqvist/*Sjögren*).

Most of the authors of this book are either PhD candidates or currently working on post-doctoral theses; some of them work in research projects at the universities of Berlin or Stockholm. The idea of bringing our research together under a common theme is the result of several years of coopera-tion within the *Network Educational Science Amsterdam* and based on a collaborate project between Stockholm, Berlin and Stanford which was supported by the Swedish ministry of education. We hereby express our gratitude to the institutions that supported this collaboration.

I

Theory and concepts

Birgitta Qvarsell

Culture as a Construction for Educational research, with Special Focus on Childhood Activities

Introduction

This essay is about culture as a concept for research in education, about culture as opening or closing construction - and the relationship to education. Education in this context is a cultural scientific discipline. I prefer to name it educology. I use this concept to stress the scientific educational task as supposed to the practice field tasks (cf. Papert 1988, Fisher 1996 and Qvarsell 2000).

During the last decades the concept of culture has come into focus for educological researchers. People act and create meanings within cultural frames and in cultural settings, and thus the conditions for socialisation and learning are of a cultural character. Methods and techniques in educological studies are often borrowed from anthropology and ethnography, not just psychology. Participatory observations, ethnographic interviews are used as techniques and we often study processes and phenomena in natural contexts and settings. We know that the claims on ethnography - concerning for instance depths of studies and lengths of visits in reality, differ among ethnographic and anthropological researchers.

Educology studies conditions and processes of significance for learning and socialisation of human beings and groups of people. *Change* is, as a human phenomenon, a focus of importance in educology. The conditions for learning and socialisation are primarily situated in cultural contexts and meaning provinces, and thus the concept of culture has to be examined and analysed within educology as a scientific discipline.

Culture as an opening or closing construction?

The concept of culture has different connotations for people working within educology. For me "culture" is not a closing concept, but it is not necessarily an opening construct either. To see something as culture does not mean that a field opens for interpretation or for different kinds of

knowledge. Rather culture is a concept which *may become useful* as a (non-closing) frame when I want to understand the conditions for learning and socialisation during for instance childhood and youth. What are the compelling and challenging conditions for children and young people finding themselves in different groups in daily life, outside as well as inside the school and other institutions? What in culture evokes change?

Every culture has an educational dimension, and without such a dimension it would not be a culture. Signs that are embedded in a culture, and that are perceived and acted on, thereby have an educative and generative power in terms of developmental tasks, challenges of various kinds, be they ethical, social or physical. You may consider these signs and powers as social constructions embedded in cultures (Hacking 1999). At the same time it is evident that the individual person as actor in this culture constructs knowledge according to a constructivist view of learning (Piaget 1971).

"Culture" is, however, in itself a controversial concept in to-day's discussions on childhood and education. Will it come to act as a unifying construction or as a distinguishing concept and frame of reference? Will it help to clarify what happens among children and young people during childhood, during youth? The strictly anthropological concept Culture as used by ethnological anthropologists like Ruth Benedict (1949) has to do with customs and ways to live together. Culture in its very essence is a topic for ethnologists. In a way it is in opposition to biology, and in reality it comes to challenge biology. At the same time Benedict suggests tolerance towards the manifold of cultural forms.

Culture as a challenging concept for developmental psychology and education

Benedict as well as other early ethnologists came to challenge the developmental psychologist tradition within education, among them Mary Ellen Goodman and Margaret Mead, both with a great interest in cultural forms for tradition of values and learning of cultural contents. Goodman (1970) claims that cultural studies may contribute to critical analyses of developmental and child psychology's theories of stages and phases, which were earlier considered as given and natural, irrespective of environmental conditions. Using the concepts "pre-figurative" and "co-figurative", Mead (1970) challenges the usual "post-figurative" way of thinking about how

learning and socialisation proceed. Once we have come to understand the problems of applying developmental psychology in attempts to understand childhood and children's life conditions, and rather approaching a cultural interpretative view, we may better understand children's possible ways of acting and thinking. This has been recognised by psychologists and sociologists, for instance Martin Woodhead (1999), presenting an analysis complementary to the anthropological view.

Play, work and study as childhood activities - a cultural question?

The difference between a cultural and a psychological view is clearly expressed in studies of children's and youth's activity fields, primarily the activities of play, study and work. An important question considering childhood culture and children's life world is how relations between children may enhance social development as a learning process. Within this process the relationship between play and competence is a key question. Among other things, children learn communicative skills by playing. Play is, as a phenomenon, a semiotic kind of activity - children use and develop many semiotic modes of expression by playing.

Using Piaget's terminology, play is an assimilative kind of activity. Children use and challenge their own competence in order to solve new developmental tasks. Children's own culture, or childhood culture, is in particular associated with play as a means to express oneself and to convey meanings and experiences. The learning principle is to start from the competence one has developed and to practice it. The "motor" or educational principle is activity, based on the child's own intentions to deal with cultural challenges.

Children in different cultures construct their own developmental tasks, which act as challenges for socialisation. Schools, as well other social and cultural settings, have to give them the opportunities to solve the tasks. Such conditions may be expressed in terms of space and time, not the scheduled time and space, but space and time from the children's perspectives. They need space and time for play, reflection and communication.

A very important prerequisite for task solving is space as room for discourse, and time as possibility for activities that lead to experiences. To take an example from the childhood culture of street children, I want to point to Roger Hart's (1992) studies on (working or not-working) street children and his observations about their ways to combine play and work

on the streets, the important condition being *shared perspectives* among the children.

But, and this has often been stressed, it is not easy to describe the relationship between play, work and learning for children in general, partly due to the fact that "work" is something that has to be better defined and recognised as a part of children's lives. That learning and play have a tight relationship is, however, rather obvious - from empirical as well as theoretical studies on learning and socialisation. Research reports show that children themselves try to find the connections, and that they try to find learning and play possibilities in combination with work.

Culture connected to school, play, mediated experiences and work

What about the concept of culture in the context of play and friends? It is interesting to compare different cultural forms and aspects, and to do this by stressing the main aspects of learning in a broad sense. Using data from different studies of childhood and culture, primarily from children's perspectives, I suggest the following reasoning as a departure for discussion. In Qvarsell (2000) I discuss three kinds of cultural contexts around children: childhood culture, school culture and media culture, suggesting that media experiences offer a rather new kind of transformed experiences.

School and childhood cultures around children are traditional and accepted, by children as well as by adults. School stands for instruction and forming as means for children's learning, while the world outside school (here understood as childhood culture) stands for more informal kinds of development and learning.

The greatest problem for today's teachers and leisure time pedagogues, at least in the Western and Northern part of the world, seems to be a third kind of culture, especially for school age kids. How can one handle the media culture? Is it a friend or a foe? Is it a threat towards traditional school skills, or does it contain important developmental tasks to be solved during the school age period?

There is however also a fourth kind of culture coming into the lives also of Western children during childhood, and long existing for children in other parts of the world - for instance street and working children, and that is work. It could be labour or other kind of work activities, the important fact being that children are supposed to handle this task as well, either

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they get pay for it or not. In the Western and Northern sphere we often consider work as something exclusive for adult life and perhaps the preparation for adult professional life.

All four cultures confront children with developmental tasks, challenges to be handled by the children themselves. Giving room for developmental tasks in schools does not, however, mean that teachers have to design the day-by-day decisions on when and where kids can work with developmental tasks as specific school tasks. Rather the other way round. Time and space as *children's needs, from their own perspectives,* is the important memento in adult planning for children's learning and development.

Children construct their developmental tasks, and school as well as day care and leisure centres have to give them the opportunities to solve the tasks. Such opportunities may be expressed in terms of space and time, not the scheduled time and space, but space and time from the children's perspectives. They need space and time for thinking, actively handling different problems and for play, reflection and communication. A very important prerequisite for task solving is space as room for discourse and time as possibility for activities that lead to experiences. To take an example from a special childhood culture, I want again to point to Roger Hart's (1992) studies on street children and his observation of their ways to combine play and work on the streets, the important condition being *shared perspectives* among the children.

To summarise: Educology as a scientific discipline - connected to educational dimensions of daily life cultures - studies conditions and processes of significance for human learning and socialisation. Change is, as a human and interpersonal phenomenon, a focus of importance in educology. The conditions for learning and socialisation are primarily situated in cultural contexts, and thus the concept of culture is of focal importance within educology as a scientific discipline. The concept of culture, with its different connotations, is necessary as an opening frame of reference in order to understand the conditions for learning and socialisation during childhood and youth as well as in adulthood.

It is reasonable, as do the authors in the anthology by Allison James and Alan Prout (1997) to talk of "a new paradigm" in the study of childhood and youth and their life conditions - a paradigm in which young persons' perspectives, own activities and perceptions of cultural conditions,

are the relevant and interesting points of departure for studying childhood and youth phenomena. It is equally relevant to study adult persons' cultural contexts with the persons themselves as informants rather than as "respondents". The "new paradigm" (which is in many ways not so new, after all) is *ethnographic* in its methodological approach, it is *cultural* in its framing of interesting phenomena, and it is *opening* in its use of concepts and constructs. *Perspective* will, thus, become an important key issue.

On perspectives, connected to space, time and control

To illustrate what I mean by perspective, I here choose the still very animated discussion concerning quality in school and pre-school. The professionals /teachers, pre-school pedagogues/ themselves tend to connect quality with well-defined goals, personnel education, leadership, and with concepts such as "view of wholeness", democracy, individualised instruction, and so forth. All these concepts relate to official texts that authorise the professional tasks as such. The children, on the other hand, tend to relate "what is good and important" (interpreted as an aspect of "quality") to peers, to being allowed to complete tasks, to control own activities, and to freely choose what to do. Children, thus, focus realities and activities, what they do and are allowed to do. Adults, professionals, focus ideals and goals. This is a difference to be noticed in every attempt to create high quality in school and child-care - things are not seen in the same way by different actors.

Another usual view on school and school children is that learning demands teachers and schoolbooks. Learning depends on teaching, adapted stepwise instructions and concentration on one aspect or thing at a time. This view is a part of an all-embracing paradigm considering school as a special institution where special tasks are trained, one at a time. This view exists, however, in a map, not to be confused with the terrain. It does not give you any valid information of what is really happening to children during a day. Children themselves often say that the best way to learn is to be busy with at least two tasks at a time, it makes them concentrate and learn better.

Another example of difference between map and terrain is the way responsible adults view children with special needs. These children need special attention, more instruction, more help with instruction. At the same time, it is obvious from daily knowledge of school life and children's

school learning that what these kids (especially) need is time and space for learning, not special instruction or special books.

One may look upon the intermediate periods and intermediate spaces as important conditions for child and youth socialisation. Times and spaces that are "intermediate" are in-between lecture rooms, group rooms, scheduled classes, and other adult planned activities.

Closely connected to the use of such spaces and times is the phenomenon of "control" - in this case the children's own control of their conditions, in as well as outside school. In-between - (or intermediate-) spaces and times may become combined with children's being *in* control of their conditions rather than being *under* the control of others, adults or peers. The conceptual dimensions of control have been discussed and analysed by psychologists as well as ethnographers and educational scientists, with the ambition to understand people's ways of acting in relation to different life world tasks. Andrew Lock (1981) uses the above mentioned dilemma of being *in* control and being *under* (other people's) control. He also connects the control dimension with locations in time and space. Ann-Carita Evaldsson (1993) found different adult ways to control children at Swedish after-school centres, and she also found play patterns used by the children as means for them to control their interactions.

The concept of control is thus, as a whole, a very important theoretical tool to discuss in a world that changes so much around children. Do they get the possibilities to develop control over their own lives? Do they have own opportunities (in terms of spaces and time) to learn how to control themselves and their conditions? In what sense may the dimension of control become questionable in the lives of children? What is the "locus of control" of school age children's views on developmental conditions?

How - then - do children themselves perceive the school day and the activities connected with school? The most obvious aspect of children's perceptions of school is its regulations of time. Breaks, not having enough time to complete tasks, trouble when trying to use the short pauses between classes, are examples of problems as perceived by children. In a study of children going from pre-school to school culture, which I conducted in the mid 1980's, kids mentioned the following aspects as typical for school:

- learning
- having breaks

- o queuing, before class and waiting for lunch

- o no talk during lessons

- o concentrating on one thing at a time

- o often being told to break activities

- o teacher telling you what is wrong and what is right

Compared with school, these children mention quite other aspects as typical for pre-school and school age care (leisure centres):

- o playing

- o own choice of play, work and break

- o no queuing

- o often making two or more things at the same time

- o own choice of activities

- o own decision of what is right and wrong

These aspects point to some important differences between control mechanisms in and out of school time, during a day. Within school, children are controlled by (or under the control of) teachers and time schedules. Outside school they often control their own activities and the time needed. The same is true for the children's use of space. When children characterise their school environments and rooms within school, it is clear that rooms are for activities and being together with peers. They prefer that kind of space rather than designed learning areas in classrooms and group-rooms. Classrooms often afford a sense of gloominess, according to children. If that depends upon the space as such or on what is usually done there is hard to say, but most probably those two aspects co-vary. Attractive rooms are in-between spaces, functionless and not designed for special activities. The same phenomenon can be identified in leisure time activities. The children make something personal and new of the environmental conditions. The planned functions are not allowed to control the use.

Changed patterns of learning and relations with consequences for research methods, theoretical concepts and data collection techniques

The situation for children of our time is very clearly marked by what Margaret Mead used to call co-figurative forms for culture and learning

(op cit, 1970). In a relatively stable society you can count on the so-called post-figurative learning form as the normal one. When changes are few and the relations between generations are stable, the younger will learn from the elder, in a post-figurative way. Parents, teachers and other professionals teach and bring up the children and youngsters. Our society is to some extent co-figurative, that is equals learn from each other, peers from peers. To some extent it is also evident that we change into a society with pre-figurative learning conditions. Younger people have to teach the older generation the rules of society in some aspects or the techniques to be used in our modern information systems. Such changes may, of course, be seen as threatening by the adults, who are not used to learn from the younger generation.

The co-figurative form of learning is of course not new. That children learn from each other is well known from school research. Collaboration and co-operation when learning may be much more developing than individual competition (see Bennett et al, 1993).

How do persons learn to know their environments, and how do different environmental conditions affect persons? "Representational content emerges in the *usefulness* of the differentiations to the rest of the system. It emerges in the potential uses to which those differentiations can be put" (Bickhard, 1992, p 71). This is an interactive view, according to which functional interactive relationships rather than structural correspondences are established. "Both interactively and constructively, perceptually and developmentally, the fundamental form of influence from the environment to the person is in terms of relevant selection pressures on the interactions, and, thus the interactive organisations, of the system" (p 73). This claim can be seen as a general basis for social research in people's praxis-world .

The theoretical frame of reference, and the connected methodological approach with inspiration from ethnography has in this case its roots in Charles Peirce's semiotic and abductive philosophy, which has been especially elaborated for use in interpretative social research (see for instance Löfberg 1994 and 2001). Peirce uses the concept of "substance" to indicate the matter of experience, but the experience of substance has to be connected to a "being". To be is to be something, and this something must have a *quality*. Quality can be experienced only via a *relation* to something else. For such a relation one needs a subjective *interpreter* (Peirce, 1891). "Quality" is, in this Peircean sense, the "something" that is related to a substance and which make us perceive its "affording" aspects.

To make a short connection to perception theory, James Gibson's concept of affordance (1979, see also Reed, 1993) could be interesting in a generalised sense: Affordances invite you to create meanings of the environmental aspects, affordances are seen as the specific qualities to act upon, qualities that are inherent as possibilities in the settings as lived contexts. Social psychologist Fritz Heider (1958) uses every-day concepts to build a common-sense conceptual design for the study of social contexts and people's actions. Concepts like "can", "try", "want" and "act" are interrelated in order to bring forth social understanding of what happens in social settings. Such concepts may be used in studies of every-day life conditions, especially when qualities that are embedded in contextual conditions are viewed from the perspectives of the actors.

A conceptual framework with opening concepts like "developmental tasks", "affordances", and "quality-relations", may be used in ethnographic educology, with reference to psychology of youth development, and to perception psychology (Gibson, Reed, Bickhard), to a pragmatic view (Peirce) and to Heider's every day- naive-psychology concepts. Indigenous (emic) concepts may thus emerge in the interpretation of data. With this background in theory and methodology as an overall view on the field of study, different techniques to collect data may be considered. Ethnographic observations and field-notes as described by Shirley B Heath (1983) and ethnographic interviews as presented by myself (Qvarsell, 1996) can be used. The important aspects of these techniques are the nearness to the field and the long-run character of the study, involving the persons as engaged and interested informants, reporting the situations from their perspectives. Semiotic interpretations focus narratives by the actors/informants related to cultural signs and conditions. The semiotic analysis of data fits Peirce's semiotic view and abductive philosophy (see also Manning, 1987).

These ethnographic and educological qualitative data collection and interpretation techniques could well be connected with other kinds of observations and inquiries, for instance self-reports and open-answer techniques in questionnaires. The important thing is that - in this case - childhood and youth cultural conditions for socialisation are grasped, from the perspectives of the actors themselves.

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Christoph Wulf

Religion and Ritual

When the relationship between religion and ritual is considered, a se-
ries of questions, problems and difficulties arise: Can religion be discussed
without explicitly or implicitly saying something about the existence of
God? Can God even be spoken of in scientific discourse? Is God not the
other through whom we speak but who cannot be made the object of
speech? Is God not beyond reason, language, imagination, and therefore
inconceivable (Derrida/Vattimo 2001)? If the defining religious experience
is not available to thinking but only to faith, what can be said about God,
religion or faith in the context of a scientific discourse, without missing
precisely the specificity of religious experience: the discovery of the limits
of the *conditio humana* through a faith in God (Wulf 1997)? While main-
taining an awareness of this aspect of God available only to faith, other
areas of religion appropriate to scientific analysis can be identified
(Luhmann 2000). The relation between religion and ritual constitutes a
frontier zone partially available to scientific discourse and partially re-
moved from it. Ever since its origins, the study of religion has been con-
cerned with the connection between religion and ritual (Michaels/Pezzoli –
Olgiati/Stolz 2001). There has been controversial debate as to what degree
the staging of rituals produces religious experience and belief, and how
much it is the belief which leads to the creation and performance of certain
rituals. But the alternatives set up by these two positions fall short; rather it
should be assumed that the performance of rituals produces religious ex-
perience, while at the same time these rituals express and represent the re-
ligious experiences underlying them. The relationship between religion
and ritual varies according to culture and historical epoch. This is true for
the various European cultures and even more so for non-European cul-
tures.

The following sketches the development of the relationship between
religion and ritual in the German cultural sphere since the Middle Ages.
The historical changes in the relationship between religion and ritual will
be identified. The starting point of this examination is the assumption that
the present-day loss in religious meaning goes hand in hand with changes
in the staging and performance of rituals and ritual structures, although the

relationship between religion and ritual cannot be fully explained causally or functionally. The loss of religious meaning is most apparent in the changes in religious institutions: in empty churches, in numerous secessions from the Church and in difficulties recruiting pastors and priests. Less affected is the political influence of the Church. But it is doubtful that the loss of meaning in ecclesiastical-religious life leads to a fading of religious questions and to the disappearance of religiosity in individuals. Max Weber argued that while the thesis of the demystification of the world as a result of the development of modern rationality was on one hand correct, it needed to be supplemented by an opposing thesis and corresponding research, in which new forms of mystification of the world and the meaning of the holy for contemporary life were examined (Kemper/Wulf 1997). In the same way there is a need for a study of the new religious phenomena spreading outside the realms of Christianity and the Church, and which in some sense are coming to replace phenomena once exclusively anchored in Christianity and in the Christian Church.

For a long time in Europe it was Christianity and the Christian Church who had the monopoly on providing answers to the big questions about the beginning and the end of the world and of man, as well as about the forms and norms of human life. Thus the origin of the world and of man lay in God. Christianity also had an answer for what happened to man after death. If a godly life was lived then "eternal" life was the reward. Religion and the Church promised salvation from suffering, pain and transience. They offered an explanation of the cosmic order and gave man a place in it. In the hereafter, they promised, was an overcoming of death and a compensation for the injustices suffered in this life. Christianity and the Church occupied the human imagination, not only with laws and prohibitions, but with stories about good and evil, with images of a successful life, of hell and paradise, of salvation and happiness. For the people of Europe, Christianity was the great producer of meaning, security and a fulfilled life. For this it had developed many rites, stories and forms of expression. The performance of ceremonies at church and in the home brought about a living practice formed by Christian values, norms and models, in whose context people knew what to do, say and believe.

The rituals of the primarily oral culture of the Middle Ages played an important role in the production of this body of practical religious knowledge embodied in Christianity (Muir 1997). In them the great events of Christianity are staged, performed and thereby made visible. But these are

not merely brought to people's attention as additions to religious texts, songs and prayers, but have to be participated in as viewers or as actors. In this way central religious events not only become perceivable but performative. Through the continual repetition of these real and imaginary religious actions, they inscribe themselves through a mimetic process into the imagination and the bodies of the participants, educating and shaping them. A practical body of Christian knowledge is produced, permeating all aspects of life and shaping its everyday actions and behaviour. Because of the central role Christianity plays in all aspects of life, Christian rituals also structure the daily, weekly, monthly and yearly routines of everyday life. These religio-ritual acts do not have to be legitimated. They are simply there and "convince" with their apparent naturalness. Unquestioned, they create order, community and meaning. The presence, visibility and performativity of Christian rituals standardize daily life and lead to a *compulsion of the ritual*. A life deviating from them is impossible; the consequence would be exclusion and persecution. The history of heretics, the Cathars for instance, Inquisition, the *Malleus Maleficarum* or confession testimonials make this evident. Deviationists become scapegoats; the violence inherent in the religion and in society is projected onto them. One becomes a scapegoat and a victim of violence by not participating in the rituals producing, confirming and perpetuating the Christian community. Through his nonparticipation in the performative execution of Christian rituals and ritualizations, it becomes evident that someone doesn't belong; he consequently loses the protection of the community, which draws itself even more closely together against the outsider. In societies in which religion and the Church play a central role in the processes of the cultural interpretation of meaning, the relevant rituals create a high degree of visibility and performativity.

The relationship between religion and ritual changed fundamentally with the Reformation. This happened as a result of the transition from a more collectively organized faith to one centered in the individual. The way to God no longer passes through church, tradition, and the mediation of the priest, but rather includes the individual reading and interpretation of the Bible and, with their help, the thematization, observation and exploration of the self. Insight into human guilt and incompleteness, as connected with original sin, is the goal; only on this basis does faith arise, and only through faith, *sola fide*, is salvation possible. With this new emphasis in Protestantism, the individual and his path to God move into the center of

religion. "Luther not only destroyed the *cordon sanitaire* the Church had instituted between the believer and God, but also dissolved the system of orientation that had been valid up until then: Where the Church once observed and advised her believers, the individual must now observe himself and seek advice from 'his' God" (Soeffner 1995, p. 45). With this inward orientation it becomes important for the Protestant Christian to see not only the works and products of mankind, but also and especially the motives and convictions undergirding them. Not human deeds but rather their background becomes important. God sees and judges not only actions but the convictions underlying them.

With this turn to the individual and his inner life in Protestant Christianity the relationship between religion and ritual also undergoes a change. Many traditional, collective rituals do continue to produce and maintain the faith. The rituals associated with the great Christian holy days carry on being performed. The staging and production of baptism and communion rituals also continue to produce their community building effects. But at the same time, new ritual forms come to articulate and manifest a faith in God. Rituals more heavily centered on the individual develop. These rituals use writing –in diaries, confessions, letters, etc. – thereby producing a new kind of relationship to the self and to God as well as a new form of education. The *rituals of literacy* developed in close connection to Protestantism contributed significantly to the development of modern rationality, historical consciousness and to the emergence of goal-oriented and systematic action. They have become the new techniques of education. These inward-oriented processes of self-formation increasingly acquire greater significance; accordingly the ritual techniques are also inward-oriented and create new forms of relating to the self and to God. So for instance the ritual writing in a diary centered on experiences with God is an individual activity, but in pietism, for example, is shared with many others. Although the ritual act of writing in a religious diary is carried out by an individual, it at the same time produces a ritual community of those who give an account of their religious experiences in such a ritual. An imaginary community comes into existence, in which everyone knows himself to be connected with everyone else. This community is not tied to an immediate bodily presence, but rather abstracts itself into an *imaginary community*, produced by the collective aim and activity of isolated individuals. These forms of imaginary, collective experience of isolated individuals usher in new subject-centered models of education and behaviour, which have in-

creasingly gained in significance since the Reformation. They share a bio-graphical orientation as well as a high degree of self observation and re-flexivity. The search for God and the search for self come together in in-dissoluble form in these rituals. This search is all the more tortuous in that it cannot reach its goal. Man cannot be sure of God; it is God who accepts man; grace and salvation come from God and cannot be won by human deeds, which are only relevant in this world. The search for self-knowledge and self-formation takes on an intermediary position between the two.

The example of the religion concept in the letters of Pastor von Goethe in the year 1772 shows that the *Enlightenment* brought about a transfer of religious themes to the modern conception of the individual. This trans-formation is already contained in the Protestant teaching of the two king-doms, according to which it is man's responsibility to structure his life ac-cording to his capacities. Although his faith allows him to enter into the kingdom of God in this world, salvation can only be won through the grace of God in the beyond. The energies directed at self discovery in connection with Luther's question "How can I get a gracious God," and the new com-petencies developed in this process contribute to the emergence of the dif-ferentiated modern individual. For Goethe the union with the divine there-fore no longer takes place through the soul freed from the body, but rather "through the soul as directed by the body...The divine [is] always grasped with the help of the senses and through sensory signs...In place of the conditioning factors of 'earthly suffering,' 'the world' and 'the flesh,' which alienated the soul from its creator and thereby necessarily from it-self, society now steps...Salvation in the beyond, the goal of all striving as predetermined by the religious tradition, is reinterpreted as the realization of the individual nature in this world. Individuality thus continues to be construed as a deviation from general rules and demands. But the value system has been reversed. The general rules and demands have lost their connection with the divine and are henceforth characteristic of the social, *per se* considered to be alienated from the truth. The individual constitutes itself as deviating from it, as divine" (Willems/Willems 1999, p. 337ff).

This development has far reaching consequences. It leads to a differen-tiation of the social and to a sacralization of the individual. At least in Protestantism the focus of religious practice is transferred from the church community to the individual. The *perfecting* of the individual comes to be the program of the Enlightenment. The development and constitution of the self, as well as its education and formation come to be the central tasks

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of the individual. With the focus of the educational process on the individual, the concept of *incorrigibility* as it is repeatedly emphasized by Christianity retreats into the background. The *perfecting of the incorrigible* comes to be the goal of education and personal formation (Wulf 2001; Kamper/Wulf 1994). Whatever stands in its way has to be overcome. The rituals and ritualizations of education and personal formation take over the central position of religious rituals. Human salvation is no longer God's affair but rather the task of education, whose role it is to perfect the individual. Accordingly the rituals and ritualizations in this area becomes especially important. The introduction and realization of *universal, compulsory school attendance* is a crucial step here. As a ritual organization, the educational institution works to effect the worldly improvement of mankind. The focusing of cultivation and education in the earthly kingdom is effected by the state's takeover of school supervision. While religion increasingly becomes the affair of the individual, relegated to the private sphere, school and education in turn become a public matter, finding their expression and representation in rituals and ritualizations (Wulf et. al. 2001).

This transformation is carried out in Wilhelm von Humboldt's *theory of education*. If at first it was a matter of limiting the influence of the Church, now the limits of the power of the state in the educating of the individual are thematized. The determining of the individual from the outside, allowing him only minimal possibilities to determine himself, infringe upon the *indeterminate educability* of every individual, each of whom carries the responsibility for his own creative development. The purpose of human life is seen as the *"highest proportioned formation of one's strengths into a whole."* *"Freedom* is the first and indispensable requirement for this education. But apart from freedom the development of human strengths requires something else, closely related to freedom, namely a *diversity* of situations. Even the freest and most independent person achieves only a low level of maturity when placed in monotonous conditions." (Humboldt 1960, vol. I, p.64). "Highest formation" does not mean high, universally binding educational norms, which the individual must come to embody. Nor does "proportioned formation" mean universally binding proportions of educational content. Rather the individual must be granted the freedom to determine his educational processes himself, and the diversity and variety of these processes must be promoted. For this the internal nature of man requires an exterior. Human thought and action can only develop as it

acts on a "not-human", i.e. on the *world*. Only through work on an exterior can the restlessness given by energetic human nature find peace and an "internal improvement and refinement." Education means "the conjoining of our selves with the world into the most general, lively and free interaction" (Humboldt 1960, p. 235).

A connection with God has come to be replaced by the task of conjoining the self with the world in a free and lively interaction. If it was once the *"imitatio Christi"*, it is now the *mimetic appropriation of the world* and the mimetic relationship to the self, *self-mimesis*, which play a central role in the constitution of educational processes. With the help of mimetic processes an expansion of the individual into the outside world and an increasing conformity to the world takes place (Gebauer/Wulf 1992, 1998). This conformity to worlds outside of the individual leads to the development of the outward oriented energies characteristic of human life. In Humboldt's understanding the structuring of the outside is at the same time a structuring of the inside. Insofar as education aims not at power but at the formation of the strengths of the individual in an encounter with the outside world, it is mimetic. In an increasing conformity to outside worlds, mimetic processes lead to the appropriation of the foreign. This causes the outside world to become the inner world. The outside world is transferred onto images which are incorporated into the inner image world of the individual. It is through this mimetic conjoining that the individual opens up the world for himself and is at the same time opened by the world. These educational processes, centered on the individual in this world, are open-ended in principle. A further step toward the self-empowerment of the individual, a belief in oneself and one's potential, lies in what Humboldt already recognized as the necessity of *self-mimesis*. Without mimetic processes directed at oneself, self-formation and self-reflection of the individual are not possible. Only with the help of self-mimesis is a "higher perfection" of the self possible (Wulf 2001).

A differentiation of societal sectors, institutions and organizations goes hand in hand with a turn to the earthly realm and to the individual. Religion and rituals undergo a transformation in these processes. With the turn of religion to the world, the sacred character of rituals diminishes. Many of them no longer have a claim to universal validity and instead acquire a specificity of region and sector. This is true both for their staging and performance characteristics, as well as for their performativity (Willems/Jurga 1998; Wulf/Göhlich/Zirfas 2001). Rituals gain meaning as stagings of the

social. Their performative quality produces communities, whose roots are no longer in religion. Nietzsche's reference to the death of God conceptualizes the new situation of a "society without baldachin" (Soeffner 2000). The expansion and pluralization of business, politics, law and administration require an increase in individualization. The diversification of spheres brings about a growth in their *complexity* and thereby a demand for the education and competency of individuals. So on one hand industrialization and globalization contribute to the development of individuals, while on the other hand only the education and development of individuals make industrialization and globalization possible. The individualization of belief leads to a belief in individualization. In reference to society and the individual the developmental dynamic is thereby transferred to *this world*. One no longer has to wait for the beyond to live a life in paradise; rather, these conditions can potentially be realized in this world. This would seem to result in a regression of transcendence experiences, what is rather observed are new forms of *secular piety* (Plessner). This includes the sacralization of the subject (Wünsche 1997) and with it, the growing interest in therapy. The *sacralization of the individual* means that the expectations that were once placed on God are now levied on man.

While religion and the Church once played the role of treating questions of life and meaning, the Church today shares this task with many other institutions. Included are the diversified educational institutions, the therapy and counseling organizations, but also literature and art as well as the ubiquitous new media. These institutions and organizations offer clarifications on the place of man in the world, and answers to questions of love, happiness, suffering and death. They impart direction and standards for feelings, attitudes and actions. With their new techniques they communicate new images of the world and humankind. What they almost all have in common is their focus on the individual and their claim to be helping him in resolving his career and family problems. Even for those institutions and organizations who do not fend off questions relating to the beyond, it becomes clear that there is a lack of competence for questions of transcendence. Accordingly the educational, therapeutic and counseling institutions treat problems in such a way that they correspond with the earthly orientation of these institutions. So on one hand they step into the place of sermon, confession and pastoral care, while on the other hand leaving aside the dimensions of death, the beyond and salvation. These fundamental questions tend to be replaced and displaced by concerns of

life structuring, so that a focus on the individual as located in this world is maintained.

With this rejection of the "great transcendence" the *here and now* comes to be the center of attention, along with efforts towards an "*inner-wordly salvation.*" No longer essential are the insight into guilt, the need for repentance and a trust in the grace of God, but instead the overcoming of alienation, the development of freedom and autonomy, as well as the working out of a wide variety of life styles. As a *manager of himself,* the individual belongs to many different living environments at once; he has to relate these to each other and design, organize and realize his life in accordance with them. The Christian religion loses her public character with this development. The uniform Christian world view with its closed cosmology and anthropology irretrievably breaks apart. Christianity enters into competition with other religions as well as with political and scientific world views. Religion becomes an *option* for the individual. Christianity thereby becomes a commodity in the *market of religions, world views and faiths,* amongst which an individual can choose. Instead of encountering a monopoly of truth in the Christian churches, the individual is confronted with a *religious pluralism,* one the one hand making him feel insecure, on the other feeding his fantasies of omnipotence. If man was once born into a religion, a culture, a language and a living environment, which he was normally unable to leave, the *sacralization of the individual* encourages the idea that he can now determine the cultural and social foundations of his individual life (Hahn 2000). No longer is it God who chooses man, but man who chooses God and a religion. Religion becomes a segment of human experience, no longer staking a claim to a complete framing of individual life or a complete characterization of man. Instead the individual assembles a patchwork rug of world views and final perspectives, so that the expression "patchwork identity" becomes appropriate.

With religion and Christianity's decline of significance and the loss of a Christian concept of the beyond for more and more people in the present-day industrial world, the Christian religion is losing her universal character and her visibility. Christianity is becoming an "invisible religion" (Luckmann 1991). Only on a few days a year and at certain moments in an individual life, especially during the Christmas season, at births, weddings and funerals, does the Christian religion become visible again for a short period, only to then retreat into the background again. Religion is visible in the great religious rituals, whose stagings and performances bring about

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the participation of the individual in traditional, collective arrangements. This is true for the religious festivals and celebrations, whose success is made possible by their ritual character. The performance of such rituals leads to a performative production of communities (Wulf et. al. 2001). With the bodily performance of the rituals, with their iteration, a self-affirmation of the celebrating community takes place, be it of a communal Christmas celebration or a party of mourners at a funeral. The differences between the participants in the ritual are worked out in the stagings and performances, helping to create a community. In such cases, religion offers the opportunity, serves as an invitation, to ritually come together in the name of God. Moments of intensified experience take place, differentiating themselves from everyday life, inscribing themselves in the memory and demanding for repetition.

The individual's turn to the earthly realm, the becoming invisible of religion, the differentiation of spheres and the need to live in heterogeneous worlds brings about the loss of meaning for monolithic, all-embracing rituals. In the state, in society, in politics and business, these *macro-rituals* become less important. They are replaced by smaller rituals, which are to some degree specific to their sphere. Depending upon the various institutions, organizations and societal areas they belong to, these rituals change and become more specific, reaching fewer people as a result. Insofar as most contemporary people live in many different segments of society, they participate in very heterogeneous rituals and ritualizations, many of which are familiar and valid to only one particular field of experience. Such partial rituals include the rituals of science, which help to produce knowledge, or the rituals of leisure, where the ability to move is a prerequisite for participation. With the differentiation of religion and other areas of society, the intensified nature and visibility of rituals diminishes, but not their meaning. This development also involves a diversification and differentiation of the rituals themselves. Like Christianity, many rituals have lost their visibility, but not their role for the all the more pressing task posed to the individual – that of producing partial communities. With the diminishing of the monopolizing status of religion and her rituals, a development of diverse rituals takes place, only valid in a limited context, and constituting these contexts in turn.

As many partial religions and world views have come to replace the Christian religion (Hohner/Kurt/Reichertz 1999), so the ritual guidance and production of meaning no longer takes place in a few visible, all-em-

bracing rituals, but rather in multiple, context-specific partial rituals. Individuals have a relatively wide range of flexibility in constructing these rituals, and they serve to overcome the diversity of their various living spheres and to relate them to each other. As the role of religion has changed throughout history, so have rituals. In both cases this has to do with the changing status of the individual. In the case of religion the individual chooses whatever is appropriate for his lifestyle; in the case of ritual it is no different. Here too the individual has an unprecedented freedom to modify, repeal or redesign the rituals. Just as in the religious realm, this occurs much less than is possible. In the same way that the individual can, in principle, choose his religion and world view, he can to a large degree also choose what ritual forms he wants to live with and how he wants to construct them. This theoretical freedom is however significantly limited due to the subordinate role played by rational and reflexive knowledge in both religion and ritual. Instead a practical knowledge gained in mimetic processes determines the participation in religion and ritual, and limits the choices of action more significantly than the myth of the autonomous, entrepreneur-like individual will admit. The diminished visibility of religion and ritual does not mean that they no longer play a role for individuals and society, but is merely an indication that profound changes in the religious sphere have taken place, requiring further study.

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Jörg Zirfas

Morals, Education and Culture

Outline of an Ethic of Education

At the centre of an ethic of education lies the question of the moral foundation of educational reflection and action. Traditionally speaking, ethics can be defined as the proving and establishing of rules, values and norms in terms of a common moral base. In this sense ethics is a discipline of reciprocal consultation about morals.

An ethic of formation and education is a moralistic heuristic of pedagogical reflections and actions combining very different tasks: the description of situations and discussion of moral decisions and alternative ways of acting, the explanation of motivations and moralistic venting of concrete pedagogical reflections and actions. The purpose of an ethic of formation and education is to provide other people with the reasons and consequences of a specific kind of moral.

At the centre of the moral pedagogical ideas of the modern age is the problem of autonomy. However formation and education are defined, every definition has to do with the intentional development of human beings, as being able to work *themselves* on their conditions of formation and education. The fact that education should be moral is here a trivial imperative. Indeed, education can be seen as always dealing with morals, for even an anti-authoritarian education is a kind of moral education and thus we may always question the ethical foundations of a particular educational approach. To speak of education is therefore to presume a level of directive moral values and norms of education. The idea of education is used to legitimate pedagogical action. Every form of education necessarily differentiates between good and bad and describes a disposition X as the moral aim of formation. (Moral-) education relates to the world of morality in three ways: a) insofar as morality is its theme, b) insofar as morality is its intention and c) insofar as morality is connected to the practice of (moral) education. In these relations moral education is contingent with regard to a) its attempt to initiate moral meanings and differentiations, b) the negotiations of moral principles and obligations and c) the teaching of universal ethical standards which enable a critical attitude. It seems that the only way for

education is to teach ethics in a way that reflects our world of morals in the light of universalisable moral ideas and concepts that mediate between the individual and the global sphere.

The last point relates to the specific problem of an intercultural ethic. This calls for a questioning of the conditions and possibilities of a world ethos, for the range, the legitimation and the establishing of human rights, for the local cultural perspective of global (political, economical, ecological, technological etc.) problems or for the problems of locality, difference, alterity, universality and universability.

In this paper I would like to discuss four questions. Firstly: In what way could it be possible to build a structure for an ethic of formation and education, or put differently, what are the relations in which education can be seen as moralistic in the history of education? Secondly: What problems and paradoxes derive from the circumstances of the modern age? Thirdly: What pedagogical consequences can be drawn to deal with the problems of an ethic of formation and education? And finally: How can the connection between moral localism and moral universalism be described? Here I would like to discuss a dialectical-ethical relationship in reconstructing the differences of local ethics on the background of universal moral validity claims and vice versa these validity claims by means of recognition through local ethics. With regard to the moral foundations and implications of neo-racism, basic human rights, the debate surrounding moral pluralism, and intercultural education, it seems evident to me that ethics evokes reciprocal and symmetrical recognition as a regulative idea, which stresses the principles of self respect and justice (Zirfas 1999a).

1. Relations between ethics and education

Looking into the moral foundation of education we find in the history of pedagogy four normative positions: a theological position, a social-political position, an anthropological position and a view of autonomy.

The oldest concept is the theological one. But this position raises many questions: Can ethics be legitimate in a moral sense only if we have recourse to God's will? Or is the theological faith a motivation for moral behaviour? And with regard to the problems of education: If we prefer a theological ethic is there any possibility for the education of obedience towards the sovereign will of God or is it possible to accuse God in the name of moral principles? What kind of principle is ultimate, that of God or of

some moral standards? If we say that God is the last answer for moral questions, then we have the relation: Something is good because it depends on God's will. The inverse relation that God's will must depend on something good implies the idea that there is an independent theological moral principle which prevails over God's will. In this sense morality cannot be founded theologically. For when we try to legitimate values and norms in a theological way we are faced with the alternative between dogmatism and decisionism (Plato 1983).

The second position is the social-political one. Communities understand their moral and their idea of a good life as coming from their traditions or from a "natural" relationship. Morality must be supported by and incorporated into education and socialisation without therefore the repressive and authoritarian character of some communities being reflected upon or called into question. Yet no community or society may guarantee *per se* the right morals or the right attitudes which people are expected to abide by. For, indeed, communities are generally not defined through a balance of rights and obligations, but through a system of dependency which is determined by personal or structural hierarchies. Here we can see how important the idea of autonomy is. Autonomy is a moral principle which allows one to criticize the rules of communities in the name of a universal idea of justice on the one hand, and with the idea of singularity on the other (Walzer 1996).

Every ethical system is anthropological because human beings are both the producers and the recipients of ethics. In the history of pedagogy, Rousseau's idea was to legitimate education from an anthropological basis (Rousseau 1990). His main principle is that the natural human being is good. And the pedagogical consequence of this optimistic anthropology is that a good child will develop into a good man in a good environment, especially in a good society. But today we have lost faith in the goodness of human nature. And so we must ask in what respect anthropological perceptions can be relevant for ethical discussions. Three problems arise here: Firstly, if we identify ethics with an anthropology we face the problem of contracting the practical educational relation because ethical reflections are not directly connected with educational practice; and what's more, anthropology does not have a genuine orientation on pedagogical problems. The second point is that anthropology often has metaphysical, philosophical or theological implications that restrict the scientific nature of its approaches and functions. And in a third sense, anthropology is a very doubtful funda-

ment for ethics because reflection on the human nature as a source of understanding and as a normative criterion can be seen as a naturalistic fallacy. There is a gap between "is" and "ought".

In the modern age the idea of practical reason is strongly oriented towards the individual. Here we find Kant's concept of the autonomy of will; autonomy means the possibility and the duty for human beings to define themselves as reasonable individuals. The principle of autonomy is the categorical imperative which shows that autonomy as a principle of moral reflection and action is not monological but general in its structural reference to a quantity or a universality of reasonable subjects (Kant 1980). The categorical imperative which says, I can and ought to always apply the maxims of my every action to the principle of a general moral law is therefore the recognition of an general perspective which looks out for the autonomy of others. But from this moral principle of autonomy the problem of a moral education derives: We are responsible for the formation of a moral system which is characterized by autonomy based on heteronymous methods – namely education. So the practical paradox of modern pedagogy is that education is based morally on the freedom and the independence of human beings but that this foundation seems to forbid any kind of educational influence. However, following Kant we have the statement that every man needs education and that our education is ethically right, if we a) discipline the naturally aggressive forces; if we b) cultivate children through instruction and information; if we c) civilize people towards a practical social behaviour; and finally d) if, through education, we moralize children to do the good for its own sake, which means following the categorical imperative. Autonomy is thus the ethical regulative of education, and cooperative self-action its constitutive element (Kant 1982).

2. The problems of a modern ethic of formation and education

Current ethical theories of moral formation and education discuss three problems: the asymmetry between educator and pupil, individualism, and the pluralistic universe of morals (c.f. Oelkers 1992).

An ethic of education is always the ethic of an asymmetry. Asymmetry is the pedagogical basis of any ethic of education and therefore its fundamental moral problem, because with asymmetry the ethic of education stands outside the mainstream of moral tradition, which defines as a general ethic an ethic of symmetry. This ethic presupposes that an object of

morality may only be an autonomous subject; the core of this tradition of ethics is the complete symmetrical relationship of recognition. Ethics are here founded on the regulative principle of a reciprocal and symmetric recognition of the autonomy of the other. Compared to this idea, in education and training practices we find differences of theoretical knowledge, power and control, differences in the practical possibilities of action and experience, in authority and dependency and in moral competence. In short: asymmetries play an enormous role in education and indeed they must play this role if education is to be a kind of influence, introduction or presentation. In this sense education is always closely connected to the problem of paternalism. And this problem becomes all the more difficult when it is clear that the objects of pedagogical responsibility are not able to fulfil the necessary presuppositions for a symmetrical position like in the case of people with serious disabilities.

In the age of reason the idea of individual happiness took on pedagogical relevance. The question now is whether pedagogy must necessarily secure the freedom and happiness of a child? Is it possible to obtain this obligation in education and should education try to secure a person's happiness against his will? If the pursuit of happiness is recognized as an important anthropological fact we must question its moral legitimation as well as the conditions and implications of happiness. Does the pursuit of happiness require that one evaluate all public institutions and social activities – including pedagogy – in terms of their respective contributions to human happiness? To what extent must education be measured in relation to the norm of individual happiness? In these discussions the form and content of individual happiness is always related to intersubjective moral rules and norms. On the other hand, education finds its moral border when faced with an individual who instrumentalises himself or others for his individual aims. Here we may speak of a lack of moral sense (Bentham 1970; Bien 1973).

Disregarding ethical reflections, pluralism can be described from many perspectives: a) as a descriptive form of phenomenology as a description of the reality; b) as the relativising of ethnology which makes a valuation between moral systems impossible; c) as a sort of behaviour, a "pluralistic temperament" or an "attitude of orientation" (James), as a "pragmatic ethos" (Bernstein), or a specific acting with pluralism and diversity; d) as a meta-theory, as a consequent pluralism, a theory which relativises pluralism itself to the idea that pluralism is not the main standpoint but merely one amongst others in moral discussions (Heyting/Tenorth 1994). In an-

other sense pluralism is a normative theory if it asks for moralistic plurality, if it refuses a general orientation on universal norms and if it criticizes the implications and obligations of such universal ethics. Pluralism is here no longer the end of morals, but merely a form of formation and, as such, of value to the extent that it can be used to describe the differences and antagonism between morals in a way that shows the boundaries, possibilities and connections between different kinds of morals. Thus, pluralism as a moral attitude shows the *transversalities* between moral approaches. If we connect this attitude with the idea of formation we arrive at a universal concept of reciprocal and symmetric recognition. In this concept one's own autonomy is connected with the autonomies of other moral positions: to deny the autonomy of the other is to deny my own autonomy.

3. On the ethics of reciprocal and symmetric recognition

In this section, I would like to discuss four ethical perspectives as possibilities for legitimating educational reflections and actions: moral responsibility, empathy, self respect and justice.

If the educator takes responsibility for his pupil in relation to a specific moral idea he will always educate in the form of a representation, or what we may call, in the form of an "advocative ethic" (Brumlik 1992). Educational responsibility as a responsibility for the other is genuinely not symmetrical and genuinely not reciprocal because it is conceived as a one-sided obligation. The responsibility is therefore representative for the legitimation of education. However, the central problem of an ethic of educational responsibility regards the content of, the instance for and – most centrally – the criterion related to responsibility. What is the essence of educational responsibility, in relation to whom or what must the teacher accept responsibility and in what form should he act? Is there a different kind of educational responsibility which differs from others forms of responsibility? How can I justify the basis of educational responsibility – in the form of an ethic or in the form of practical consequences? And finally: When does educational responsibility start and when does it end? (Apel 1990)

Starting point of an ethic of empathy is the empirical fact that people sympathize with those who are suffering. And they sympathize, according to Hume, because they are themselves able to suffer their own pain – and so they identify with other people's suffering. However, with Kant we may question the purity of the empathetic motivation. And with Nietzsche an-

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other thesis is suggested: that empathy derives not from sympathetic compassion but from individual lust. Insofar as this may be true there must be forms of wrong empathy and, if we go a step further: we never have enough empathy. Who should be the object of empathy? Where are its borders? How exactly should I sympathize? When may empathy turn into paternalism, or into the passionate love of educators? And why should I not argue that I myself am the most indigent of all people – and that everyone should empathize with me? (Schopenhauer 1981)

Self-respect is not a genuine moral principle if we understand it as self-loyalty or as self-government towards a succeeded or happy life. But self-respect has a moral form as the representation of the ethical principle of autonomy. Self-respect is a dual moral relation which mediates the individual recognition with the social structure of recognition. The individual respects him/herself in the light of common values and the public respects the individual for this form of self-recognition. Self-respect is an attitude which concerns the individual being as a human: he/she becomes moral if he/she tends towards reciprocal moral values, towards a common theory of an autonomous good life. Only if I respect the other in his dignity and as constituting an end in himself I can respect his autonomy with regard to moral rules, which also confirms my own self-respect. For indeed, human beings do not want to be respected for accidental, arbitrary attributes and neither do they want to be respected by amoral persons. Self-respect is a regulative principle of a symmetric ethic of recognition. This kind of ethic has the following analytical implications: a) moral judgements are related to the whole person; b) the moral self-respect which is mediated through others must be symmetric and c) this symmetry is related to objective moral values which enable people to respect each other in a reciprocal manner (Tugendhat 1993; Walzer 1994).

From a formal perspective the idea of justice demands to treat equality equally and inequality unequally. Here I will show that a theory of justice is related to a theory of self-respect. Educational institutions are just if they practice a moral system which enables everyone to constitute self-respect. These reflections of a theory of justice can be concluded in three moral norms: 1: Respect yourself in such a way that you do not lose your self-respect relating to others; 2. Respect the self-respect of others in such a way that you do not prejudice their self-respect and 3. Respect the self-respect of others in such a way that everyone is given the chance to relate his self-respect to others. A theory of justice which goes in this direction is the the-

ory of justice by John Rawls (1991). Here we find self-respect in two senses: Through self-respect man gets a feeling of self-value which corresponds to his concepts of a good life and the respective individual theories of the good with the certainty of a self-value. And secondly, self-respect brings trust in man's abilities to carry out plans and ideas. If we take self-respect as the regulative principle of an ethic of formation and education we must ask how this central value is to be constituted in just pedagogical institutions. These institutions would be just, or as Rawls would be say, fair, if they followed two principles, which people have chosen in a – virtual – initial situation: the first principle requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties (the principle of freedom), and the second holds that inequalities are just or fair only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged (the principle of difference). The moral idea of justice is not only related to that which is good for all in a like manner, but also to that which is good for the individual in his/her singularity.

The moral principle of a reciprocal symmetric recognition is a mediating principle which relates the substance validity of particularistic moral statements to a universalistic and formal approach to morals. This ethic of recognition cannot thereby claim an absolute validity itself because this ethic is a mediating one. If formation and education were to follow this ethic of recognition self-respect and justice would be their regulative principles. While self-respect is connected with the problem of understanding oneself as a moral human being in view of a pluralism of morals, the theory of justice is connected with the problem of a good life for all and everyone. At the centre of an ethic of reciprocal and symmetric recognition there does not stand the orientation towards a discourse of rationality, agreement and consensuality (Habermas), but towards the individual, systematic and institutional possibilities of damage and violation of self-respect. In this sense it is important to see that in an ethic of reciprocal symmetric recognition one should do justice in education to the self respect of others but also create objectively fair conditions which make self-respect practicable for everyone. In an ethic of recognition we have the obligation to a reciprocal respect of our singularity and otherness. And we have the obligation to work out educational possibilities of reversibility and solidarity in view of commonly shared ideas of values. In an ethic of reciprocal symmetric recognition people, formation and education should be directed towards cognitive, emotional and motivational institutions of justice.

4. Problems of an intercultural ethic: globalization, neo-racism and intercultural education

On the background of a reciprocal and symmetric ethic of self respect and justice it firstly seems to be important for an intercultural view to reflect moral problems and conflicts which depend on the interface of locality and globality. However, the dialectics of globalization can be seen in many ways, not only in the tension between the global and the local. One can differentiate globalization from above, which means a process that primarily affects the elites of special nations or across national contexts, from a globalization from below as a popular process (Appadurai 1997; Burbeles 1999). Thus, one can speak of dualities in the sense of the economic and the cultural dimension or of the trend to homogenization and the trend to the increasing contact of different cultures; one can differentiate between the globalization as a material process (migration, techniques, mass media, capitalism etc.) or a discursive effect. And finally, one can speak of good globalization or of bad or unjust globalization: pre-globalization or anti-globalization.

In this sense we should develop our possibilities of awareness for the potential of conflicts in these interfaces: For example, wars are not only the expression of a global crisis between different state interests, or not the fighting act between states and a group of "international terrorists", but also concrete acts, involving violence and harm to people and to that extent violations against the human rights. Ethics must discuss concrete conflicts or religion, identity, values, norms and ideas of a good life for people – all over the world. Indeed, it must reflect the ambivalences, complexity, and flexibility towards the main values, the practical norms and the moral attitudes, which are necessary for the relationship between local moral and global perspectives, for *intra-* and *intercultural* problems. Thus we see that there is no "real", holistic, homogeneous moral of "the" west, which can be compared to something similar or different from "the" east. Ethics can sensitize us to questions of authenticity, homogeneity and naturality, to questions of a persuasive and practical essentialism or to the ontological and strategic uses of binarism (Bauman 1995; Herzfeld 1997).

Ethics must strive to reveal local differences and the concrete realisations of problems and differences of action in a political, intercultural or transnational context. For, there must be no natural boundaries, no underdogs, no enemies or strangers to ethical discourse. The establishment of a "cosmopolitan solidarity" (Habermas) or a "contextual universalism"

(Beck) can only be realised *through* the mediation of a local, content moral with a universalisable, formal ethic, a meditation, which should be connected with the moral programme of human rights. Such an ethic is dialectical, processual and oriented to application. The moral principles of such an ethic of mediation are the regulative principles of self respect and justice, which stress the idea of trying to understand the other in his own language.

The importance of this ethic can be seen and the necessity of mediation is evident, whenever we try to solve a local problem in global terms, which means stepping beyond particular interests and morals. In such cases one is forced to recur to a reciprocal recognized basis of values and norms. If under modern societies we understand an institutionalized public sphere, which recognizes the human and community differences, so these societies are susceptible to racist discourse – less according to biological theories, but by operating with arguments according to cultural diversity. In recent times there has been a shift in neo-racist discourses from the idea of race to the idea of culture, from heteronomy to intercultural variation, from heterophobic to heterophilic arguments and from a direct and declared to a symbolic and indirect form of racism. We can see that most racist arguments are couched in terms of cultural identity and national boundaries and that racists don't use the idea of biological inferiority of groups (Anthias 1997). Is the term "culture" perhaps becoming an ideological form for racism? Is culture only a compensating legitimating idea for the (lost) good community? How are we to criticise neo-racism if it emphasizes the moments of difference, equivalence and incommensurability of cultures – moments, which are also important for an ethic of recognition? Are neo-racists perhaps in fact "real" multiculturalists, because they stress cultural reproduction and enclavisation and refuse the processes of cultural penetration and hybridity – processes, which tends towards homogenization (Goldberg 1994)?

In order to criticize racism, we may criticize the connection between a "biological nature" and social and moral attitudes according to this nature, which represents the inferiority of special groups and legitimizes a specific set of acting like marginalisation, discrimination and oppression. From the standpoint of an ethic of recognition it would seem to be wrong that neo-racism forces an implicit universalism insofar as the (re-)production of its own racist community is thought to be exclusive and infinitely good. In this ethical view racism is a paradoxical construction: It is structured through an

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aporia by which it emphasizes a universal demand for the recognition of differences; but the demand could not be legitimized through as racist particularism, which is only able to prove values and norms in terms of its own criteria. On the other hand: A moralistic particularism in a strong sense, which accentuates the integrity of a "thick" moral form of life (Walzer), presumes an ethic of reciprocal recognition, because this ethic "guarantees" the recognition of differences and limits the range of specific particularistic moral systems. The neo-racist recourse to a moral of cultural autonomy needs a set-over-moral, which is able to criticise the particularistic approaches, and only a universalisable moral leads not to the awareness and recognition of differences but such an ethic brings about their possibilities.

So intercultural (moral) education becomes a permanent de-centration which – due to the reciprocal local-global relationship – makes possible moral development, on the one hand, and requires the other's ethics as part of one's own ethics, on the other. An intercultural education based on this ethic of recognition has to show the contingence, the possibilities and the variabilities of a specific moral standpoint, so that the pluralism of morals may be an enrichment in a person's learning process of morals. Although intercultural education has to deal with the problems of the incommensurability and irreducibility of morals – education should try to work out a model of moral learning, which is based on a process to a more common, more reflexive and more differentiated form of interchangeable recognition (UNESCO 1997). Therefore we can see the first affords to build up a theory of intercultural education on the background of the human rights (Abou 1995). Project number 7 of the European council, *L'éducation et le développement culturel des migrants*, directed by Louis Porcher, can be seen as a basis for this model of education. The project's 1986 results define "quatre éléments de l'interculturel": "a) la plupart de nos sociétés sont devenues multiculturelles et les seront de plus en plus; b) chaque culture a ses spécificités, comme telles respectables; c) le multiculturalisme est potentiellement une richesse; d) pour qu'il le devienne concrètement, il faut instaurer une interpénétration entre toutes les cultures sans gommer l'identité spécifique de chacune d'entre elles, mettre le multiculturel en mouvement pour le transformer véritablement en interculturel, avec tout le dynamisme que celui-ci implique (en termes de communication et d'interaction notamment)" (Conseil de l'Europe: Allemann-Ghionda 1992, S. 142).

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Birgit Althans

The Use of Culture in Education – From Shared Meanings to Contest and Competition

In terms of desire – Mary Parker Follett's approach to the difference between management and education theory

"The use of culture in education" sounds quite familiar to German education theorists. Eduard Spranger, an exponent of Dilthey's "Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik," published a book titled "Culture and Education" in 1928 in which he presented his ideas on culture as "objective spirit," produced by mankind which ought to be transferred to the "subjective spirit" of the individual, youth, or child. Education, or "Bildung," transports this process of absorption and distribution. From our point of view, Spranger's comments on culture and education appear to be deeply influenced by two strong traditions in Germany. On the one hand, he supports national education of the individual for the benefit of the state and, on the other hand, a concept of German culture as something original, tribal, and deep-rooted yet highly sophisticated, which has to be learned from the cradle. As Terry Eagleton points out in "The Idea of Culture" (2000), the romantic and idealistic German traditions of "culture" as "way of life" were formed in opposition to universalistic approaches of the Enlightenment, as vital counterpart to rationalism, closer to "primitive cultures" than to "civilized" societies (Eagleton 2001: 21f.). Even if these romantic traditions of culture seem favoured, a pluralism of cultures and different ways of life, the result of German education during the 1920s and 1930s, rouses a bad taste – the outcome was fascism.

Current education theory in Germany still struggles with different concepts of "culture", "ethnicity", and "difference" with concepts of the "other" and the "stranger" or "foreigner". As Marianne Krüger-Potratz (1999) argues, education theory seems to recognize "cultural difference" above all in the context of disadvantage, handicap and as a problem of minorities. This perception of cultural difference (such as migration, gender, or mental and bodily handicaps) as imperfection has created new fields and

disciplines in education theories, including intercultural education, gender studies, and disability studies. These new disciplines seem to rely on upholding a notion of difference, but their goals of "education as the integration of difference" are challenged by opposing approaches to dealing with difference which are all included in the German word "Aufhebung": to keep and hold on to difference or to compensate and neutralise difference through education. Dieter Lenzen (1999) points out that, even on a European level, the idea of social and cultural integration through education is dominated by a strong idealism. But from a systemic approach, education theory can only share the idea of systemic integration but has to separate the idea from its essential practice which means observing the action and communication of social integration and disintegration. Educational and political practice shows that some minorities in Europe reject integration into a political system and tend to defend their distinctive traits – their signs of disintegration – as a major part of individual identity and culture. This rejection can be read from a post-structuralist point of view or from the perspective of historical anthropology as desire: those minorities demand not only recognition; they desire recognition of their (different) desires. On the other hand the process of European unification suffers from being based solely on economic, legal, and monetary issues. People have had to realize that social and cultural integration means compromise and loss of habits, routines, money, privileges, control, and individuality. So the idea of collective surplus through social integration of other cultures is widely rejected. Perception of fear and the irritating experience of otherness and strangeness lie beyond consciousness. Training in self-reflection to confront these bodily and sensuous processes, and dealing with different desires – perhaps a new method in education – is necessary.

This paper aims to present a classic thinker in management and organisation theory who dealt with cultural differences, desires and conflicts in a constructive way: the early American political scientist, philosopher, social worker, and management reformer Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933). In management and organisation theory, her work is considered "classic." She was recently praised as a "prophet of management." But in education theory, her pioneering work in the field of community education and on the group concept is forgotten or neglected. As a female pioneer in early management theory; a cross-border commuter between education theory, social work, and management theory; between German idealistic philosophy and Gestalt-theory and American pragmatism and behaviourism; the life and

work of Mary Parker Follett constitute a good subject for discussion in this workshop – she lived and worked in different cultures. What was so remarkable about this historical female figure is not only her shift from the field of social work to management lecturing, but her successful application of her concepts from community education to management theory. Follett had a very radical interpretation of desire, difference, and conflict. In "The New State," an account of her experiences in the field of social work and a highly noticed book on the group concept, she said, "The first object of getting people together is to make them respond somehow, to overcome inertia. To disagree as well as to agree with people brings you closer to them. I always feel intimate with my enemies. It is not opposition but indifference which separates men." (Follett 1918, 212).

From my point of view, it is especially Follett's relaxed, classical, dialectical position towards different desires which makes her interesting for education theory in the context of "historical anthropology". I attempt to prove this claim in three points: 1) a biographical note to present Follett's work, her experience in the field of social work, and her management lectures in terms of her "field of desire"; 2) the ambivalence of the term "desire" in the humanities; 3) Mary Parker Follett's own use of "desire" in her concept of constructive conflict. In my reconstruction of Follett's theory and practice I focus on her use of the term "desire" and the methodology of "historical anthropology."

1) Management as "creative experience" – Mary Parker Follett's unusual approach to the world of business.

1.a) Starters: small town experiences, philosophy and the study of politics

Mary Parker Follett was born in 1868 in Quincy, Massachusetts and, like many social reformers and progressive intellectuals of that era (Jane Addams, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, Robert E. Park, Josiah Royce), was brought up in and by the intimate community (including social control and gossip) of a small town (Quandt 1970). From very early on, Follett received excellent training in American and German idealism, especially in the philosophy of Fichte. From that early time, Mary Parker Follett's thinking and practice were strongly influenced by Fichte and his "Wissenschaftslehre" in combination with his concept of the subject as

self-creation, as blueprint (*Selbst-Entwurf*) between the spiritual "ego" and the material "not-ego" outer world (*Ich und Nicht-Ich*). As she herself reported in an anecdote, she used Fichte even in her dialogues with businessmen (Follett in Fox/Urwick 1973, xx). She studied history, law, and political science at Harvard's annex for women in 1888 and at Cambridge (UK) in 1890-91 and published her first book, her doctoral thesis, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives*, in 1896.

The book is not only an empirical study on the methods and strategies of politicians to exert influence on the legislative process – it is a study about how power works. Follett focussed on the then inconspicuous figure of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and showed how function and influence of the Speaker changed in different historical contexts and discourses; from being devoted to the King during the Tudor reign and being chosen by "magic" rituals to an increase in influence as Colonial Speaker far away from the House of Commons. In some respects, Follett's analysis appears "structural": she shows the change in significance of the "sign" Speaker (which stays always the same in its function) caused by "gliding of the chain of signifiers". Not only did this book establish Follett as a serious writer in the field of political science, but from Fox/Urwick's point of view, the book "also presents an interesting contrast to her later work, in which she doggedly rejected the techniques of persuasion, compromise, and pressure which normally figure so largely in the legislative process, and shows that her later position did not stem from a naïve lack of appreciation for the way these techniques operate. What happened was that as her experience and thinking advanced, she came to the conclusion that there must be a more effective way of resolving social issues..."(Fox/Urwick 1973, xi).

1. b) Main course: dealing with difference in the field of social work and political reform

Around 1900 Follett moved, like many other women at that time, to the field of social work. She worked with immigrant families in underprivileged areas, in clubs for young boys and men, and, with the Women's Municipal League of Boston, organised school buildings as "evening centres" in order to get young people away from the street and provide them with some sort of training. Between musical groups, dramatic, civic and debating clubs, folk dancing and team games, Follett organised centrally co-ordinated placement programs to find work for her young visitors. Her

committee worked with the Vocation Bureau of Boston, the Children's Welfare League of Roxbury, the Girl's Trade Education League, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and engaged students from Harvard and Radcliffe to investigate job opportunities and working conditions. Follett seemed to be moved by the same spirit as the women's movement and social reformers such as Jane Addams, Florence Kelley and John Dewey in Chicago; but she avoided the patronising atmosphere of the settlement houses. Follett was able to lean on Jane Addams' and her co-workers' brilliant performance of social reform – which is now called "reformance" (Jackson 2001) – and the settlement ideas about the need to translate the perspective of the other for public benefit. She relied more on William James' Psychology and his view on Pragmatism. But she reflected the effect of social work on a philosophical level, like Dewey, and emphasised the potential value of group processes based on her observation of groups in her centres in *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government* (1914). "She noted that people in groups produce results both in thought and action that could not have been produced by any of the participants acting or thinking separately. Each person making his contribution to the process influences the thinking of the others, but in turn is influenced by them so that the final product is not the sum of what each had to offer at the outset, but something new and different from anything the participants could have produced individually." (Fox/Urwick, xv). It is obvious that a lot of her former concepts, such as "co-operation," "integration," "circular response," and "constructive conflict," result from her experience in social service. But at the same time one can see the influence of the contemporary discourse of pragmatism (William James and John Dewey) and sociology (the "ecology" of Park's Chicago School of Sociology and Georg Simmel's concept of "interactivity") on Follett's perception of social phenomena. I agree with James Stevers, who points out that Follett was, in her theory, always balancing between two philosophical traditions or cultures: German idealism and American pragmatism. (Stevers 1986) The process of "self-government," or self-creation (Fichte), which she observed in several groups, convinced her of the resources of constructive social interaction in unresolved social problems which could be used for national and international reform. In *The New State* she formulated the need for scientific research of group psychology and group processes – which she clearly distinguished from popular psychology of the crowd (Le Bon). She promoted from her own practical experience things like "community education" and "pluralism", recent demands in

education theory in Germany and Europe today. Consequently, her evening centres moved more and more toward education for democratic citizenship. "One of the most significant facts of the present day is the demand of we hear on all sides of us for a wider citizenship. For a co-operative activity, for a common life. This demand, the special contribution of our generation to the world is the underlying force of many social movements of to-day. The School or Neighbourhood Centre is one attempt to satisfy this demand; it is one answer to the modern cry for group life as opposed to individual life. This whole movement is an expression of that ideal whose aim is the good of all through the activity of all, by means of the subordination of all. ... This craving for a larger consciousness than that of the individual expresses itself among our boys and girls in the desire of companionship, for recreation, for clubs and associated groups; among the older people in the demand for communal activity, an activity which shall have a common purpose and end as well as a common bond." (Follett 1912: 5f.)

But Follett's observations in social service also taught her the importance of the function of a leader or manager to "cultivate" situations for constructive communication and conflict solving. "I don't know that any one before has tried to define the position of manager of an evening center. I find it a little difficult although the matter is clear in my mind. ... We know that he is not merely the head of a group of club leaders. His relation to the center is organic and vital but just *what* is it. I think the manager is above everything else the link which connects the community with the center, the center with the community. If the center becomes an integral part of the community, and that is the final test of the success of the center, this end will be accomplished by the manager. ... The manager must ask himself. "What is the relation of the center to the neighbourhood? What does it mean to the life of the neighbourhood?" In order to answer this question he must know his neighbourhood well. Every manager should make that his first duty. He must know the needs of the young people of his district; he must know their chief temptations. He must know their aspirations and wishes; whether they care for lectures, whether they could be reached chiefly through athletics or dancing or some other means. He must know the needs of men and women.... Do the women need a common bond which might find its symbol in the center? Is social life their greatest need? Do they wish to learn more in regard to the management of their home? Are they ready to take an interest in municipal affairs? Is it a neighbourhood where the lack of a common language makes music the

chief means of stimulating fellowship and stimulating the common bond? After these and all such questions are answered we must remember that many of these indicate only surface characteristics. After all these things have been discovered the neighbourhood must be studied to find out its underlying forces. In every community there are certain underlying forces which make for righteousness; they differ in different places; they must be got hold of and fostered and nurtured until they come to their full fruition."... (Follett 1912: 12f.)

All her interest in betterment of social life, education, and living conditions in her neighbourhood led her more and more toward the natural enemies of the working class, toward the businessmen.

1 c) The pudding: the world of business as creative experience

All this is written down in her third book, "Creative Experience"(1924). Her growing interest in leadership capacities not only moved her from the academic field of social problems to the field of business, it made her interested in the work of businessmen and, at the same time, made her positions attractive to progressive businessmen. "One of the most interesting things about business to me is that I find so many businessmen who are willing to try experiments. I should like to tell you about two evenings I spent last winter and the contrast between them. I went one evening to a drawing-room meeting where economists and MPs talked of current affairs, of our present difficulties. It all seemed a little vague to me, it did not seem really to come to grips with our problem. The next evening it happened that I went to a dinner of twenty businessmen who were discussing the questions of centralization and decentralization. Each of them had something to add from his own experience of the relation of branch firms to the central office, and the other problems included in the subject. There I found hope for the future. These men were not theorizing or dogmatizing; they were thinking of what they had actually done and they were willing to try new ways in the next morning, so to speak. Business, because it gives us the opportunity of trying new roads, of blazing new trails, because, in short, it is pioneer work in the organized relations of human beings, seems to me to offer as thrilling an experience as going into a new country and building new railroads over new mountains" (Follett 1933 zit n Fox/Urwick 1973, XIX).

Businessmen seemed to give her more than dry academics; they offered her the possibility to change things in an effective way. "The last word in science – in biology – is the principle of unifying as the fundamental principle of life. And now businessmen are finding it is the way to run a successful business. Here the ideal and the practical have joined hands. This is why I am working at business management, because while I care for the ideal, it is only because I want to bring it into our everyday affairs." (Follett 1926, in Fox/Urwick 1973, xiv)

So it was paradoxically her idealistic interest in *practice,* grounded in her personal ethics formed by Aristotle, that led her to find in management and organizational practice – in "dynamic administration" – her final field of desire. Business for her was "Creative Experience" as she described in her book of the same title in 1924. From 1925 to 1932 she was a Member of Henry C. Metcalf's Bureau of Personnel Administration. Her lectures of that time present a very elegant but radical critique of the dominant discourse of scientific management. Mary Parker Follett wanted management to become *more* than a *techné.* She pronounced very early on, in a fine policy of separation from the current ideology of scientific management, the need to train managers scientifically in the "art" of decision-making and leadership. She was open to the possibilities of psychology but critical of the "industrial psychiatrists," especially of some of the bizarre approaches of Elton Mayo (Follett 1928 in Fox/Urwick 1973, 294-302; Althans 2000, 388ff.) In England she was associated with B. Seebohm Rowntree and held a series of lectures for managers and supervisors in Oxford and at the London School of Economics. Mary Parker Follett died in 1933. In my view, she prepared not only the transition in organization theory from scientific management to the human relations movement but from social work and education to management and organization theory as well – an influence in the discourse of education and organizations that needed occasionally to be ignored. The question is: why? My answer is: because of her desire.

2. The ambivalence of desire in the discourse of humanities

Desire has become desirable in the discourse of organizations, as some authors from different points of view have shown (Burell 1992; Fineman 1993; Peters/Watermann 1894, Peters/Austin 1986; Krell/Weiskopf 2000). Manageable desire seems to be a useful and powerful force to create pro-

ductivity and efficiency in the members of organizations, to create "wow-factories" – but desire creates the opposite, the destructive impulse which produces burnt-out members of organizations as well (Krell/Weiskopf 2000, 33). Desire is not easy to handle but it is a desirable force for educational processes – this has been recognised in philosophy and educational theory since Plato. The difference between "appetite" – which can in principle be satisfied – and "desire" – which is an unfulfillable demand – has been a central issue in economics from its beginnings in the early eighteenth century with authors like Mandeville and Defoe (Hirschmann 1977, Althans 2000). Desire encourages us to search for the absolute idea(l) and, at the same time, drives us down to the darkest criminal or sexual action. Foucault (1986) has shown us the difficulties of the pedagogic/pederastic situation in the antique polis where the desire of the body and the "desire to know" in the teacher/student relation were not separated. German idealistic philosophy in the nineteenth century was concerned with the problem of differentiating between the notions of "need," "drive/instinct to know and to form (*Bildungs-Schöpfungstrieb*)," "striving/aspiration (*Streben*)," and "desire" – a problem which Hegel tried to solve in the development of his dialectical system (Kozu 1988). Hegel's best-known description of the ambivalent figure of desire is his so-called "master-servant-paradox," an asymmetrical figure of recognition of the master's desire through the person of the servant, who himself develops a desire to transgress his dependence on the master through his work (as Lacan says, through his knowledge). This model influenced not only American pragmatists, such as George Herbert Mead and his model of social interaction, but, with the "translating/transforming" lectures of Alexandre Kojève in the 1930s, it influenced an important group of French theorists such as Georges Bataille, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jacques Lacan. Kojève translated Hegel's figure of the master-servant-paradox as "the desire of human being [that] always desires the object of the other's desire" and Lacan shortened it to his well-known definition: "desire is always desire of the other." The problem however is that the subject often doesn't know his desire. Sigmund Freud created the psychoanalytical situation in order to reveal the forgotten desire, the lost object of desire, *la cause de désir*, Lacan's *objet a*. The *objet a* can only be found in the field of the other. Freud with his method of psychoanalysis learned a lot about the *cause de désir* by working with female hysteric clients. As Joan Riviere, (one of Freud's patients and his former translator and early female psychoanalyst), pointed out in *Womanliness as Masquerade (1929)*, the woman always had to mask

her desire; and even the masquerade is a tool for recognition of her desire by the other – a position adopted by Jacques Lacan (1958) and Judith Butler (1991).

I believe Mary Parker Follett was moved by both traditions of the reception of desire (pragmatism and psychoanalysis) when she formulated her concept of desire.

3. Mary Parker Follett's use of desire in her concept of constructive conflict

Mary Parker Follett's concept of constructive conflict has had a lot of influence not only on organizational practice but on the practice and theory of negotiations and dispute resolution (Kolb/Jensen/Shannon). One can find her principles at work in the Harvard best-seller by Fisher/Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiation Agreements without Giving* (1991), although obviously without any reference. Conflict or dispute was for Follett a "creative experience," a possibility to create a new situation with her method of integration. Her main – and in my opinion very radical – aim was to give up any idea of domination and compromise. "...compromise we understand well, for it is the way we settle most of our controversies, each side gives up a little in order to have peace, or to speak more accurately, in order that the activity which has been interrupted by the conflict may go on. Compromise is the basis of trade union tactics. ... Compromise does not create, it deals with what already exists; integration creates something new." (Follett 1925, Fox/Urwick 1973, 6).

Exercise

To make Follett's distinction between compromise and integration clear, I developed together with Bernhard Mumm, who teaches the Feldenkrais method in Berlin, an exercise to show the difference on a bodily level.

Find a partner and create a confrontation face-to-face. That is, hold your arms and hands closed like a ring in front of your tummy and claim an area in front of your body as "your own" which has to be defended. Try to expand your own territory by pressing and pushing. The other does the same. The pressure of the other moves me to become clear about the strength of my own desire. It becomes evident as well that this situation could last forever. If I look for an outcome of the conflict and give way to

the pressure and the dominance of the other in giving up my own desire and pressure – like a lot of young people used to do in the practice of social work by "hanging up" – I will find that we both are suddenly far too close to each other and lose our latitude. We stand nose to nose and look silly. We arrive at the same uncomfortable situation in the case of conflict resolution with compromise. If I reduce my desire, the other comes too close and reduces my area. I do the same on his side. If I choose integration, I have to find another solution to deal with the pressure. I can open up my expanding/defending position briefly to the pressure coming from the other side and can give way to it without leaving my position. I can just let my foot turn, let the other change my point of view, let me become moved by his desire, his pressure and energy without giving up a centimetre of my position. With integration of the desire of the other, I got a new point of view, a new perspective without giving in. The conflict became constructive, to speak again in Follett's terms.

For Follett friction should be set to work, to do something. With just a compromise, non-integrated conflicts or differences threaten to become pathological; they tend to "come up and up again in some other form, for in compromise we give up part of our desire, and because we shall not be content to rest there, sometimes we shall try to get the whole of our desire. Watch industrial controversy, watch international controversy, and see how often this occurs." (idem) The analysis of hidden desire in hidden conflicts was her first aim in business. "A business should be so organized (this is one of the tests for us to apply for your organization) that full opportunity is given in any conflict, in any coming together of different desires, for the whole field of desire should be viewed. Our employees should be able to see, as we should be able to see, the whole field of desire. The *field of desire* is an important psychological and sociological conception; many conflicts could, I believe, be prevented from ending disastrously by getting the desires of each side into one field of vision where they could be viewed together and compared. We all believe to a certain extent in Freud's "sublimation," but I believe still more that various desires get orientated toward one another and take on different values in the process of orientation" (Follett 1925 in Fox/Urwick 1973, 10). No repression of desire for Follett. To find out the whole field of desire may sound radical, but it works: the request "to find out what is behind the option," to find the "real," the "hidden" interest behind an option in a negotiation process, can still be found as a main part of the negotiation programme

currently taught at Harvard as instruction for lawyers (Fisher/Ury 1991; Kolb 2001).

But what makes Follett's use of the term desire sound so different from the use in current discourse concerning the useful force of emotions? I think it is, on the one hand, a relation to the philosophical tradition which turns up in her dialectical use of the term desire which she borrowed from Heraclitus, Hegel, and William James (Follett 1918: 34). But Follett, even when she was always searching for the synthesis of different desires, rejected, like all pragmatists, the idea of an absolute spirit and final solution of conflicts. She relied on the incompleteness of processes, of human life and desires. This moved her to borrow from Freud as well. "The key-word of psychology today is desire. If we wish to speak of conflict in the language of contemporary psychology, we might call it a moment of interacting desires. Thus we take it from any connotation of good or bad. Thus we shall not be afraid of conflict, but shall recognize that there is a destructive way of dealing with such moments and a constructive way. Conflict as the moment of appearing and focussing of difference may be a sign of health, a prophecy of progress." (Follett 1926 in Urwick 1973: 5). Even if her simple style of proclaiming her ideas made her so attractive for management theory that they rediscovered her enthusiastically in 1995 as a "prophet of management," Follett's resistance to universal recipes makes her approaches very difficult to deal with. It is difficult to reduce her ideas to a simple method, because they are too complex, even if her language sounds so easy and simple. Their complexity is masked (the same phenomena we find in Freud's theories). As Rosemary Stewart puts it, "It is easier to sell a single idea, with its variations, than a well-developed discussion of different ideas. One reason why Follett's writings received little attention over the years since her death is that they are too rich. Other classical writers can be more readily identified by a key idea, even if they wrote more widely about management, but Follett contributed insightfully to many aspects of management. Ask management students what Fayol and Taylor are best known for and they may be able to answer, but a similar question about Follett is likely to draw a blank, even if they recognize her name." (Stewart 1996: 173). Mary Parker Follett can be perceived as a "masked author" as Foucault puts it – she disappears in her own discourse and has to be rediscovered again and again. Joyce K. Fletcher relates Follett's to other "disappearing acts" in organization theory where only people like Follett's contemporary Elton Mayo hold their positions because of their

techniques to ascribe privileged rationality to managers and legitimate their authorities (Fletcher 1999: x). It was Follett's own desire to act behind a mask of simplicity, devoted to her ideas of improvement of democratic culture. But she caused disturbance behind that mask like the masked female desire always does when it points out that nobody has the Phallus ... (Lacan 1958).

Perhaps education theory should try to learn from Follett – not only from her methods of how to deal with conflict, different desires, and cultures, but from her devotion to her ideas and the masquerade of her authorship as well.

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Andrés Klaus Runge Peña[1]

„Being Latino" Abroad as a Discursive Effect exploited by Consumer Culture, the World of Music and the Mass Media

„Vivir en los límites significa que tú no eres ni hispana india negra española, ni gabacha, eres mestiza, mulata, semi-parida, atrapada en el cruce entrecampos mientras llevas las cinco razas sobre tu lomo, nunca sabiendo hacia qué lado volverte, desde donde correr [...] Para sobrevivir en los límites tú debes vivir sin fronteras, ser/estar en una encruzijada."

Gloria Anzaldúa

„... the modes of subjectivity that take form in the postmodern scene are just the ones which give individuals the illusion of free electing by masking the means through which the social and material practices of the capitalist consumer culture have constituted the parameters that define such elections."

Peter McLaren

„The act of power comes not in creating something from nothing, but in reducing something to nothing."

Lawrence Grossberg

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[1] Graduate in English - Spanish Language Teaching at the University of Antioquia (Medellín - Colombia) and doctorate in Pedagogy at the Free University of Berlin (Germany).

1 Introduction to the problem

1.1 „Being Latino" as a way of individual and collective identification

To have a name - to be named - and to carry that name is a way of identification for individuals and/or collective subjects. But, as Hall maintains: „Identification is a process of articulation, a suturing, an over-determination not a subsumption [...]. Like all signifying practices, it is subject to the 'play' of *différance*. It obeys the logic of more-than-one. And since as a process it operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of 'frontier-effects'. It requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process" (Hall, 1997: 3).

For historical, social, cultural, ethnic as well as anecdotal reasons, as originates of Latin America, we have learned to recognize - to identify - ourselves, above all after the Conquista, as the sons and daughters of thievish and colonizer Europeans, of raped Indian women, and of exploited, enslaved and tortured black people. As Latino Americans we have, to some extent, always represented the *other*[2] of Europe - the exotic, foreign and strange. In fact, the great paradox of our „*son of a bitch* complex" (González), which also serves to maintain our supposed cultural identity as Latino Americans in our collective imaginary, is that we have had compassion for our suffering and violated Indian mother and have identified ourselves with her, but at the same time, we do not want to be like her - we are ashamed of her -, because of her situation of oppression, enslavement, primitiveness, marginality, subordination and underdevelopment. Moreover, we want to overcome this uncomfortable situation by striving to be most like our European father. We desire and want to have his force and power, but we hate and denigrate him too, precisely because of what he has done to our mother. Seen in this contradictory way, we have a little of both sides in us and, for this reason, we cannot be anything; we are „*in essence*" nothing. Accordingly, our condition is to be at the same time moderns, postmoderns and non-moderns.

But should this bring us to conclude that we are *sub lumine oppresionis* collective Latino American identities? Is it enough to see ourselves today as an *asymmetrical community* turned into a *symmetrical one* because of

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[2]   See Todorov, 1982, 1989; Lévinas, 1991; Wulf, 2001b.

the concrete and painful experience of having been conquered, oppressed, subdued and excluded?[3] Must we see ourselves as the painful and incorrigible *dialectical synthesis* of an historical and social „*Werden*" resulting from an inevitable movement of reality - of the „*Spirit*" - like that outlined by Hegel and post-Hegelian historical thinking?[4]

„Latino"[5] is the name by means of which people from Latin America, in general, *learned* or *were taught* to identify themselves. It is also the common name by which *the others, those with the power of speech,* nowadays identify the habitants, or those originating from or born in Latin America. Looking both from a diachronic and synchronic point of view, from without and from within, we are Latino American identities *due to* a merely geographical ubication inside a region. However, this does not mean that „being Latino" is something like a fixed „achronic identity"[6] or the „absurd notion of a an uncontaminated culture in a single country" (Bhabha, 1997: 53). Rather, we must conceive ourselves as cultures involved in a permanent *hybridizing process*[7], that is to say, as the result of particular and singular performative and transformative practices.

According to that, our purpose here, which is similar to Grossberg's, is not „to escape the discourse of identity but to relocate it, to rearticulate it by placing it within the larger context of modern formations of power. [We] want to propose that cultural studies need to move beyond models of oppression, both the 'colonial model' of the oppressor and oppressed, and the 'transgression model' of oppression and resistance. Cultural studies need to move towards a model of articulation as 'transformative practice', as the singular becoming of a community" (Grossberg, 1997: 88).

In the book compiled by Mojica and entitled: *Culturas híbridas - No simultaneidad - Modernidad periférica. Mapas culturales para la América*

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[3] See Dussell in: Klesing- Rempel, 1996: 123ff.

[4] See Zea, 1969, 1976, 1987, 1993.

[5] Here I understand the term „Latino" not in its strictly historical and etymological meaning which refers to the naturals of European and American places in which languages derived from Latin are spoken, but in its common and abbreviate modern use as a way to designate people who come from Latin America.

[6] An „achronic identity" is the one that results after determining the necessary and sufficient conditions that make a thing identical over the time. See Jorge J. E. Gracia, 2000.

[7] The „hybrid" is understood here in the broad sense used by Canclini as a group of mixtures of culture and as a result of the combination of some dichotomies of thought that refer to the culture, society and individual. Above all, however, it refers to the permanent results of identifying processes which proliferate indefinitely and in a contingent way. See also: Bhaba, 1997: 58.

Latina, Jean Franco, in his article, reproaches García Canclini - one of the most important theoreticians in the field of the Latino American Studies - for not giving enough emphasis and priority to the problems which have to do with „subjectivity and enunciation".[8] According to his criticism, this omission significantly reduces the „interdisciplinary potential" of Canclini's book *Culturas híbridas. Estrategias para salir de la Modernidad* (Hybrid Cultures. Strategies to come out from Modernity) (1989).

Despite Canclini's emphasis on the hybrid character of Latino American cultures, he does not take into account those particular and concrete aspects which play a crucial role in the hybridizing processes as such. Canclini is right to explain the hybrid character of Latino American cultures as a general mixing movement, but he fails to see the local and specific conditions under which these hybrid cultures, generally identified as Latinos, *appear, become* and *keep on* existing. With his periodization strategy he homogenizes the different populations, their multiple temporalities and their particular spatial existences. As a consequence, his concept of „hybrid culture" largely remains abstract and macro; it remains tied to the „superstructure", and thus appears as something immobile and local, fixed in reference to a geopolitical territory.

Another important point is that the author fails to discuss the structuring aspects and principles of these hybrid identities in local, specific and particular cases *outside* the Latino American territory. What I mean here is that performing the self as „Latino", or better, identifying oneself as „Latino" is something that not only takes place *inside* Latin America, but especially *outside*[9] Latin America, precisely where there is a bigger awareness of „being Latino" - for example, due to the simple fact of feeling oneself as a foreigner - and is therefore mostly evoked and yearned.

1.2 On the necessity to investigate social and cultural identifications from another theoretical perspective (Latino American studies in connection with theories of performativity)

The starting point of this paper is this „*empty place*" left out by Canclini. For the purpose of giving an account of „being Latino" as a way of

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[8] See Franco in: Mojica (Ed.), 2000: 57.

[9] That is why under the world wide conditions of globalization, mobility, emigration, etc., we need to reconceptualize with spatial categories the ways of performing the self as „Latino" in order to see the particular effects of the discursive formations over the subjectivities in local contexts.

life, as a parameter for people's individual and collective identification to-day, current theories of performativity[10] constitute an important tool, be-cause with their support we can explain and conceive the social and the cultural identifications of people, not in substantial, essentialist and exclu-sively geographical terms, but in a *free-flowing* way as specific perform-ances,[11] that is, as the continued result or effect of constantly performative „staging" practices, actions and discourses that are determined by histori-cal, social and situational contexts.

In accordance with this perspective, our main premise here upholds that the *communitas* (Turner), the social and the cultural in general, the specific identifications of the performing self, and the ways of fulfilment of an in-dividual's personal life are the results of social and cultural „perform-ances",[12] which are determined by discursive and non-discursive performa-tive practices,[13] and carried out through individual and group *stagings*,[14] as well as through specific ritualized actions and patterns of behaviour[15] in which mimetic human capacities[16] play an important role.

From this point of view and in the face of today's conditions of the third world migration, „being Latino" - positioning and performing the self as Latino - should not be considered as an essence, as a naturally defined state or as the stiff dialectical synthesis of one *specific* culture, but rather as something that is *performed* within society in particular places. That is why it should not be understood as a construction strictly based on the „recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation" (Hall, 1997: 2),[17] but rather as a

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[10] Theories of Performativity have as a subject matter *the performative*, that is, „an event that cannot be absorbed in the general or in the particular, an event that cannot be annulated within an identity or a difference" (Wulf/Zirfas in: Wulf and others, 2001: 339). (T. of A.K.R.)

[11] See Wulf, Göhlich, Zirfas (Eds.), 2001: 11.

[12] See Singer, 1959.

[13] See Foucault, 1973, 1975, 1991, 1991b, 1992; Butler, 1990, 1993, 1993b, 1998.

[14] See Goffman, 1973, 1974, 1977, 1997, 1999.

[15] See Turner, 1969, 1982; Goffman, 1999; Gebauer/Wulf, 1998.

[16] See Gebauer/Wulf, 1992, 1998; Wulf, 1989, 1996.

[17] This is precisely the general basis of the discourses of *Latinidad* which must be criticized and relativized, because of the presumed universality and unity of its subject. This supposed unity around the conception of „being Latino" is a *fictive unity* which falls under the „mode of representation" (Said, Grossberg). Aparicio is right in seeing that this „unifying discourse of Latinidad, proposed also by the Spanish-language media, Telemundo and Univisión, by Cuban- American pop singers such as Gloria Estefan, and fuelled by the ever-growing force

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permanent individual construction which is never totally fulfilled and which is never equal or identical to others.

Under these interpretational parameters, „being Latino" as a given *hybrid, undefined*, and *contingent* naming for our social, cultural and personal condition must be understood here as the „*sedimentary effect*" (Butler) of ritualized forms of personal behaviour that are influenced by established discourses, images and practices which have to do with power relationships[18] and especially with enunciation and consumption strategies. The specific identification of individuals as „Latinos" requires therefore a performative effectuation - to be staged - inside a network of group, social, historical, cultural and situational contexts which are to be regarded as authorization and validation instances. The credibility, validity and recognition of this „being Latino" depends precisely on those institutions.

„Being Latino" as an effect, as an act of self-referentiality and self-positioning in a field, does not depend, therefore, on the evocation of an origin, on isolated stagings or on exclusively free individual decisions, but on a complex series of conditioning and interacting elements which can be both part of and emanate from the situation itself. Those elements are determined by wide institutional, social, cultural, political, economical and power contexts, but they also have to be *embodied* and *staged* by the individuals in concrete situations and moments[19]. In this sense, „being Latino" as a „role represented is not an organic thing which has a specific place and whose destiny is to be born, mature and die; it is the dramaturgic effect developed from the represented scene and for which the important question is whether it is worthy of credibility or not" (Goffman, 1997: 231). As a sedimentary and „*dramaturgic effect*" of determined individual or collective „stagings" - performances - „being Latino" is thus anchored to social institutions with their specific discourses, models, images, and instituted habits, ways of acting, rituals, and practices.

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of Latinos as consumers, celebrates a seamless and unproblematized Latino 'imaginary' that is both politically and economically strategic" (Aparicio, 1999: 3). Therefore, people „who strive to constitute non-discriminatory minority identities cannot simply do so by affirming the place they occupy, or by returning to an 'unmarked' authentic origin or pre-text: their recognition requires the negotiation of a dangerous indeterminacy, since the too-visible presence of the other underwrites the authentic national subject but can never guarantee its visibility or truth" (Bahbha, 1997: 56).

[18] For the conception of subject as an effect of power see Foucault, 1978: 83.

[19] See Wulf/Zirfas, 2001: 339.

Accordingly, our purpose here is to show that the general conception of „being Latino" *abroad* - the imaginary projection of „being latino" world wide - finds itself articulated in a „mode of representation" (Said, Grossberg), and functions under the *reductionist logic of difference*, as a *stereotyped* product - as a discursive effect - of some of today's postmodern theories and *unifying discourses of Latinidad* which are in a concealed and strategic relationship with consumer culture, the mass media and the *world of Latin music*.[20] This attempt at interpretation from a performative point of view also aims to criticize and demystify what commercial capitalism, as a *politics of visualization*, is producing today with the notion of „being Latino", that is, an *obvious reality* before the eyes of the - consumer and/or foreign - people, or rather, a worldwide *stereotype* functioning abroad as a *visible, recognizable* and, above all, *desirable* model of identification, which fulfils people's - or foreigners' and emigrants'- own interests and at the same time the interests of modern capitalist consumer culture - and therefore is highly *commercial* and *merchandisable*.

With this in mind, our main hypothesis is that many of the ways in which „being Latino" is experienced, assumed, incorporated, incarnated, structured, understood and performed today mostly in foreign countries[21] are connected to capitalist consumption strategies that are promoted, executed and set to work through instances like the Scene of Latin Music or MTV, for example. It is through these dominant instances that *identificatory attitudes, stereotyped patterns of behaviour, representations, knowledge, historical memories and images*,[22] which penetrate and configure people's body and mind, are generated, produced, reproduced and *sold*. These instances can be seen as contributing to the reconstruction of a collective imaginary as Latino and therefore to the promotion of a certain

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[20] We can conceive here the „world of Latin music" as something like a „dispositive" in Foucault's sense, that is, as a heterogeneous group of elements which are in a direct relation or not, but in such a way that they fulfill an strategic function. The world of Latin music as a strategic network embraces its institutions, authorized persons, rhythms, dances, artists, magazines, videos, images, special channels, related and divulgated discourses, recognized practices, behaviour patterns, attitudes and places. As a formation within the capitalist consumer culture, the world of Latin music carries out with the strategic function of making desirable acceptable and merchandisable images, patterns of behaviour and „ways of life" under the motto of „being Latinos". See Foucault 1991: 128- 129.

[21] I am referring here to the specific case of Germany.

[22] Featherstone writes in this respect: „Indeed, the inner logic of consumer culture depends upon the cultivation of an insatiable appetite to consume images. The production of images to stimulate sales on a social level is echoed by the individual production of images through photography" (Featherstone in: Featherstone/Hepworth /Turner, 1993: 178).

„habitus" (Bourdieu) determined and labelled as „being Latino". In this way, „being Latino" abroad can be seen today as a performative effect resulting from consumerism strategies in connection with the very particular forms and needs of identification.[23]

With this position we place ourselves within Hall's programme too, since like he, we „need to situate the debates about identity within all those historically specific developments and practices which have disturbed the relatively 'settled' character of many populations and cultures, above all in relation to the processes of globalization, which I would argue are coterminous with modernity [...] and the process of forced and 'free' migration which have become a global phenomenon of the so-called 'post-colonial' world [...] Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies" (Hall, 1997: 4).

Some questions resulting from what we have said so far point in a Foucaultian direction: What makes us to be what we are (Latinos) in a particular social and historical complex? What are the conditions through which people can belong to a common collective as Latinos? What does „being Latino" as a constructed identification refer to? How ist this postcolonial „Latinized" subjectivity to be analyzed? How is the current fascination with „Latinos" to be explained? What is behind this fascination and its apogee? How can we understand this epoch in which „being Latino" is worthy of mention, attention, study and acceptance, and also desirable, visible and socially articulable? What are the strategies, conditions, and performative ways in which „being Latino" is visualized, knowable and comes into effect? Why is the marginality of „being Latino" becoming universal (De Certeau)? What makes it possible for these institutionalized discourses and practices to have a dominant function, a performative character and, therefore, affect the bodies and minds of individuals in particular?

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[23] We agree here with Nava when she states that „Consumerism does not simply mirror production. Cultural forms and meanings are not reducible to class and the economy. Consumerism is far more than just economic activity: it is also about dreams and consolation, communication and confrontation, image and identity [...] it consists of a multiplicity of fragmented and contradictory discourses [...] Consumerism is a discourse through which disciplinary power is both exercised and contested. While not negating its relation to capitalism, we must refuse to return it always to questions of production" (Nava, 1992: 167-168). See also Bauman, 1983.

2   Two possible approaches to the subject-matter (modes of performativity)

From a performative point of view, if we understand „being Latino" not as something that a person is, but rather as something that is constructed within specific contexts, or in Butler's words as „an instituted identity through a *stylized repetition of acts*" (Butler, 1997: 402) in time, then the conditions of possibility of „being Latino" nowadays, and the way in which this allows for certain specific types of imaginary identification and consequently for the stylized repetition of such acts, call for clarification. Two approaches offer themselves here. One has to do with a specific mode of performativity, it investigates *what is done to the subjects*; the other investigates *what the subjects do*.[24]

It is not within the scope of this essay to answer these questions fully. We propose therefore to concentrate on delineating the first approach. This directs us, on the one hand, to the question of the current conditions of apparition and consolidation of what is denominated as „Latino", in other words, to the discourses in which „being Latino" finds its support. On the other hand, it raises the question of the reasons and origins of the *force* of the discourses about „being Latino" which make it possible that those discourses exercise a powerful identifying effect.

Of course, in order to deal with the complexity of the *performative*, an approach „from above", like the one that I will sketch here, must be confirmed in concrete and specific contexts and performances. This is why fieldwork, which is part of the second approach, is necessary and complementary to this *theorization from above*. It has to do with the places and concrete situations to which discourses and knowledge apply. This more pragmatic approach investigates - maps - group and individual performances in concrete scenarios and arrangements.[25] People's identity is defined

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[24] See Butler, 1990, 1993; Lagaay, 2001.

[25] In my opinion, Latin discos - and the scene of Latin music in general- represent one of the best fields for investigating the performative character of „being Latino" abroad and are appropriate for this second approach. They are places which people use to identify or affiliate themselves with others as Latinos. „Being Latino" here is to assume a common - stereotyped - position which differentiates them from others. Those places function as limited spacial instances which allow for and foment *ways of positioning and belonging as Latinos*. „Such places are temporary points of belonging and identification, of orientation and installation, creating sites of strategic historical possibilities and activities, and as such they are always contextually defined. They define the forms of empowerment or agency which are available to particular groups as ways of going on and of going out. Around such places, maps of

here by what they do, by the ways in which they act, show and present themselves. It is the positioning that each subject *in propria persona* assumes[26]. This approach emphasises the „*under which conditions*" and the „*how* of concrete realizations".

3   Conditions of apparition of „being Latino"

With regard to the first approach, my hypothesis is that „being Latino" can be seen as the reversed effect[27] of the „mode of representation" (Grossberg, Said) by which a person or group of people tries to distinguish themselves from others. The apogee and fascination for „Latinos" and their „way of life" is due to a differentiation/identification process in modernity and its continuation today through the Mass Media and the world of Latin music with its ever-growing group of consumers - „Latinos" as consumers and consumers of what is designated as Latino. It is through these instances that „being Latino" could have an existence and became a part of the collective and individual *imaginary*. What „Latino" names and refers to is a complex knowledge of prevailing discourses tied to „plays of power" in which visualization, verbalization and enunciation, as well as demarcation strategies are used and promoted. Through such relations of differentiation/identification, Latino identities become social constructions.

In my opinion, at least five types of discourse or „discursive currents"[28] come into play here, which serve also as demarcation forms, as discursive

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subjectivity and identity, meaning and pleasure, desire and force, can be articulated" (Grossberg, 1997: 102).

[26] An investigation of this type is based on the dramatic or theatrical model. See Goffman, 1997; Fischer- Lichte, 1998.

[27] As Etienen Balibar writes: „the identificatory language of discrimination works in reverse: 'the racial/cultural identity of 'true nationals' remains invisible but is infered from [...] the quasi-hallucinatory visibility of the 'false nationals' - Jews, 'wops', immigrants, *indios, natives*, blacks" (Balibar in: Bhabha, 1997: 55).

[28] We understand the concept of „discursive currents" in a similar way as Foucault's concept of „discursive formations". For Foucault discursive formations are the enunciations - and the knowledge that they carry - which are moving in the same direction or, at least, in a space with a lower level of uncertainty or indetermination. In order to analyse them as knowledge, they must fulfill certain rules of formation. The task here is to identify those rules of formation in order to relate the enunciations of a specific discursive practice with a certain area of knowledge. Our idea is that „being Latino" functions as a knowledge in this sense, that is, as a general signifier that can be thought, mentioned or referred to. It takes form and is visualized in these discursive formations thanks to sedimentation lines and rules which have to do with enunciation strategies of the consumer culture. In this essay we are not interesting in doing a complete „genealogy" or „aqueology" (Foucault) of „being Latino" (a general investigation of the conditions of emergence of what we can consider as a „history of „being Latino"). Our purpose is more specific: we wish to interpret today's conception of „being

limits, and as ways of inclusion/exclusion and of visualiza-
tion/concealment. They function as discourses which work with the notion
of *„difference"* (Derrida) - as supplement and negativity[29]-, and in this way
- by supplementing and negating - spread identifying images and therefore
impose a certain people's stereotyped identity with its corresponding be-
haviour.

These discourses are:

A) Discourses which praise the body and corporeality,

B) Discourses which praise spontaneity,

C) Discourses which praise seductiveness,

D) Discourses which praise gallantry (flirting) and

E) Discourses which praise the other/foreign/exotic.

A) Discourses which praise the body and corporeality

Today, the discourses which praise the body and corporeality run par-
allel with the critical situation of pure reason - of the spirit - and the re-
sulting post-modern mentality. In the West, above all in Europe, the
„process of civilization" (Elias) has been characterized as one of distancing
and separation from the body (feelings, desires, passions, impertinences,
necessities) in favour of reason and spirit. According to this critical stand
point, the body and corporeality, once visualized, gain attention in society
in different ways and for different purposes, for example, as an academic
issue or as a fundamental component of a person's identity. But we must
keep in mind that those postmodern discourses which praise corporeality
are a double-sided: they fulfil not only a critical function referred to its
own social and historical situation, but they also support other strategic
discourses typical of today's postmodern consumption culture.

That is why in the course of the late twentieth century praise of the
body and corporeality have turned into praise for the „consuming" (Falk)
body and corporeality. As Shilling writes: „Recognizing that the body has
become a project for many modern persons entails accepting that its ap-
pearance, size, shape and even its contents, are potentially open to recon-

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Latino" as a strategy of the consumer culture which is supported and promoted through and
by the instances that have to do with the world of music.

[29] Under the model of 'supplement' the other appears as desirable and/or as an unreachable
other, and under the model of 'negativity' the other appears as exotic and strange other. See
Grossberg, 1997.

struction in line with the designs of its owner [...] This involves a practical recognition of the significance of bodies; both as personal resources and as social symbols which give off messages about a person's self-identity" (Schilling, 1993: 5).

In the - stereotyped and general - characterizations of „being Latinos", the body and corporeality play a very important role. „Latinos" are identified as affectionate people with a very passionate temperament. In particular they are thought of as people who make use of their own body as a stylised way of communication, self-representation, enjoyment and pleasure. Discourses and practices which have to do with sensuality, sexuality and eroticism also refer to the - sexy - body and are adjudicated to Latinos. At the centre of this lies a kind of admiration of and wish for *corporeal pleasure* which, especially since the *Aufklärung*, was to be fought and controlled. In my opinion, these discourses are only possible because the West is experiencing a „return of/to the body" (Kamper/Wulf) which seems to be a *symptomatic manifestation* of the modern crisis and the postmodern situation.

In the late twentieth century, *commercialisation* of the body and corporeality have provided Western cultures with an escape for their rational subjects from the schematic and rational structures of their own life-world (community and society). That is why in today's consumer culture the body is proclaimed as a means of pleasure and as a mode of expression.[30] Kamper/Wulf write accordingly: „Ever more people are in agreement with this - both in a practical and a theoretical way: body therapies, often based on Asian techniques of the body, find large attendance and dissemination; in self-experience groups people try to regain sensitivity of their bodies in contrast to the armours and shells of an abstract I. As before, sexual emancipation [...] is caught between the Scylla of the demands of justice and the Charybdis of the sex market; variants of body art set free horizons of sense superimposed in a civilizing way and construct bridges to the wild with its archaic laws" (Kamper/Wulf, 1982: 10).[31]

Under these circumstances Latino American dances and rhythms - or cultural events - in which sexy bodies exhibited and in movement are admired, gain importance. This is also visible in sport, for example, the flashy and colourful football scenes in which domination of the body,

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[30] Using Bourdieu's concepts, we can say that „physical capital" *experiences a conversion into* „social, cultural and economical capital".

[31] (T. of A.K.R.)

spontaneity during the play and bodily virtuosity are very important. And last but not least, we must mention exotic and sex tourism - in places like Cuba or Dominican Republic, for example. Following the same parameters of consumption and liberation, „Latin sex" is elevated to an incomparable experience worthy of being paid for.

B) Discourses which praise spontaneity

Spontaneity has a different place in relation to a general ethics, that is, in relation to a discourse which defends a universal and proper way to behave in society. Typical for all discourses on spontaneity is an admiration and praise for human drives and behaviours, which do not require much thought and which have a ludicrous and „tactical" (De Certeau) character. According to this characterisation, „being Latino" refers to spontaneous people who differ from rational, calculating ones. One admires - or hates - their attitude of living and enjoying the moment and its treatment of daily life in general.[32]

Because of this, "Latinos" do not enter or fit into the programme of individual and social „Vervollkommnung" (Kamper/Wulf) as proposed by the „project of modernity" since Kant with his *„Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht"* of 1784. Thus, as a rational lifelong effort to overcome the „animalitas" (Kant) and to take control over the time, the *„sapere aude"* (Kant) is not valid anymore when it comes to living and enjoying the moment. However, praise of this spontaneous way of life not only produces admiration, it also influences people's identification as Latinos. This is why the interplay between admiration and self-recognition supports this discourse and its identifying effects on Latino Americans abroad.

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[32] De Certeau's distinction between „tactics" and „strategies" functions in a similar way. Thus he writes: „I call a 'strategy' the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an 'environment'. A strategy assumes a place that can be circumscribed as *proper* and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, 'clientèles', 'targets', or 'objects' of research). Political, economic, and scientific rationality has been constructed on this strategic model. I call a 'tactic' [...] a calculus which cannot count on a 'proper' [...] The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place [...] The 'proper' is a victory of space over time. On the contrary, because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time [...] It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into 'opportunities'. The weak must continually turn to their own ends forces alien to them" (de Certeau, 1988: xix).

C) Discourses which praise seductiveness

When we speak of seductiveness, we mean ways of impounding or captivating the mood and the spirit. Seen in this way, seductiveness is understood as a strategy to obtain or achieve something, whose main characteristic is that it does not appeal to conviction, but to seduction. With seductiveness the domination of desire is at stake, not necessarily of the head. It thus represents a threat to reason and all forms of conviction which are based on rational arguments. From the point of view of reason, seductiveness is dangerous because it can make reason go against its own principles and collapse.

Those discourses that see the processes of rational understanding as an eroded form of cohesion are in favour of the fascination that is linked to seductiveness. Strategies of seductiveness are closely connected to the body and corporeality - for example in the way in which the body is presented, its behaviour, its gaze and expressions, etc., and in the ways through which other people are captivated. Such discourses debilitate the rational attitude, as long as they turn to spontaneity, corporeality and gallantry as forms of cohesion. Here „the 'performing self' places greater emphasis upon appearance, display and the management of impressions" (Featherstone in: Featherstone/Hepworth/Turner, 1993: 187).

Connected to these discourses is the usual identification of Latinos as strategic seducers. They not only deceive for their own aims, but they also move the desire of others and captivate them. As a consequence, they are at the same time interesting and risky, precisely because they can captivate the mood.

D) Discourses which praise gallantry (flirting)

Gallantry is understood here in a double sense: first, as a way of being gallant and, second, as a way of flattering. On the one hand, in a positive sense, it means to behave kindly and properly; on the other hand, in a negative sense, it means to act strategically in order to obtain something. In general, discourses of gallantry stress the lively, cheerfulness and ludicrous character of people's behaviour in the context of social relationships. Discourses about gallantry emerge in opposition to a reflective and honest love (from the Latin *dilectio -nis*) which is typical of „cold heads". Gallantry is also thought in opposition to the moderation and coldness in peo-

ple's ways of treating, behaving towards and conversing with others, as well as with regard to sexuality and intimacy, etc.

According to the overall view, Latinos are generally considered gallant, not only because of their strategic and seductive - sexist - attitudes towards other people, but also because of their friendly and cordial treatment of other people.

E) Discourses which praise the other/foreign/exotic

Ever since the „conquista", in many chronicles of travels and expeditions, originates from Latin America are often described as *negative-differents*[33] in relation to contrasting, differentiating and self-referential operations. As Grossberg says: „Since the modern constitutes its own identity by differentiating itself from an other [...] identity is always constituted out of difference" (Grossberg, 1997: 93). In other words, in the name of the colonizing „Vernunft" (reason), Latino Americans are identified with the „Andere der Vernunft" (the other of reason) (Böhme/Böhme)[34] both in a negative and a positive way.[35] At any rate, what we would like to draw attention to here is that the association of Latino Americans with the „other of reason" is not new. Therefore, we must assume a critical point of view in order to see the reasons of this vindication.

In view of the intense critiques of the rational way of life in the West, of the eroded models of identification and humanity proposed by the project of Enlightenment, of the tiredness, and loss of value of the sameness, the other/foreign/exotic appears as something interesting and captivating. The „opening" (globalization) of the West to the rest of the world and the - political, economical, intercultural, commercial - discourses that support

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[33] Here we follow Hall when he says: „Throughout their careers, identities can function as points of identification and attachment only *because* of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render 'outside', abjected. Every identity has at its 'margin', an excess, something more. The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure, every identity naming as its necessary, even if silenced and unspoken other, that which it 'lacks'" (Hall, 1997: 5).

[34] „The other of reason, seen from the point of view of reason, is the irrational; ontologically, it is the unreal; morally, it is the indecent; logically, it is the alogical. The other of reason, in contents, is nature, the lived body, imagination, desire, feelings - in other words, all that reason could not appropriate" (Böhme/Böhme, 1996: 13). (T. of A.K.R)

[35] In his anthropology (Second Discourse), assuming a positive point of view, Rousseau mentions that people from America still maintain a tight relation with their own „lower nature". For him this means independence from society and man's self-sufficiency.

this worldwide situation, are awakening people's interest in relating to and entering into contact with the other/foreign/exotic.[36]

But, this „being Latino" as someone exotic and captivating is an illusion, and a stereotyped image for both participating parts: natives and foreigners. In particular, contact between these two parts is possible today, to a great extent, thanks to the mediating function of the Mass Media and the world of Latin music. These have helped to create a common image or representation of „being Latino" for Latino Americans abroad and for other people.

In this perspective, the other/foreign/exotic as „Latino" is seen to be someone who_attracts attention and is worthy of being in contact with. This double effect functions as follows: As long as we understand ourselves as other/foreigner/exotic and as long as we are open and available to others as such, we can gain recognition from these interested people who observe us in this way. This means that to understand ourselves as other/foreign/exotic is to become important and striking for others. In being of interest for others we can recognize ourselves because we enter into their desire and attention (dialectic of misrecognition). In affirming that „we are not like them, we are 'Latinos'", we beg for recognition and acceptance as the other/foreign/exotic, not as *equal human beings*, but as the Latinos they think we are - and whose role we have to assume in order to be accepted. Thus, as a search for recognition, „being Latino" is not only a way of elaborating *différance*, but also a way of dealing with the *indifference*.

4   The necessity of identification and consumer strategies

The strategies of consumer culture have clearly shown how to articulate - how to „citate" (De Certeau) - this collective *lack*, this *call for the return to an authentic origin*, this *feeling of being outside* and the need to identify with specific images and stereotypes which give an idea of an essence which is not there. The *evocation* of „*Herkunft*" (Nietzsche; Foucault) through the media recreates a world of identifying images, both on a par-

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[36] In my opinion is not coincidence that the best studies on Latinoamerica (Latino Studies) and the considerable fascination and apogee for „Latinos" have occurred *outside* Latino America. In this sense, it is not surprising that one of the principal sources of consumer capitalism the United States, and a „cold and rational" nation Germany, are not only the seats of the best centres of investigation about Latino America, but also the principal promoters of an „academic imaginary around Latino Studies" (Aparicio) and of intercultural events in which more and more „latinos" play an important role.

ticular and collective level, and helps to maintain a certain homesickness and yearning for the origin. This articulation is supported and promoted by means of consumption strategies which also help people satisfy their fundamental necessity of recognition and self-recognition.

Under the influence of those instances a kind of Latino American „deterritorialization" occurs and is experienced, because the identifying referents are others: images, visual discourses, rituals and behaviours originated by the world of Latin music, etc. In this sense, there is not a properly structured and rational discourse which founds „being Latino", but a world of images and, above all, *idealizations*. The Mass Media and the world of Latin music function as instances which integrate and maintain the Latino American collective imaginary of people abroad. Seen in this way, „being Latino" abroad is therefore a praxis which is not tied to a *Latino American space*, but to a way of belonging and attachment that are influenced by consumer strategies. „Being Latino" abroad is to perform an identity without „territorial memory" (Martín-Barbero) in concordance with discourses without territorial ground.

Our purpose here has been to point out succinctly that „being Latino" emerges - becomes visible and mentionable - in discourses thanks to certain operations of exclusion and differentiation. All these discourses serve to *frame* and structure knowledge about „being Latino" which also has an identifying function over the people abroad. We do not wish to say that these discourses refer exclusively to „Latinos". Yet when we consider what „being Latino" is referred to, we find that those discourses contribute in some way to creating it. In general, the stereotyped idea of „being Latino" derived from these discourses is that of a passionate, affective, spontaneous and interesting person who has an intimate contact with his/her body and whose presence and way of acting serve as a form of seduction and self-representation.

In the search for recognition abroad, people's awareness of such a stereotyped ideas make them believe[37] that they must be and behave in this way. Foreign Latin Americans find themselves resorting to being like those who others admire or to identifying themselves with the images pro-

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[37] The identification as „Latino" „is the phantasmatic staging of the event. In this sense, identifications belong to the imaginary; they are phantasmatic efforts of alignment, loyalty, ambiguous and cross-corporeal cohabitation; they unsettle the 'I'; they are the sedimentation of the 'we' in the constitution of any 'I'. Identifications are never fully and finally made; they are incessantly reconstituted and, as such, are subject to the volatile logic of iterability" (Butler, 1993: 105). See also de Certeau, 1988: 178.

moted by the consumer culture. Because of this they feel themselves to be even more „Latinos" than the Latin-Amercans in Latin America. However, this does not mean that they are totally free to choose, select and assume their own identity. In this sense and following Butler, „being Latino" „has not an ontological status apart from the acts that compound it; only the bodily styles, movements and gestures constitute the illusion of a support" (Butler, 1990: 139). „Being Latino" is an act of „materialization" through mimetic actions and ritualized „stagings", it is the operation of an always identifying mimesis which does not have originals or a „core-I" (Kern-Ich) existing out of the performance as such.

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Katrin Goldstein-Kyaga

The Tibetan Culture of Non-Violence – its Transmission and the Role of Education

Introduction

The first draft of this article was written only a few days after the 11th September terror attack against the World Trade Centre, and no one knew how the United States would react. The use of expressions such as "civilization's fight"[1] was a frightening reminder of how rapidly the situation in a nation can escalate from a seemingly peaceful condition into being on the point of war (Elliot, 2001). Within days of the terror attack against targets in the US, the army was mobilized, and it was not difficult to imagine a scenario, when the world would be drawn into a third world war. From this perspective it could be asked if it is possible to create a society, which is more prone to peace, where single terror attacks do not so easily escalate into war. Rummel (1995) has pointed out that democracies are less violent than non-democracies, although the year following the attack of 11th September, has reminded us that also democracies make war, even if they are less warlike than other types of political systems.

Among the Tibetan refugee community in Northern India, which is led by the Dalai Lama, an attempt has been made to create a completely non-violent society. This has been done while developing a democratic system in the exile community. The Dalai Lama was the religious and the national ruler of Tibet up to 1959, when he and his family and the greater part of the Tibetan government escaped to India following the Lhasa uprising against the invading Chinese People's Liberation Army.[2] They were fol-

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[1] This expression used by President Bush was probably inspired by Huntington (1998). In his book he argues that clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and that an international order based on civilizations is the best safeguard against war.

[2] Although the official Chinese stand is that Tibet has always been an integral part of China, and that the army came to the rescue of a hard-oppressed population, there is little historical evidence for this claim. Most historians and international jurists agree that Tibet was an independent country at the eve of the invasion (Shen & Liu, 1973; van Walt van Praag, 1987; Goldstein, 1989, Richardson, 1984), and even if there certainly were differences between rich and poor, they were not very pronounced; the richest Tibetan noble would cut a poor

lowed by more than 80,000 refugees, a group which now amounts to approx. 130,000 (The Tibetan Government of Tibet in Exile, 1996). Most of them have settled in India, where an exile government including educational and social institutions has been set up.

Refugee camps are often a breeding ground of hatred and terror activities due to the human losses, the sufferings and the terrible experiences that most of the inhabitants have endured. Considering the destructive spiral of terror and re-terror which often emerges in such situations, it is important to study if and how a Tibetan culture of non-violence has developed and its transmission. As Herrman (1997) points out, violence-formation of human behaviour and the powerful violence-activity of persons and groups is always a result of individual and collective learning processes, and this could also be said about non-violence. The investigation of these learning processes is one of the aims of a research project about the Tibetan culture of non-violence, which I am conducting, and it has provided the data for this article.[3] In this article it is argued that a modern culture of non-violence has evolved among the Tibetan refugees, and the characteristics of this culture and the role of education in its transmission is discussed.

The uses of the words "peace" and "non-violence"

Within peace research the concept "peace" is used to signify something positive, in contrast to the concept "non-violence", i.e. the absence of violence, a state which seems negative. The word "peace" is associated with positive ideas such as "harmony" and "cooperation". This is also the way it is used by Tibetans. In the Tibetan language there is no special word for non-violence. The word *zhi wa* or *zhi bde* (peace, peaceful) and their derivations, for example *zhi 'thab* (nonviolent struggle) are used. The word *zhi wa* is also used in religious contexts as the equivalent of the Sanskrit word *śanti* meaning peace, pacification.

Within peace research the word "peace" rather than "non-violence" is used to expand the field of research from prevention and control of war to the study of peaceful relations in general (Galtung, 1985). But as Galtung (1990) also observes, the term has a basic shortcoming: it is too static.

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figure compared with a moderately well-to-do businessman in Calcutta or Bombay (Richardson, 1984).

Peace is a characteristic of a system; it is what we have when creative conflict transformation can take place non-violently.

In this article the terms "peace culture" and "the culture of non-violence" are used more or less as equivalents. There is however a slight difference in meaning. The word "peace culture" is used as an overall term, whereas "the culture of non-violence" signifies a more active stance, an approach aiming at a change of the political situation. The word "non-violence" implies according to Galtung (1965) an effort to influence. For the Tibetans the overall aim is the self-determination - either independence or genuine autonomy in relation to China - of the Tibetans in Tibet.[4] This includes the effort to influence the world opinion. Perhaps it is symptomatic that the word "non-violence" is used only in English, whereas the word "peace" is used in the Tibetan language. This shows how the Tibetan and the English language respectively are used differently in the political discourse.

Galtung (1990) considers it prejudicious to assume that there are societies which are completely peaceful or violent, and he therefore argues for the presence of a peace culture "if many and different aspects legitimate and justify structural peace". One might ask excactly *how many* and *which* aspects should be present in order to speak of a peace culture. This will be discussed in the following.

Characteristics of the Tibetan culture of non-violence

The conclusion of my investigation among the Tibetan refugees is that there is a difference between the peace culture of old Tibet and the culture of non-violence among the refugees, which can be attributed to the process of modernity. One of the most important aspects of this modern culture of non-violence is the role played by the Dalai Lama. The non-violent stance taken by the Dalai Lama himself is probably the most important factor. This has consequences for the behaviour of the government officials, the teaching in the schools and the whole context of culture reproduction.

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[4] The Dalai Lama has since 1988 officially given up the demand for independence of Tibet, and advocates so called genuine autonomy. Even if contemporary Tibet is called "Tibet Autonomous Region" the autonomy is illusory with Tibetan officials holding powerless positions. The proposal of the Dalai Lama implies that the Tibetans would handle their own internal affairs, while the Chinese government would be responsible for the foreign policy. Tibet should be declared a zone of peace, but China could maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet for defensive purposes (Shakya, 1999).

In the Buddhist tradition the Dalai Lama is considered a Bodhisattva[5] and the protector of Tibet. This gives him a strong charismatic role. But this does not lead to blind faith in him. The democratic society allows various views, without diminishing the strong loyalty shown to the Dalai Lama by almost all Tibetans. This loyalty is not only a matter of religious belief. The exile has also made the Dalai Lama an important symbol of the ethnic identity of the Tibetans irrespective of religion.

Another important factor is the role played by education. The fact that a comprehensive, secular system of education has been set up in exile is important, but not sufficient for the developing of a culture of non-violence. Militant fundamentalism is not unusual among university students. As Maaloof (1999) points out, a young man entering a university in an Arab country, who earlier would have been drawn to a marxist or nationalist organisation, would today probably attach himself to an Islamist organisation. The latter would better answer to his existential problems and identity. What is special for the Tibetan culture of non-violence is both a principled and tactical discourse[6] on non-violence, which is transmitted to the younger generation, not only in the schools, but within a general context of culture reproduction. This is not a superficial, non-committal, talk of "being nice to each other", but a well-developed philosophy based on the Buddhist tradition. It is transmitted in a modern, educational context, where the pupils are supposed to argue rationally for their position. The aim of the schools, especially the autonomous Tibetan schools,[7] is to inculcate values on a deeper level to the students. The principal in one of the most well-known Tibetan schools used the Tibetan word *sung-shuk* (gzung bshuks)[8] to describe this. According to him there are three ways of being religious:

1. Blind faith
2. Academical
3. The development of own values, *sung-shuk*

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[5] A Bodhisattva is a potential Buddha, who abstains from entering into Nirvana, in order to help other sentient beings to reach Nirvana (Tucci, 1980).

[6] For the terms *principled* and *tactical* non-violence, see Bedau (1991, p. 8).

[7] There are 85 Tibetan schools in India, Nepal and Bhutan divided into three types: Central Tibetan School Administration (CTSA), Department of Education (DOE), Autonomous schools. These schools differ in organisation and the possibility to influence by the Tibetan, Indian, Nepalese, Bhutanese authorities respectively.

[8] The word actually means "the inserting of mantras", used about rolls of prayers and mantras put into Buddha statues to make them holy. Before this is done the statue is considered an empty shell, merely a peace of brass.

The third point represents the way the schools try to develop the student's values.

There is no contradiction between Buddhism and a secular, critical worldview inherent in the Tibetan school system. In fact, a critical view of knowledge is in accordance with Buddhism. This can be found in religious texts such as *Pramana*, which is one of the basic texts taught in the monasteries. Teachers sometimes quote the *Tattvasamgraha* (Gyatso, 1992, p. 7), to inspire a critical attitude to knowledge:

- Bhikshus! Scholars should not accept my words
- Merely out of respect for me,
- But only after a thorough examination of them,
- Like gold after it is burnt, cut and rubbed.

The dominance by the culture of non-violence became obvious to me while interviewing, as persons being critical to the non-violence strategy often ended their interviews with a reservation or saving clause, such as "....but actually I am a Buddhist believning in non-violence". Thus, even if there are critics, the fact that everyone has to relate to the culture of non-violence, demonstrates the existence of such a culture.

The characteristics of the Tibetan culture of non-violence can be summarized in the following points:

- There is a charismatic leader, the Dalai Lama, who is completely committed to non-violence, and who has the full support of his people, in exile and in Tibet,
- there is a discourse on non-violence, which everyone has to relate to, whether pro or against non-violence,
- there is a religious, philosophical tradition with a strong commitment to non-violence, furthered by the Dalai Lama and the Buddhist monks and nuns,
- there is a democratic exile government, which has adopted non-violence as a leading aim,
- there is a secular as well as a Buddhist educational system, with an aim of creating a non-violent generation of educated Tibetans,

○ non-violence has become an integral part of the Tibetan identity, whether they are Buddhist, Bon (the old pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet) or Muslim, and

○ the Tibetan non-violence movement has influenced other liberation movements, such as that of the East Timorese, the Eastern Turkestanis, the Burmese, and even the Chinese, and it has also had some influence in the West.

The development of a modern peace culture

Tibet before the Chinese invasion

It can be disputed whether old Tibet was a peace culture, but as it evolved from the 13th century on until the 1950s, it can definitely be considered a culture, which to a great extent was characterized by peace. Tibet was formerly a great empire extending its borders into present Pakistan, Eastern Turkestan, Western China, Burma, Nepal and India, but with the introduction of Buddhism as a state religion in the seventh century, the military conquests gradually stopped. There were always violent aspects of the Tibetan culture, as has been pointed out by the Tibetan author Jamyang Norbu and others, particularly in the eastern parts of Tibet, where large numbers of bandits roomed the countryside and the absence of political control made it necessary to be armed (Goldstein-Kyaga, 1999). The dominant culture, which was transmitted by the Buddhist monasteries and the monks and the nuns, was however on the whole peaceful. This was especially the case in central Tibet and the area around Lhasa. Until the early 20th century there was hardly any army or police, and Tibet did not start any wars for more than a thousand years. This seems to have been due to the fact that Buddhist lamas, first of the Sakya order and later of the Geluk order, ruled Tibet, except for a short period in the 14th century. It gave rise to a unique society, which differed from other Buddhist countries ruled by kings, such as Burma and Thailand.

Tibet in Exile

The non-violent approach has become the official ideology of the Tibetan government in exile. Since 1960, when the Dalai Lama proposed a democratic constitution in exile, the system has continuously improved; the latest change being the public election of a "prime minister" (*kalon tripa*) in August 2001. Although the Dalai Lama and the exile government

accept a division of approximately 20,000 Tibetan soldiers within the Indian army, the non-violent ideology has become so dominant among Tibetans in exile that it is sometimes referred to as "official propaganda". Officials have been trained for the work with the government, the administration of the departments and the agricultural and handicraft settlements, which is supporting the larger group of the refugees. The officials are expected to comprise the non-violent ideology advocated by the Dalai Lama. Since he believes in non-violence, they follow this. If he, however, had advocated violence they would have supported that. The philosophy of non-violence has resulted in a democratic culture where conflicts are solved by dialogue rather than by violence. One might therefore say that there has been a mutual reinforcement between the democratic institutions and the non-violence culture.

The centre of this culture is Dharamsala in Northern India, the residence of the Dalai Lama and the exile government. From this centre where the peace culture is dominating, in a similar manner as in Lhasa in old Tibet, it is spread to other parts of the refugee community and to Tibet by radio programs, tapes, videos and returning refugees. It is even spread to Buddhists in other countries and members of resistance movements in Burma, China, and formerly in East Timor.

There is however opposition against the non-violent policy among the refugees; the most well known organisation in opposition being the Tibetan Youth Congress. Today the organisation advocates the liberation of Tibet with non-violence, but considers violence as one of many methods, if there are no alternatives. Even if the Dalai Lama is strongly opposed to the use of violence, he accepts the stance of the organisation, just as the Tibetan Youth Congress accepts the stance of the Dalai Lama, as the expression of views in a democratic society. This does not conflict with a strong loyalty by Tibetan Youth Congress to the Dalai Lama, including his future plan of Tibet as a Peace Zone (for this plan, see *Tibet. Proving Truth From Facts*, 1993). This loyalty is also shared by the Tibetan Muslims, who number 2,000 in exile (Butt, 1994).

The culture of non-violence is consciously used to obtain support for the Tibetan cause in the international community. In fact some of the newly arrived refugees comment on this use of non-violence:

We never heard of non-violence in such a way in Tibet. Non-violence is according to Tibetans related with *karma* in Buddhism. They don't think of it politically.

In India it is used both spiritually and politically, hence I think it is more practical.

The culture of non-violence has thus developed within the international context, of which the refugees area part. Even if critics among the refugees ironically dismiss the non-violence strategy as being used simply for the international opinion, it is evident that this is not the case. The culture of non-violence is firmly based in the Buddhist tradition and in the democratic society, which has evolved in exile. This aspect of the culture of non-violence should instead be understood as a characteristic of a modern, in contrast to a traditional culture of non-violence. This culture is formed by the global society, rather than the traditional society where Tibetans had limited knowledge of the outside world.

I hesitate to use the words *modern* versus *traditional*, because they are associated with misleading connotations, but lacking better terms they are applied. As Wolf (1982) rightly points out, the term *tradition* often implies stasis and lack of development, thereby denying the countries termed as traditional any history of their own. By dividing the world into traditional and modern societies, effective understanding of the relationships betweem them, for example colonialism, is blocked. The above meaning is not given to the terms here, but rather they are used to describe processes such as the introduction of a mass education system, democratisation and the closer integration with the global society.

The Role of Education

When the Tibetans were forced into exile, they made education a top priority. It is a widespread opinion among them, that the reason for the loss of independence of their country was their lack of knowledge and awareness of international politics. This is one of the reasons for the rapid setting up a Tibetan educational system with the help of the Indian government and international aid agencies. Nowadays most Tibetan children in exile attend school for at least 10 years and many continue to higher levels. This is in sharp contrast to Tibet, where only 50 per cent of the whole school age population – this figure includes the Chinese population in Tibet - attend primary school according to official statistics (Bass, 1998). The actual figures of school enrolment among the Tibetan population on the country-

side, where almost all Tibetans live, is probably less than half of this. The low level of education in Tibet is reflected by the large number of illiterates among the recent refugees.

Non-violence is not really an official part of the curriculum of the schools in exile. It is is an integral part of the teaching of Buddhism, but since religious teaching is not allowed during school-hours in India, this is taught after school. Non-violence is also part of the curriculum of the subject "culture". Moreover, there are debates organized in school, and the topic is often "non-violence". Since non-violence is one of the most important, or *the* most important goal of the Dalai Lama and official policy of the exile government, there are lots of discussions about this within the exile government. The different arguments of non-violence versus violence are often debated in the schools, and in this way the pupils are able to form their own views. There are also various projects to develop non-violent values among the children. For example, in each school, there is a peace zone. This is a concrete way of trying to implement the plan of the Dalai Lama to turn Tibet into a peace zone in the future. Children who quarrel are sent to the peace zone to talk about their disputes peacefully. There they are not supposed to argue, not to raise their voices, but simply to walk around and contemplate peace.

As mentioned, the transmittance of the culture of non-violence is not a stated aim of the curriculum. Therefore the essential part of the culture of non-violence might very well be transmitted outside school-hours. Yet, it is important to emphasize the role of education as such in furthering a nonviolent approach to life. The alternative, no formal education at all, is a reality to the many of the new refugees, who arrive to India. Some of them speak of the strong experience when learning to read and write, a deep feeling of empowerment.

The daily transmittance of nonviolent values in the schools is of decisive importance, but there is also a meta effect of education, which might be even more important. This is the ability of reasoning about nonviolence, which is the result of a modern system of education.

The sister of the Dalai Lama, Jetsun Pema, who has been the director of the Tibetan Childrens' Village, explained this in an interview with me:

In the past in Tibet it was the community, that decided what could be done and not. With the empowerment of people through education, the understanding of peace is more of an individual choice. Because you are edu-

cated, you have an interaction within yourself. When you contemplate on peace, and you think of what nonviolence means, it has another kind of effect on an individual. Today's peace education and knowledge of our religion is received in a more concientious way, rather than taking it for granted. The level of understanding is much deeper.

Methods and research design

For a person being trained in a rational university environment in the West it might be difficult to understand the special religio-political discourse, which Tibetans in Tibet and exile adhere to on a deeper level. Schwartz's (1994) analyses of the religio-political discourse of the resistance in Tibet has inspired me to try to reach a deeper understanding of how Tibetan refugees think and talk about non-violence. For such an undertaking I have to a certain extent tried to apply a hermeneutic approach, but having little experience of this method I tend to slip back into the social anthropological methods, which I used in earlier studies. For the time being I am analysing the data with the help of Grounded Theory and the *Atlas* computer program. The methods used are therefore a mixture of various more of less qualitative approaches.

The data consist of approximately 100 interviews and conversations, most of them conducted in Dharamsala, India, but also in other places where Tibetans live, such as Majnuka Tilla in Delhi, in Kalimpong, in Kathmandu, Nepal, and in Lhasa, Tibet. The major part of the interviews were conducted in Dharamsala in the Reception centre for newly arrived refugees, and in two Tibetan schools in Dharamsala: the Tibetan Transit School and the school in the Tibetan Children's Village. The interviews were mainly made with young refugees between 17 and 25 years old, and since the major part of the newly arrived refugees are young men, this also applies to the interview group. Some interviews were however made with older persons. They could be characterized as key interviews with persons possessing special knowledge of the subject of non-violence versus violence, for example the sister and one of the brothers of the Dalai Lama, the *kalon tripa* Samdong Rinpoche (prime minister of the Tibetan exile government), and the author and former guerrilla member Jamyang Norbu.

I made the major part of the interviews myself with the help of a Tibetan, but a teacher in the Tibetan Transit School also made a part of them.[9]

The hermeneutic approach was used by mapping the life stories of the interview persons and trying to understand their statements within this context. The social anthropological methods used have been the traditional, i.e. interviews with the help of *gate keepers* or *key informants*, the interviewing until *saturation* is obtained and then turning to next area of investigation.[10] While interviewing I was living with a Tibetan family with whom I am related through my husband. The data were not obtained with participant observation during the long period of time which is often used by social anthropologists, as the environment is well known to me since the last 25 years. Moreover, I collected the data for my doctoral thesis in the same places. At that time, I also spent some time in the schools. Therefore, it was not necessary to stay for the long period, which social anthropologists generally do to learn the language and to understand the culture.

In Grounded Theory, the research should be done by *theoretical sampling* according to which the theory is developed while collecting the data; the hypotheses, concepts and theories being derived from the process of doing research (Burgess, 1982). As Agar (1980) points out, theoretical sampling covers a practice, which has long been used by anthropologists. It simply means that the researcher chooses the next people to talk with in a self-conscious way to obtain data for comparison with that he already has. This strategy was to a certain extent used, but not very systematically. In the present study, Grounded Theory has been mainly used for the analyses of data. These analyses have been facilitated by the computer program *Atlas,* which codes and categorises large data quantities. The oscillating back and forth between the data and the emergent theory becomes easy with the help of network views and other aids. This oscillation process has been useful to dig deeper into the data, and the technique is in itself a hermeneutic method. All the data - written, in pictures, sound, etc. - are analysed within a so called hermeneutic unit, and codes, categories and networks are attached to the data. In this way, larger amounts of both quanti-

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[9] I am grateful to this teacher, Pempa Tsering, and all other persons who helped me with the project. It is impossible to name all of them, but I would like to express my gratitude to all including the interviewees, named and unnamed. In addition to Pempa Tsering I would especially like to mention Lobsang Tenzin Kyaga, Tsewang Yeshi, Lobsang Nyandak, and Sofia Eriksson.

[10] The method used was more or less the same as in my doctoral thesis, see further Goldstein-Kyaga (1993).

tative and qualitative data can be analysed with relative ease *(Scientific Software Development's Atlas.ti,* 1997).

A rationalist, nationalist, or religious discourse?

Having completed the data collection my interpretations still seem to be rather "rational", and if this is due to my inability to understand the religio-political discourse on a deeper level, or if the interview persons indeed have given us "rational" answers is difficult to say. Tibetans are often annoyed of being treated as beings on a high esoteric level, and there has been some scientific discussion of what has been termed the *Tibet myth.* This discussion was initiated by an article by the Tibetan researcher Tsering Shakya (1993, p. 14, my tanslation), who argued that the Tibet myth had been an obstacle to the cause of the Tibetans.

The Western ideas of Tibet, the images that are connected with Tibet, have been an obstacle to the political cause of the Tibetans. The mystification of Tibet has obscured the real nature of the Tibetan political struggle.

The fact that a large part of the interviewees are recently arrived refugees may also have influenced the results. Since the Chinese authorities oppose and at times have forbidden Buddhist teachings, this has probably influenced the new Tibet-bred generation. Their worldview is probably less religious than the exile-born Tibetans. This conclusion is reinforced by results of my earlier studies. Tibetans in contemporary Tibet seem to have a more nationalistic identity than the Tibetans in exile. The latter describe a "good Tibetan as kind-hearted and religious", believing in the law of *karma,* not hurting others, being polite, honest and helping the poor and those escaping from Tibet. Those who have recently escaped from Tibet give similar answers but mention the working for Tibet's freedom and independence in the first place; they are Buddhist in the second place (Goldstein-Kyaga, 1993).

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Karsten Lichau

SurFaces InterFaces

This somewhat troubling (or troubled) title hints at a no less troubling subject. Indeed, the title can be read as intimating the trouble introduced by "Faces" in meanings and contexts that are supposed to be commonly known, evident and semantically safe. Or, if we take "Sur" and "Inter" for the spatial notions they refer to, it can show how introducing faces often troubles the established order of what is "Out(er)", (Sur) and "In(ner)" or "In-Between" (Inter).

I suggest reading it (again translating "Sur" and "Inter") as "On Faces-between Faces", for that is precisely what I am dealing with: Faces facing "other faces" – or: masquerade.

Fortunately, however, when Faces come together, other, new readings of "Faces" often arise...

Preliminary note: the face as a body-metaphor

The face represents a body-metaphor that allows one to examine the complex interweaving and interacting of body, society and subject. The term "Body-metaphor" expresses the idea that "the face" exerts something – not only in metaphorical figures of speech such as "the face of a clock", "to save one's face" or "to give face to somebody or something", but also in physical perception and medial enactment, in direct personal interaction and scientific discourse. This function of the face is similar to that of a metaphor in language: The face refers to that which is "other" (mostly to invisible aspects of the body, i.e. soul, character, disposition, etc.). At same time the face is thought to contain something of the truth of that ungraspable "other", to speak for it.

This semiotic function is produced and maintained by a social enactment or staging of the body. In this context the notion of "enactment" or "staging" refers to a repeatable act that defines social forms or orders in an exemplary way as obligatory, self-evident or important, and at the same time opens a space for the negotiation and change of these forms and orders.

In the first part of this essay, I would like to draw the attention to the face as Interface. Many social processes and functions in which the face takes its role as a body-metaphor tend to place the face in an *in between* position. Often faces appear in a sort of no man's land between cultural spheres that are held to be fundamentally opposed and mostly consist of binary differentiated categories facing each other: gender categories (women-men), spatial notions (outer-inner), and other oppositions such as nature and culture, body and mind. These cultural spheres, in their attempt to establish and to assume an essential, ontological face, cannot exist without being (secretly) interlinked by messengers – and faces often work as such messengers, that is, as Interfaces.

In order to underline the fact that these processes of production and interweaving are far from easy passages, I have chosen to replace the word "Interface" – which, for its technological attributions, often refers to a smooth transport of information – by "InBetweenThing". As an InBetweenThing, the face joins various cultural spheres, but not without frictions, not without providing an own, material and often troubled sphere, rich with complex micro-processes.

In the second part, I propose to deal with a particular aspect of opposition interlinked by faces: the opposition of unity and difference. In this context, the face stages two different social functions: It works as an imaginative and unifying "emblem" that plays a central part in the discovery process of individual selves and in the construction of social unities and coherences. At the same time, it provides an area of social distinction and differentiation: Social classes, genders, artistic or political movements enact their differences to a great extent by staging faces. Or, in the language of Pierre Bourdieu, the "fine distinctions" that are manifested in the "habitus" call for differentiated "other faces" – for masquerade.

The face – an "InBetweenThing". Doubled myths

Recent years have seen the emergence of an increased preoccupation with the body, its social construction and cultural staging. Yet within this novel interest in the body and its parts, the face has tended to be strikingly neglected. Deconstruction of the body – and in this context the body always means the gendered body – often focuses on the symbolic association of the body with "inferior" spheres, with nature, femaleness, materiality etc. For, these dimensions are often associated with inferior body parts like

digestion, locomotion or sexual organs and extremities. The face, that is, the part of the head that represents the "superior" realm of the mind and reason, the immaterial, maleness, etc. is often conceived as counterpart to the physical and therefore appears in symbolic opposition to "the body".

A scientific approach that is seriously concerned with the cultural construction of the body must seek to challenge such binary differentiations. The cultural staging of the body (in western European cultures) is marked by a "double myth structure" that troubles and blurs the perception of its own way of proceeding by superposing two levels of myths (see below), and only once this structure has been made visible, will we be able to deal with the body by taking these simple binary schemes seriously and making them the object of a deconstructive work – which does not mean making them disappear, nor should it lead us to be deceived into considering constructions unreal or inexistent. However, we should try to establish our own theoretical endeavours as far away from these schemes as possible. And at this point, studies about the social staging of the face may provide some important aspects. For, within the staging and discourse of the body, the face – and this is my thesis – finds itself in a troubling "InBetween" position, it resists any univocal symbolical attribution to binary cultural categories.

As an "InBetweenThing" the face allows interesting conclusions as to the strategies of the staging of the body, for it disrupts a thought in dichotomic differences and calls for a theory capable of looking at the body beyond such simple differentiations. In the following, I will (try to) explain this aspect:

A. (Wo)Manliness as a face: faces and gendered bodies

Just like the body – and being body – the face is a priori gendered face. Insofar as it may only come into existence – in its quality of an InBetweenThing – by means of the social staging and differentiation of categories such as nature vs. culture, body vs. mind, female vs. male, surface vs. depth, the visible vs. the invisible etc., through which subjectifying processes in western cultures have had to pass, the face as subjected body finds itself from the very beginning under the sign of the gendered body.

The face takes its position – in a symbolic process, not in the sense of a trans-symbolic phenomenology – between these cultural dimensions. It refers to the physical body and the semantic horizons linked to it – insofar as

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it connotates flesh ((facial) muscles), senses (looking, hearing, tasting, smelling and sensing are all seated in the face), materia – as well as the metaphysical spirit, to the extent that it stands for thinking, for that which is soul, mind, character, immaterial. The face is both "body" and transcends it.

The face is a borderline, a "no man's land", where the differentiation of these cultural categories is performed, but it keeps its own "symbolic materiality", not unambiguously located in the above mentioned categories. This ambiguity can be read as "symbolic materiality" for it tends to search for spatial manifestation. In addition to these semantic fields, the staging of the face between two semantic horizons requires a space where these fields can face each other. It is this place that makes the face an "InBetween-Thing" and its study a troubling but instructive target: On this SurFace, in this InterFace, categories of high social relevance are put on stage. At the same time, this SurFace-InterFace highlights these processes of construction and attracts attention to them, for the simple fact of never entirely fitting with these culturally constructed dimensions.

Here, we may begin to discover another aspect of InBetweenThings: They appear in front of a background by what one could call a "double myth structure", which is wide-spread in the modern western world and can be found in various cultural spheres, in oppositions like nature vs. culture, body vs. spirit, or spatial notions such as surface/depth, visible/invisible.

I propose to examine the function of the doubled myth(s) with the example of the gender-opposition of woman vs. man (which contains semantic links to all the above mentioned spheres). Gender distinctions are established by the circulation and institution of numerous myths about the qualities gender categories are thought to comprise, about what should be held as male and female attributes; in this process, the myths tend to place "manliness" in the realm of that which is superior, associating it with "high" culture and the spiritual, whereas "womanliness" is woven into a net of significations that comprises the inferior, the "low" nature, the bodily etc.

On a second level – and this is what the term "double myth" refers to – another myth of manliness and womanliness covers the first level, and this second level only qualifies specific sections of the cultural mythology as being mythological. Thus, by (re)presenting womanliness, for instance, as

deceitful and deficient or – of particular interest with regard to the face – as masquerade (cf. the discussion about Joan Rivière's concept of "Womanliness as Masquerade" (Rivière 1929) taken up by Lacan, Butler, Spivak, and others), not only a new horizon of meaning is created, but also the first level is disguised in its mythological aspects or dimensions of masqueradeness and construction. The whole binary construction mode as well as one of the two sides that is hidden or not (re)mentioned as being mythological on this second level (i.e. manliness), and consequently the associated fields of signification, appear not to be founded in the area of the mythological and cultural, and in consequence adopt a solid, ontological aspect.

Stated in other words: On the one hand, mythological concepts like that of "womanliness as a masquerade" produce real effects (in the real), which attribute womanliness to the realm of deceit and illusion and stage it appropriate signs (e.g. evoke the "female" desire for make up). On the other hand, mythological concepts draw attention away from the masquerade aspect of staged masculinity and confer an ontological air to the cultural masquerade surrounding the face (and body) of men assigning them an aura of spirituality, purity and self-evidence.

In fact of course the "double myth structure" comes into existence by concrete staging in a much more sophisticated and sublime way than my description. Thus, not all men wear the same spiritual mask, but often, in particular social fields, rather "bodily" masks. Nevertheless, they have in common that these qualities appear less menaced, more essential than the masks of womanliness.

B. Mirrored faces – faces of the mirror

We also find the face in an "In Between-position" between the functions of individual perception and social enactment (or between social perception and individual staging, since, as we shall see, these spheres are inseparably interlinked). Of great importance in contexts of social interaction – since processes of discovery, appropriation and transmission of the social figures of subjectivity, of the "self", of "alterity" and of other forms, all occur in and between faces – the face occupies a place half-way between the categories of the individual and the social, as well as between perception and staging (note, e.g. the history of the Latin word "persona" which originally designated the theatre mask (cf. Le Breton 1992: 240)).

The crucial point here is that these simple and simplistic oppositions find themselves subverted, as it turns out that all of these forms (subjectivity, individuality, the self, the other) are social forms, invested by social enactments and therefore due to social plasticity and imagination, change and masquerade. In the social drama of the discovery of the "Me", described by Freud as the recognition of an image of the body (and as a picture of the body in the outer, social world) and qualified by Lacan as a "méconnaissance", the face figures as a main actor and reveals the individual to be social and perception to be far from a purely passive act. Research on "non-verbal communication" often tends to forget these phenomena and thus overlooks the flexibility of both individual and social perception.

I propose to take a closer look at the social dimension of processes involved in perceiving a "persona" by examining artistic production. In his studies on the art of portrait, which focuses on the involvement of the body, the art historian Ernst Gombrich has pointed out the interweaving of the social and the individual, of perception and mise en scène.

Analyzing Oskar Kokoschka's techniques of portrait drawing, Gombrich suggests that the artist's "understanding of another person's physiognomy took the way over his own muscular experience" (Gombrich 1972: 41). He considers this to be the manifestation of a complex interaction of self-projection and self-detachment at work. There are two crucial aspects an artist must learn to combine within a portrait. First, he must have the skill to project himself – and even his own facial features – onto the face and the picture of the model – a phenomenon clearly recognisable in Kokoschka's portrait of Thomas Masaryk, which obviously mixes the artist's facial features with those of his model (cf. Gombrich 1972: 41).

Indeed, only by combining this mimetic skill of feeling and thereby "representing" the other's face within one's own – which involves the no less important skill of being able to detach oneself and one's own feelings and features from the other – is the creation of "master-portraits" made possible. This second process allows the other's face to be reduced to that which is most "typical" about it, to its most characteristic features (like a caricature, which manages to evoke an individual's unique identity in but a few brushstrokes). Such master-pieces excel by leaving the face its ambiguity or "depth", in this way evoking the spectator's projection and imagination, and creating at the same time a sort of coherence or "dominating expres-

sion", which gives rise to an impression of recognition of a person and his/her typical "aria".

Thus we come to recognize that faces are much more than prefigured biological schemes for the expression and perception of feelings. As In-BetweenThings, they enact social significations in a complex procedure and interweave individual perception with social staging, social perception with individual enactment.

C. Interaction interfaces

Another InBetween position that is particular to the face can be found in the context of so-called direct interaction and medial information. The face plays an important part in both interaction forms, for the strong focus on communication and interaction processes on visually dominated functions has placed the face into the centre of social attention. Here, it must be mentioned that both "direct interaction" and medial information proceed through the intermediary of semiotic systems, but they differ in their reciprocity, their involvement in time, the type of signs they employ and by the presence of the body (which is of course not totally absent to medial information functions).

It can be observed that faces and their presentations are involved in and changed by transformation processes which take place in the development of distribution media, but continue to play an important part in it. Thus, while faces and their mimic codes served as one of the most important codes of direct interaction in the courtly culture, in our days they are of great importance in picture-based media, which does not mean that they are disappearing from direct interaction, but that a strong influence of the medial code on the mimic codes of direct and everyday interaction is obvious. Here, we can only suppose that perspective angles, camera movements, the possibilities of technical (re)modification and other medial developments have a strong impact on codes directing everyday direct interaction in terms of re-staging attempts.

This interaction of interaction forms is however by no means a recent phenomenon. An indication that, at least since the end of the middle ages, the face has been closely connected to the question of direct and medial interaction and the self-reflection of picture-based media, can be seen in the example of the "Veronica", the representation of Christ's features emerging on a sweat-cloth (the "Veronica" cloth) in outlines, which is said

to have been the product of a direct impression of the divine face. Thus, the "Veronica" legend raises the question of a "vera icon", a true picture. In this context, Gerhard Wolf (2002) has demonstrated how the representation of the Veronica-cloth as a veil (i.e. in pictures by Filippo Lippi) assumes a sort of "catalyst function" for an "extensive reflection or self-reflection of the visual or artistic media in the early modern period" (Wolf 2002: 243) The face-image itself becomes a concealing veil, "indicating the limit that separates the spectator from the picture (Bild), or even the original (Ur-Bild), and that, in front of the picture, can only be disguised by imagination" (Wolf 2002: 237), but thus releases a new projective and imaginative empire of pictures. The veil-cloth can be seen as an early prototype of the "screen inside the picture". It announces a long historical process of reflection on the relation between media and direct interaction. If this reflection has come to the point of wondering whether in our days forms of direct interaction are actually disappearing or losing in importance, and being more and more replaced by medial information, the need for InterFaces seems to persist.

D. Talking heads

Finally, the face finds itself between picture-based and literary-based media. What we see (or read) in a face is influenced by the pictures we imagine along with it, as well as by the impact of the words that we contextualise faces with. Although this dimension is often neglected or hidden, gestures and mimics do not usually "speak for themselves", but instead tend to evoke an impression. They can only function by performative practice, and in this context writing plays an important part.

One of the most influential contributions to the paradoxical attempt to establish in writing a non-literate "language" based on faces or pictures comes from the Zurich parson Johann Kaspar Lavater. In the late 18th century he tried to defend the idea of a non-literate, direct evidence of faces against the "deceitful truth" passed on by the written word used in distribution and text-based media that has reached a previously unknown grade of distribution at the time. Moreover, Lavater was greatly successful with this project, drawing together disparate Anti-Enlightenment tendencies, which, fed up with the rational approach of enlightened scientists, sought more sentimental aspects – though, it would be too simplistic to resume Lavater's work to a simple Anti-Enlightenment position, for it comprises different influences and currents (cf. Fischer/Stumpp 1989).

I would like to draw attention to Lavater's method, or rather to what might be called his way of performing. In his attempt to demonstrate the undeniable evidence and truth of faces and of silhouettes – small pictures produced by copying the outlines of shade projections – he proceeded as follows. In his main work, "Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis und der Menschenliebe (Essays on physiognomy designed to promote the knowledge and the love of mankind)", published between 1775 and 1778, he showed silhouettes or portraits of people "famous" or "common", "genius" or "crazy", "intelligent" or "stupid". Lavater's purpose was to present these pictures – and, above all, the faces that they were supposed to reproduce realistically – as showing the truth, as univocal signs of character. In order to see this truth, the reader was encouraged to train his perception, and this training took place through the commentaries that Lavater provided as explanations for the pictures. Thus, for instance we read: "Diderot's forehead undeniably shows a bright, profound looking spirit – but so delicate, so hesitant. His nose is handsome and productive. Notice the outlines of the upper eyelid – delicacy and tenderness are undoubtedly expressed in it" (Lavater 1948: 48).

Further on we read: "People whose noses tend extremely towards their mouths are never really good, nor really cheerful, neither great, nor noble; their spirit pursues earthly things; they are reserved, withdrawn, insensitive, and incommunicative and usually have an insidious, ill-tempered spirit: They are most chronically hypochondriac or melancholic. If such noses are sharply curved in their superior part, this in addition signifies an extreme inclination towards carnal vice" (Lavater 1777: 95).

Whether these examples are of scientific or rather poetic value is of little significance here. What is striking is the fact that the evidence and truth value Lavater bestows the faces and pictures is obviously obliged to pass through written media. He may in fact be right to suggest that after a long and repeated training process one might come to "see" the "truth" in isolated pictures or faces, in a nose or a forehead, or wherever. But only after having passed through – once again – a double myth structure that in Lavater's performance tries to make the adept forget the second (or rather: the first) half of its mode of function. Here, the fact of proclaiming a picture or face to be truer than a word actually only works by the use of words. Once again: the one-sided aspect of this double myth structure – here, belief in the truth-bearing non-mediated evidence of a face – is far from being an illusion. Or better, it is an "illusio" (Bourdieu) with real ef-

fects, a part of a myth structure that is as existent and real as the other parts. But it is a part that tries to hide its own, no less existent and real way of coming into existence, which, moreover, is obliged to pass through InterFaces – through InBetweenThings that allow one to interlink cultural spheres that do not disappear in this process. In paradoxical reciprocity, the cultural spheres and parts of the myth require InterFaces to exist, whilst on the other hand, InBetweenThings may only come into existence by interlinking spheres.

Combining all these "InBetween" aspects, the face reveals itself as a promising contribution to a "general theory" of the body. Due to its ambiguous position – as an InBetweenThing between body and spirit, material and idea, woman and man, picture and text; between the social and individual, interaction and information – the face calls for a theory that can detach thought about the body from binary schemes in which it continues to be captured even in current conceptions (i.e. by representing the body in a precipitate and simplifying way as a pure source of resistance or subversion and in consequence – even maintaining the contrary – as an extra-discursive agent of liberation).

The face as an InBetweenThing perhaps allows one to draw interesting conclusions with regard to the "body" theme. It draws our attention to the danger of claiming the body in a one-sided sense for specific political purposes. Only by considering the body (and the face) neither as the pure material of discipline, nor as a pure source of resistance, can we hope to approach the body without overcharging it with illusions, but by paying attention to its role as a political actor.

Conceiving the face as an InBetweenThing means emphasizing its openness. Thus it becomes obvious that the face is body – just like other parts of the body; that it belongs to what Michail Bakhtin calls the "open body". "Open" here does not only mean openness for biological worlds and environments, but primarily for social worlds; power, discursive and other circuits, may they take on a disciplining or resistant effect. This conception of the open body also evokes Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the "habitus", which also conceptualizes the body as being open to the categories and influences of society (e.g. social, economic, symbolic and cultural capital; gender or ethnic constructions, etc.)

1. Emblematic face and masquerade

"To give a face to somebody or something" means to create a unifying surface that stands for something other, on which "One" stands (in) for a "variety" or an "Other". Focusing body_perception on the face reflects the movement of power (as used by Foucault) inside the society body, that is, the strategic attempt to fix partly open, dynamic discourses and social practices to anchorage points of power (as scientific, artistic or state institutions). Partial segments are assembled to – supposed – unities and refer to a strategic whole, the totality of which, however doubtful, they establish and protect.

Or, to put it in Foucault's words: Of all its emblems, our society bears that of the speaking face (cf. Foucault on "sex" in Foucault 1977: 97). The relation between face and body is enacted in the form of part and whole, inner and outer, visible and invisible, etc. The face thus refers to social processes and discourses (i.e. of discipline, discrimination, etc.). And at the same time, it stages these spheres, by interweaving the social construction of the body and the bodily production of the society. For, bodily relations perform social relations and their interlinks, surfaces and depth, their truths, enigmas and silences.

J. K. Lavater's physiognomy draws a connection between bodily and metaphysical dispositions. As the "art of reading the essence of a man in his (facial) features", its considerable success, not only in Germany, but also in other European countries, like France or England, is due to its attempt to establish an image of the society, a political anatomy of the society body, by studying individual bodies and faces. Discerning the rigid osseous parts of the skull as infallible signs of the unchangeable character that attributes each human being a fixed place in the world order willed by God (and in consequence in the social order), Lavater considers the mobile parts of the face and its "mimics" (facial expressions) as a deceitful surface that tends to betray the physiognomist by its variability and its playing possibilities: "I have hinted more than once [...], that I consider the bony system as the sketch of the human body; and that, in my apprehension, the skull is the basis, the abridgement of this system, just as the face is the result and the summary of the human form in general. The flesh, according to these principles, is only, in some measure, the coloring, which relieves the drawing; and the principal object of my researches will be the constitution, the form, and the curvature of the skull." (Lavater 1792: 145)

Throughout this paper, I have constantly spoken about "the Face". In reality of course there is no such thing as "the Face" – no more than there is such a thing as "the body" or "the human being". Put in other terms: "The face" only exists as a "name that can be given to a historic device" (Foucault) – and by this as an effect of these historic devices. Such a system is built up by different discourses and practices that tie together a wide range of different faces, each of them facing the others. These rivalling faces bear differences that are enacted and fought out by battles on "social fields" (in Bourdieu's sense of the term, cf. Bourdieu 1982: 378-99).

On one hand, therefore, faces are masks. Faces first take on significance by means of various practices of differentiation; by different discourses which create faces and distinguish their own faces from the faces of other discourses as well as distinguish between their own multiple faces, in a word: put on faces. On the other hand, the repeated strategic attempt to assemble the complex, dispersed and diffuse dimensions of discourses brings with it an effect that could be called "emblematic face".

The quest for the "true face" and the desire of a "distinguished face" turn out not to be simply contradictory antitheses. In the eyes of the individual, only the distinguished face is the "true face". On the level of society, some of the distinguishing and differentiating tactics employed by single individuals and separate discourses come together and make up a system we could qualify as the "system of the emblematic face". Moreover, it is precisely this emblematic aspect which gives the face its unifying power, its capacity to represent a true, univocal, universally recognisable instance – and at the same time hides its differentiating function.

An anthropology of education that is orientated against a cultural and historical approach must surely reject going over the "'face' of an epoch" (Foucault 1973: 19) and ought to try to reconstruct (or deconstruct) the different faces under which discourses and practises come together and reside for longer or shorter periods. An analysis of the face looking for the face of the face would be bound to go wrong if it failed to consider the different faces that appear in different constellations and circumstances.

The emblematic face finally turns out to be part of the masquerade game – even if it tries to hide this effort. It comprehends the "fine distinctions" – the masquerade – by means of which positions and dispositions on social fields differentiate. This is, once again, the structure of a double myth: The belief in a non-masked, literal, non-deceitful truth speaking

from the face, has its origin in a masquerade of the masquerade (or a masquerade of the myth). The staging of the "true face" covers up and blurs its own way of functioning, or is enacted as non-masquerade or anti-mask.

Nevertheless, this belief in the face is to a large extent "real". Believing in "the face" engages real, material effects – "the face" is an "illusio" in Bourdieu's sense of the term: "[T]he *illusio* is that enchanted relation to a game which is the product of a relation of ontological correspondence between the mental structures and the objective structures of the social space" (Bourdieu 1998: 141). "The face" represents a frame provided by different social institutions and areas allowing the constitution of different faces – as a strategy in the body or sexuality system described by Foucault.

This power to assemble into unities the perception of fragmented bodies as well as to stage differentiated societies makes the face symbolically stand out in relation to other parts of the body. We find other elements of the body, however, which in diverse contexts symbolize the unity of individual and social bodies – e.g. the heart (as the seat of emotions), the nervous system, the blood or the blood circuit (as in the Nazi's macabre "blood and earth" ideology). A more recent example of growing influence is the human genetic pool or genetic code. However, none of these elements compare with the power of the face to stand for a whole. And none of these elements is so deeply imprinted by the strategies of distinction, differentiation and discrimination that, like the face, it is considered essential, natural and beyond discursive construction.

The paradoxical appearance of the relation between the emblematic face and the masquerade raises the question of the staging techniques and the strategies of discourse by which it becomes possible to make the face symbolize unity and differentiation at once. The face might be read as a metaphor for the – largely paradoxical – effort to go along with the perpetually new production of individual and social forms of social presence, coherence and existence. Proof of this can be found in expressions like "to give face to someone or something", "to loose one's face", "to save one's face", "to show one's true face", etc. These expressions draw our attention to the face as an indispensable element of the "habitus" – which Bourdieu takes to comprise the incorporated, and at same time structuring and structured forms of social dispositions – and thus play a prominent part in the struggle between the poles of social fields (cf. Bourdieu 1982: 277-98).

1. Faces facing each other

The time of the "Weimar Republic" was a period of particularly pas-
sionate manifestation of this struggle for the face. In the Germany of the
1920s and 1930s, artistic and intellectual movements, scientific currents, as
well as everyday-culture and aesthetics which were undergoing a strong
and growing influence by the so-called mass-media, all these fields found
themselves under the sign of a developing crisis that can be characterized
as a rupture of the picture of the unitary, self-identical and autonomous
subject of the modern period. This process had already begun in the 19th
century, but, propelled by the trauma of the First World War, it now
reached a peak and found its most significant expression in the catchword
of the "lost face" of the Germans (cf. Schmölders 2000).

Even if not all refer explicitly to this expression, an intense preoccupa-
tion with faces, a "search for the lost face" (Schmölders), can be noticed
within the (Human) sciences, within artistic and intellectual life, and in
everyday-aesthetics. What is seen and perceived in faces acquires move-
ment and new figures come up here and there that comprise similarities
and differences and establish connections and delimitations between the
fields, their actors and exponents. Within all this, new (con)figurations of
faces and new types of staging and enactment are used.

What new orders of the relation between face and body can be outlined,
and how are these connected with the treatment and discussion of unity
and difference? How are the dispositions of social and political standpoints
(i.e. of avant-garde artists or various anti-modern philosophers) that run
through the body expressed in textual and pictorial (self) representations of
faces? Moreover, how do the – sometimes overlapping – anti-democratic,
national-avant-garde, Christian-conservative or "culture-critical" intellec-
tual currents of the time (Rudolf Kassner, Ludwig Klages; Stefan George
and his circle, Ernst Jünger; Max Picard, to name but a few of the most
prominent), in which we find an intensive occupation with the face subject,
how do these turn into interfaces that can later be linked to fascist images
of body and society? And, finally, what is to be seen in the approval or dis-
approval of the new visual "mass-media" of (press) photography and film –
in which faces figure large – and how do these preferences spread over so-
cial and cultural "elites" and "masses"?

I cannot answer all these questions in detail here, but I would like to
sketch these interrelations by choosing some examples. My suggestion is
to read philosophical or scientific works as (unconscious) self-descriptions

of habitus that try to map the social (dis)positions that run through one's own body or the body and face of others.

"Das Menschengesicht" (The human face) for example, a work published by Max Picard in 1929, represents a highly instructive "habitus-self-analysis", which allows to comprehend how his social disposition – due to a crisis caused by the deep impact of social change – reveals itself in bodily realised distinctions between faces. Picard, a philosopher of religion, was backed by a wide spread attitude of cultural pessimism, which in his case took the form of Christian conservatism and an antidemocratic posture. He projected his disapproval of "the modern" onto democracy, the mass media (and above all cinema) and urban life. In this spirit he distinguished the "former", God-like "Menschengesicht (Human face)" from the modern "Kinogesicht (cinema face)", which he considered lacking "substance" and "essence": "It is in the invisible part that a face has his reserves. It lives and grows in the visible only because of a power that flows from its invisible part. [...] Today, there is no longer an atmosphere surrounding the human being. Disconnected from the invisible, the human being stands isolated in the visible. He stands there in too much brightness, not subdued by the invisible [...]; he is no longer protected by the invisible. [...] There is a lack of atmosphere that keeps a human being away from the other; people push each other away. The human face of today is without presence. It has become but a cinema face." (Picard 1929: 115).

I would like to bring this example face to face with another, written this time by Ernst Jünger in 1932. Again, we witness a deep cultural pessimism, here tending towards a prophetical admiration and enthusiasm for a future determined by industrial work and technical advance, in which the mask – indeed, the working, protective mask – is seen to be growing in influence.

"In fact, it is not a pure accident that the mask has recently acquired a role in everyday life again [...]. In places where the specific character of work is breaking through, whether it be as face masks for sports and high speeds, as each motorist now possesses, or as protective masks for work in spaces that are threatened by radiation, explosions or narcotic processes. My guess is that the mask will take on entirely other tasks than are foreseen today – e. g. in the context of a development in which photography reaches the rank of a weapon of political attack." (Jünger 1982[1932]: 122).

For Jünger, the mask announces a future in which the bourgeois individual will disappear to be replaced by the "typus" whose outlines emerge in the mask-like. In Jünger's conception, the mask does not represent difference – like I suggest in my use of the word – but, on the contrary, is considered as that which overcomes "differentiating values":

"Only in this way, as a cult of the individual, can we understand [...] the enormous impact unleashed by physiognomy at the end of the 18th century. [...] The individual, in its attempt to establish an identity of its own, appeals to values by which it distinguishes (itself), that is, its individuality. Whereas the typus tends to reveal values that are situated beyond the individual existence" (Jünger 1982[1932]: 141-44).

Talking of the typus in this way evokes several contexts, e.g. contemporary gestalt psychology. But it also evokes the later National Socialist discourse of "Ganzheit" (wholeness) and "Volkskörper" (the Nation's body).

In the context of natural science, the famous bio-psychologist Konrad Lorenz argues in his work "Die angeborenen Formen möglicher Erfahrung" (The inborn forms of possible experience) that perception of the good and beautiful are connected by an hereditary biological scheme. For this reason, "we react in the same way again and again to an open forehead, a bright eye or a good profile; even though we know exactly how often we have been fooled by our inborn schemes in this regard" (Lorenz 1943: 313). At first sight it would seem that Lorenz claims that "inborn schemes" fool us. A closer analysis of his argument, however, reveals that in fact his aim is to blame cultural influences and civilisation for causing perception to be troubled. For he continues: "Without a doubt we must see in the function of the inborn schemes a last anchor for cultured peoples menaced by the devastating consequences of civilisation. A tolerably well-balanced racial harmony in a nation thus seems to us of fundamentally new importance. For this is how it is. It [this harmony] is an important precondition for the normal function of schemes. It is the confusion of the "good and beautiful", which, attached to our reactions to our fellow creatures with the full inconvincibility of the scheme, also gives the aesthetical its value. Even if we do not want to estimate the beautiful as highly as the ancient Greeks, [...] we must not overlook the reactions to aesthetic schemes most deeply anchored in the human nature, if, that is, we do not want to damage the natural selection of ethical values at the same time" (Lorenz, 1943: 314).

This quotation refers – among other things– to the long tradition of physiognomic thought and the "art of reading faces", that at the time rose to new power and scientific reputation – not only after 1933.

Biometrical methods of discerning the psychological character could rely on combined biometrical and moral psychological, criminology and psychiatric traditions in their attempt to define "beauty" along the lines of national-racist ideology, often by mathematical and geometrical proceedings. Thus, in 1924, an expert opinion delivered by Max von Gruber, racial hygienist and acting as president of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, pronounced: "Face and head, bad race, bastard. Low, receding forehead, unsightly nose, broad cheek-bones, small eyes, dark hair. [...] These are the face features of someone not in full control of himself, of a madly agitated individual." (Max von Gruber, cit. in Fest 1963: 53)

This quotation, and the fact that its author was no one less important than the president of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, shows that race hygienics had a growing success not only after 1933. Indeed, it established itself even earlier, inside a scientific field that made it possible for race hygienics to take over and keep a scientific face between the above mentioned "legitimate" discourses of biology (biometry, hygienic), psychology (moral psychology, biopsychology), medicine and "social hygienics" (criminology), which themselves were subordinate to the wider frame of "biopolitics" as a whole.

That the person described so unflatteringly in Gruber's (expert) opinion was no other than Adolf Hitler, who was later to lead this same racial hygienics project to its terrible summit, may astonish at first sight; but it goes to show that faces do not bear "truths" in themselves, but in the features they assume. The rise of National Socialism was not only the rise of Hitler and this of course did not only depend on his face. Perhaps it may be said however, that Hitler's face filled the gap left by the "lost face" – and this not because of his biometrical measures, but by means of staging strategies that found resonance on different social fields (cf. Schmölders 2000).

We find this echo expressed in a word by Otto Wagener, one of Hitler's long time confidants: "From the very first moment, his eyes fettered me. They were clear and big, calmly and self-confidently directed at me. Yet the clear look did not come from the eyeball; it came from much deeper. I had the feeling, it was as if it came from infinity. It was impossible to read those eyes. But they spoke, they wanted to speak. They did not ask, but they talked." (Otto Wagener, cit. in Schmölders 2000: 9)

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From these words, links can be drawn to other quotations: the notions of "depth" and "infinity" recall Picard's "invisible part" and the power springing from it; and the range of metaphors charged with religious allusions can be found in the words of various philosophers in the 1920s.

The disappearance of a dialogical principle, or at least of an interpretive reading behind a unilateral and directive communication – and the contrast between "It was impossible to read those eyes", "They did not ask" and "they spoke, wanted to speak", "they talked" and the speech of the fettering eyes, can certainly be interpreted in this direction – is analogous to the rise of mass media and its lack of a dialogical dimension as noticed by authors like Picard. From here, connections may be drawn to his renouncement of the "cinema face" and Jünger's approval of the mask and the typus.

Finally, the univocal expression as felt by Wagener contrasts clearly with the menace and insecurity that Lorenz believes to have discovered in the "cultured peoples" threatened with extinction by the annihilating consequences of the civilisation process.

Even if all these interconnections are only sketched here and would need to be explained more precisely, what has certainly become clear is the extent to which, as an InBetweenThing, the face represents a powerful part of the body and how this power is manifested in the forms of "emblem" and "masquerade". These "faces facing each other" in different, sometimes disapproving, sometimes coherent ways may give an idea of the extent to which the face, a part of the body often perceived as a trans-discursive communication agent or simple screen of the inner existence, is a major actor in (body) politics.

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Benjamin Jörissen

Who's online? Anthropological remarks on the construction of self and other in computer-mediated communication

Internet culture and cultural identities – a critical approach

In the last decade, a lot of useful insights and informative studies about the problem of identity in online surroundings have been published (Turkle 1995; Donath 1999). Also, research about the appearance and handling of cultural identity/cultural difference within the internet has produced quite a few books and articles (e.g. Ma 1996; Colomb/Simutis 1996; Jones (ed.) 1997; Poster 1998; Burkhalter 1999). Still, online research in terms of culture and identity is evolving, as can be seen in the as yet manageable number of theoretical and especially empirical studies on the subject. This contribution wants to investigate the interdependency of culturality and identity in computer-mediated communication (CMC), with an emphasis on the processes of transformation both are currently undergoing.

One of the most obvious characteristics of the internet is its world wide accessibility. But (more or less) global access does not simply cause an increase of intercultural encounters. Although there is a multiplicity of intracultural and intercultural aspects to CMC, we want to show a dynamic tendency of the Internet to dissolve the borders of cultural identity and to promote what Wolfgang Welsch called ‚transculturality' (Welsch 2001). This fractalization of culturality, we argue, forces us to grasp the issue in the individualized terms of identity and alterity rather than in terms of an identification with a fixed ethnic or cultural group.

What we want to describe as a genuine form of culturality developed within, and by, the Internet itself, may be, considered historically, a part of 'cyber-culture'. Since its introduction in Gibson's famous novel, the term 'cyberspace' does not only describe the connection of digital data. It is rather associated with a realm of new technological (sub-) cultures, which often goes hand in hand with alternative lifestyles; be it that of those highly motivated software-engineers who developed the new information technologies in universities or research institutes by day and night, or that of enthusiastic users, 'netizens' or hackers, or even that of the extreme sort

of science-fiction fans calling themselves kryonics, extropians etc., or other activists, artists or avant-gardists of cybernetic prostheses (*cyborgs*, cf. Derry 1996, Freyermuth 1996, Stelarc 1996, Turkle 1995). What these net-users all have in common is their *engagement* in this medium. The Internet is part of a—mostly real, but partly just wishfully imagined— technological world where participants have to *get into* this game, governed by a technical atmosphere, if they want to be recognized as a respected member of one of the various *online communities*. For example, acting in a MUD is a very skilful task; and there is a high requirement for a special *practical knowledge*, which keeps a participant of a chat room from being classified as an outsider. Most communication devices of the Internet have special places for 'newbies', where these can practise taking part and where they learn the rules – a kind of virtual obedience school. Being a part of an online community requires regular participation, following codes of speech and behaviour ('netiquette') and often even showing the willingness to help with communal or organizational tasks and duties as well as, importantly, helping each other in the case of an emergency (Rheingold 1994). In this way, online communication allows, demands and promotes the appropriation of new habits, representing an adaptation to the respective 'local' communication culture. The case studies delivered by Sherry Turkle (1995, Chap. 7) significantly demonstrate the high motivation of net users and the enormous amount of time they are willing to devote.

This kind of involvement could be described as the virtual pendant of a complex Pierre Bourdieu (1993:122) called *illusio*. *Il-lusio*, 'being-in-the-game', is characterized by dedication and high interest in the game, as well as the recognition of its premises, and a belief in the social game and its rules (which Bourdieu defined as *doxa*). The countless acts of recognition, which are the indispensable prerequisite for affiliation, and which permanently produce a false collective perception which keeps the field alive and, at the same time, is an effect of the field itself – these acts of recognition are a kind of an *investment* in the collective enterprise of the achievement of symbolic capital. The often conjured 'reality' of virtual communities (Rheingold 1994; Wellman/Gulia 1999) is constituted by this willingness to invest and to reproduce the collective illusion. The degree to which a form of online communication creates its own culturality could in this respect be assessed by asking whether it demands a specific *practical*

knowledge which represents the basis of the *illusio*, which stands for both a *belief in* and a *reproduction of* the established rules.

The Internet's culturality points to a general tendency towards the transformation of culturality currently taking place, and the Internet may just be an exemplary case where this tendency appears more overtly than in 'real life'. Wolfgang Welsch (2001) provides many good reasons for criticizing the traditional concept of culturality (taken as a homogeneous, closed-in-itself complex of language, lifestyles etc.) as well as the conceptions of multiculturality and interculturality, insofar as these are implicitly based on this traditional definition of culture. Welsch's critical remarks gain a special importance in respect to our thesis of the internet's own culturality: while it may be that the normative supposition of the 'other' culture as being a totally different, homogeneous entity of its own (a supposition which is implicitly fundamental to the notion of interculturality) is partially accurate for contemporary forms of culturality (although we suppose that the further globalisation spreads, the more this kind of culturality will be transformed)—it does not meet the conditions of culturality which are developing in cyberspace. According to our thesis, cyberspace is rather a paradigm for transculturality. Welsch (2001:264) sees this transformational stage on the way toward a fully denationalised or deregionalized culturality as being characterized by the following traits: 1) the external interlacing of cultures (as an effect of migration, global traffic- und communication systems, economic interconnections), producing similar attitudes towards global issues (e.g. human rights, feminism, the environmental movement); 2) the hybrid character of contemporary cultures, where on many levels (population, consumer goods, information) other cultures are part of the content, as for example in eating habits or in art; 3) the dissolution of the difference of the own and the foreign, taken as the decreasing ability to clearly distinguish between the home-grown and the foreign. The imported elements of the home culture are closer to their culture of origin (or to the same imports in other cultures) than to the home culture. Someone whose culinary socialization has given him a preference for *pasta* will feel much more at home in Rome or Little Italy than in the restaurant around the corner serving traditional fare: the inner relations of a culture today contain nearly as much foreignness as the relations to other cultures.

Finally, the concept of transculturality is in accordance with the fact that internet culture is anything but uniform. Belonging to a certain culture

not only has an influence on the preferred modes of internet usage—ethnicity rather inscribes itself into the net, not without posing a series of difficult questions concerning 'virtual ethnicity' (Poster 1998), deriving precisely from the cultural permeation of the internet. As Poster (1998:206) reports, Jewish internet-communities have to deal with special problems: "Countless difficulties confront the would-be CyberJew. How is one to know that participants in electronic communities are Jews? Or does participation constitute ethnic membership? [...] Conundrums over the basic features of Jewish practices assail ethnicity in cyberspace. It would seem that the transplantation of social forms that arose in preindustrial contexts into high-tech contexts would have great difficulty. [...] Others were more sanguine but placed their hopes for the Internet in a global spiritual renewal, rather than in an simple transformation of Judaism."

With unprecedented clarity, the Internet demonstrates that identity and otherness are   mere constructs. Especially with regard to tranculturality, the construction of otherness and foreignness has to be reviewed critically. In the face of cultural interpenetrations, otherness often is a mere effect of a—for instance, economically motivated—strategy of demarcation (cf. Hahn 2000:41): in a situation where the Other has become our competitor due to his similar characteristics and abilities, otherness is constructed by the positing of a supposedly homogeneous 'proper culture' uncontaminated by foreign influences.

This kind of otherness, which is often a completely implausible construction, may be distinguished from a deeper notion of otherness which belongs rather to the realm of the 'sacred', and acts as a 'fascinans' and 'tremendum' (Hahn 2000). This sort of otherness too is a construction. But its ability to distress points to the fact that this phenomenon is more than a *mere* construction. An unease arises as a direct result of the insufficiency of our constructions, making the incomprehensibility, opacity, unfathomability and unpredictability of its cause even more palpable. The reason why otherness has the effect of a 'tremendum' lies in the symbolic threat to one's own world view. The resulting fear of alterity is not bound to rationally negotiable points of view, but inheres in a transdiscursive realm of implicit assumptions appearing in the form of attitudes (*habitus* in the sense of Bourdieu), preferences and orientations (cf. Hahn 2000).

This kind of otherness is not logically bound to the presumption of monocultural differences. It lurks right in the centre of what seems to be familiar, maybe at a place where a merely fictional consensus creates the

illusion of companionship (cf. Hahn 1983), or in a situation of a life crisis when we may become strangers to ourselves. It therefore plays an important role, particularly under the conditions of transculturality, which implies a conjoining of cultural closeness and distance. Transculturality may be understood as an effect of *individualization* of cultural differences which formerly were regionally located (not *within* a person). This circumstance leads to the following conclusion: If the question of intercultural encounters within the Internet is to be posed in a meaningful way—and this is desirable in the face of ethnic conflicts on the one hand and the potential for communication the Internet grants on the other—it then has to aim at the *possibilities of the experience of alterity* in the sense explicated above.

The insight into the constructedness of otherness points to the impossibility of a 'genuine understanding' of the 'other'. A more humble, but no less important goal could be found in the reflection and consideration of one's own non-understanding of the other. Such an experience implies an insight into one's own constructions of otherness, into one's own 'inner otherness', or 'foreignness to oneself' ("Selbstfremdheit", cf. Gebauer/Wulf 1998:244). By recognizing the way I construct the otherness of another person on the occasion of his or her alterity, my ability to identify and reflect my constructions *as such* increases. In doing so, one's worldview and self-image can be discovered as relative and limited. A *practical experiencing* of the other becomes possible without the need to reject his alterity: as Welsch (2001:278) stated, in intercultural interaction it is not so much a hermeneutic understanding of other persons or cultures which is important, but rather the recognition of shared assumptions and lived values.

Eder (1999:46) gets at the essence of this issue by remarking that the philosophers of virtual reality are perhaps right in their claim that intercultural understanding is a mere *performance of understanding*, which means that the criteria of its success does not lie in a 'true understanding' of the other, but in a successful performance in the sense of a commitment by all the members to the given performance. The shared assumptions and values themselves, one could say, *are* identical with this performance: the *performance of a common ground.* This implies two conclusions: On the one hand, the performance of understanding produces a *real* community— maybe not in terms of content and social knowledge, but at least in terms of performance. It's not that the performance would just pretend to create

commonality; rather its success *per se* means understanding and acting toward a common 'goal' (which, in this case, lies in the performance itself). On the other hand, to achieve a *durable* performative success demands a kind of common ground (at least in a practical sense, not necessarily as a communicative processes of negotiation) which motivates the *willingness to achieve* such a performance of community (which only can be successful if all involved parties or persons perform the same acts in similar ways). On this occasion it is strictly speaking of less importance if the stock of shared ways of acting derives from traditional contexts, if it is an effect of what Eric Hobsbawm calls the 'Invention of Tradition' (Hobsbawm 1998), or if it is merely an effect of a global consumption of similar or even identical media contents and lifestyles (cf. Jörissen 2001:198).

This does not mean that cultural interaction is only possible under conditions of a globalised monoculture. The intersections Welsch intends rather build a common ground which allows for both the negotiation and intermediation of difference. In 'real life' interactions bound to space and bodies which are not able to permanently evade each other, it has been shown in empirical studies that commonalities develop by means of the ritualisation of everyday interactions (Wulf/Althans/Audehm e.a. 2001). Cultural, gender and generational differences are negotiated within ritualised performances producing mutual acts of recognition: pragmatic communalities and common practices are not based upon the levelling of differences; on the contrary, they enable *practical* forms of recognition of difference.

The Internet is a medium which facilitates community (Rheingold 1994; Jones (ed.) 1998; Smith/Kollockb (eds). 1999). Therefore, the performance of community and mutual understanding is no less than a constitutive aspect of the Internet, and accounts for an important part of its myth. It is nevertheless rather improbable that this means that it spontaneously provokes regular negotiations of cultural differences (the limitlessness of cyberspace make it too easy to avoid alterity, which always threatens to cause an inconvenience). No one *has to* meet here to experience the stimulations as well as the demands alterity brings with it. Swerving into more convenient communication opportunities is just a mouse click away.

But could the Internet contain a special potential for experiencing alterity? In the end, both of its properties—its tendency towards facilitating

the development of communities on the one hand, its global spread on the other seem to form a good basis in this respect.

Who's online?

Although the Internet is partially a medium of direct communication, it is impossible to communicate *immediately* through the internet[1]—in this respect the Internet has to be distinguished from other forms of tele-media (like telephone or video-conferencing systems). Sybille Krämer points out that internet-interaction cannot be understood in the same way as personal interaction: "People can be active within the net only by transforming themselves into symbolic expressions" (Krämer 2000:107, my translation). For this reason, in online interaction one does not have contact to persons but to symbolic structures—in contradiction to the illusion produced within the medium. Regardless whether the identity of a person is performed or pretended, or if a person tries to act as himself: it is quite impossible to act within the Internet without transforming one's person into a *persona*. Consequently, it is only this persona which can be experienced by the other participants.

Now this situation reminds us of a circumstance typical for all kinds of personal interaction: "We are what we perform to be; we are what we are made by being a part of discursive and non-discursive practices" (Krämer 2000:113 f.). Even in immediate interaction it is exclusively constructions we are confronted with, in the form of applications of social categories serving as individual identity-markers (signifying gender, ethnic and social origin, habits, age, etc.). One could be led to assume that the persona is a mere (additional) part of the person, a new aspect of identity which stands more or less on equal footing next to the 'conventional' fragments or parts of identity. But following Krämer's analysis, this notion turns out to be misleading. Our own constructions of the other person in real life can easily be suspended: we may discover that we have deluded ourselves in our perceptions or expectations, or the other person may reject our constructions (and the corresponding social categorizations). Historical anthropology makes use of Jacques Lacan's conception of a "screen" onto which an image of the person appears as a result of being looked at as well as (herself) acknowledging this (objectifying, identifying, categorizing etc.) gaze

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[1] (Apart from speech transfer and audiovisual conferencing systems, which however cannot be said to be internet-specific forms of communication.)

a fixation of a social image which is maybe, but not necessarily, also desired and intentionally provoked (cf. Gebauer/Wulf 1998:265). This image remains tied to the person in her presence; recognition or rejection of this image directly implies recognition or non-recognition of the individual whose image or identity is at stake.

In cyberspace, on the contrary, when transforming into a persona, the person *herself* creates an image of her own – the primary persona of a person online is consequently not a construction of another person. The *persona* is an image created out of the person's conception of, and imagination about, herself, and *by no means* is this basic image constructed by her social surroundings. There is a kind of static notion about this picture which is more than the process of fixation in a socially constructed image, which is due to the fact that the social environment has no opportunity of taking part in creating the persona within online communication. The social image resulting out of online interaction through a process of recognition and negotiation, may solely refer to the already construed *persona*, and never to the person behind the persona (as it would be in real life).

In addition, the other person who recognizes the *persona* may likewise just appear and act as a *persona*. If I experience the recognition of a part of my personality, represented through my contributions to an internet communication, the value of this recognition depends on my own evaluation of the person (i.e. the *persona*) recognizing me (i.e. my *persona*). But because in online communication I may just interact with a *persona*, which, as a merely virtual symbolic construction, lacks the ability to recognize anything, its ostensive recognition has to be referred to its creator, the person 'behind' this *persona*. Insofar as there is no immediate contact with this person, I am bound to my imaginations and fantasies about her, which are constituted by my own constructions based upon my impressions of her *persona*.

The approach to the other person takes place as an approach to this virtual symbolic construct, which may be manifested as a virtual social identity. We have to stress that the term 'virtual' in this context does not mean a part of a person existing in a virtual surrounding, but rather a factually *simulated identity*, which, due to its very structure may not be a real part of a person. This curious and direct relation between person and *persona* (e.g. the person types in sentences or actions the *persona* speaks out

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or enacts) may be described as a kind of shadow in regard to the reduced dimensionality of a *persona* as compared to a real person.[2]

In CMC, we unavoidably interact as digital shadows with other digital shadows. Yet, as long as this *shadow play* isn't explicitly framed by other games (e.g. role-playing games), it is not recognizable as a such: CMC creates an *immanence of the imaginary* in that the interaction of two *personae* simulates social interaction and—importantly—at the same time produces the *illusion of immediacy and presence*. The following two phenomena tend to validate this conclusion: a) Precisely where the absence of a bodily presence should cause the most trouble —we are referring to 'cybersex' or 'virtual sex' (vsex)—the simulation of social practices on the contrary *promotes* the illusion of presence and enhances the immanence of the imaginary. As Deuel (1996:138) reports: "For participants who are emotionally invested in such activities, a number of additional factors come into play to enhance the experience: the slow development of real-time interaction and mutual stimulation between the two participants, the tempo inherent to this process, and the gradually unfolding expression as participants react to each successive response. Most participants describe a point at *which the screen disappears*, when one is no longer sitting at a terminal but is perceptually in another space and the *imagination has taken over entirely*" (my emphasis, B.J.). b) Due to the increase in technical potential, particularly in the improvement of real time transmission of complex three-dimensional objects, a trend seems to be emerging towards a replacement of the hitherto imaginarily created images by technically produced ones (simulated environments, avatars). Thus, a degree of visual immersion becomes possible, creating a perfect illusion, such as in the well-known computer games like Tomb Raider. Current examples of this technology are 3D-chat-systems like *rose* or the *reddog-galaxy*. The MIT media lab research project „Zora" (cf. Bers 1999) examined narrative identity-construction processes in a multicultural group of children who spent several weeks together in a newly developed graphic 3D-MOO (‚object oriented multi user dimension'). These kinds of virtual surroundings could become standard for online interaction in the near future.

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[2] Shadows are dimensionally reduced; they just represent the outlines of a thing, and can turn out, as a result of the missing third dimension, to be misleading,. On the other hand, they promise to represent the true ‚profile' of a person (one may think of silhouettes). At the same time, shadows ‚act' immediately by means of the bodies they belong to, so that they may cause the impression of great liveliness (like in a shadow play).

To sum up, we may conclude that within a social context transformed into a symbolic structure (text, images), there is, in principle, no possibility for a genuine experience of alterity in terms of the 'otherness' of the other person we meet. There are several additional reasons why there is no such possibility:

- The lack of bodily interaction thwarts real mimetic participation (Wulf 1999:31). Thus an important non-cognitive dimension of experience (and instance of the encounter with otherness), well-known to the ethnographer, is missing. It is one thing to participate through communication in the manners and habits of foreign (sub-) cultures, but another to bodily take part in these customs. A level of understanding in terms of a *sens pratique* (of a foreign culture, not the local online-culture as described above) is nearly completely missing.

- The social conventions available in the simulation of direct interaction (emoticons etc.) and the self-presentation and experience of the other person experienced in this way, are sparse compared to real-life interactions. Vivid expression is reduced to rough outline, as can be demonstrated by the example of laughter and smiling. Online communication provides several forms of laughter. Emoticons, abbreviations (like 'eg' for 'evil grin') and onomatopoeic reproductions ('ha-ha', 'hehehe') offer a variety of conventionalised expressions—used in the same way pretty much world wide. Yet laughing and smiling are highly variable expressions, culturally and historically, both in their performance and in their social meaning and effect. Additionally, the accompanying bodily expression of a laugh or a smile may have a great influence on its social meaning. The interactions connected with laughter or smiling may at first view appear simple, but are actually complex social procedures with a high degree of significance to the concerned individuals. The 'answering smile,' for example, is neither a simple reproduction of a perceived model, nor a mere reflex, but rather a mimetically produced movement in reference to a movement of another person according to the attitude *(habitus)* of the answering person (Gebauer 1997:514). All of these complex performative acts cannot be achieved with the roughly differentiated expressions in CMC.

- Online communication exhibits typical distortions as compared to face-to-face interactions, such as a tendency towards increased friendliness (Marotzki 2000:239), as well as a tendency towards disinhibition, which Ma (1996) credits to weaker ties between participants: „The risk involved in intercultural computer-mediated communication is significantly lower than in intercultural FTF [face-to-face; B.J.] situations because participants usually do not share a common social network and because the chance to meet their communication partners in FTF situations is slim. [...] participants in synchronous CMC do not seem to have as high a commitment as when they engage in FTF communication" (Ma 1996:178, 184). In light of the effective virtuality of online interaction as examined above, this effect appears to be self-explanatory.

Without the possibility of a genuine experience of the other, then, both the resulting self-images and the resulting constructions of the other are to be assessed critically. Nevertheless, online surroundings appear to have a major potential in a *pragmatic* respect, especially where reflexive, more narrative forms of communication aren't restricted from the outset (e.g. by communication devices such as chat rooms, where there is an average sentence length of six words, cf. Werry 1996:53). The benefits of online communication are to be found in a reduction of a fear of contact (by means of disinhibition and increased friendliness within CMC), whereby the stated tendency towards the development of communities is of special importance in regard to the construction of identity. In the end online communication always implies a kind of *pseudo-understanding*, which demands to be corrected in real-life interaction.

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Constanze Bausch

Collapsing Towers
Pictures of Power and The Power of Pictures

On September 11th the World Trade Center collapsed. I would like to talk about the role of the media in the attack. The success of the attack would not have been so effective globally had the media not been so thorough in its representation of the collapsing World Trade Center. Within minutes of the catastrophe the image of the collapsing World Trade Center was propelled around the world, gathering a worldwide community of pictures and thereby creating a media-based global experience – not knowledge – a global *experience* of the contingency and insecurity of the modern world. This experience grew from seeing the destruction of something we thought would remain solid and secure for ever; from seeing something fall down that we never imagined would fall. On September 11th the assassins did not only attack one of the main symbols of the modern capitalist world, not only did they destroy them and thereby thousands of civilian lives, but what they really did was *collapse a symbol*. To me this was the one real and main force of the attack.

I will give an analysis of the attack or its media-reception. No doubt media coverage could certainly be more critical. For sure the media are producing and enforcing what is called war, yet again producing and enforcing a two-sided world with goodies and baddies, the civilized versus the barbaric. Theories of conspiracy are rising everywhere, and, just as in fairy tales, we do not really know how much is true about the story, how much is interpretation and how much manipulation. As we already knew and as we are realising again the media are storytellers. But for now I am not interested in the truth or falsity of the story. What I am interested in is the human experience of this attack, released by a flow of pictures around the world: Everywhere for everybody at the same time the same images of the falling symbols of the modern capitalist world, a global and simultaneous wiring of the international discourse focussed on one theme only.

I would like to outline three main points:

1. the merging of film and reality,

2. the simultaneous global connection through media, and the creation of a worldwide community,

3. the well-scripted choreography of the attack and the equally choreographed response of the American media.

11/9/2001

On September 11th 2001 I happened to be reading "Critical Theory", a powerful and sharp conception of the capitalist media society, in which human beings have become products and the way of seeing the world and being in this world is reduced to profit counting. In the middle of a sentence about the interdependence between capitalism and patriarchy the telephone rang. I was in deep thought when, by means of an electronic audio-signal a different time and a change of times entered my apartment, my body and my mind. A quite panicky voice was shouting into the telephone, breathless and shocked: "You haven't heard? Where have you been? The world is not the same as it was three hours ago!" The voice told me of a world where I am out of the game after three hours without communication, and it told me of the collapsed World Trade Center. The two highest buildings in Manhatten destroyed by hijacked airplanes. I can't remember what the voice exactly said, but this one sentence stuck in my head: *The world will never be the same.*

After the telephone call my mind turned around in my body and my body turned around in my apartment. One phrase surfaced from the deep levels of my unconscious mind: *The world is getting colder friends, we have to move closer.* Later on I remembered that this phrase is a lyric from a song by Konstantin Wecker I had heard more than fifteen years ago – a melting together of my own and collective media history.

I felt a strong desire to be with people I had complete confidence in. Family. I went to watch television with both my sisters. The cold light of the black box of constantly changing pictures and sounds sucked me into their flow of information and time. In this very moment of the enlarged awareness of shock, I can hardly remember what was said, just that the pictures burned into my head, swirling without words, faces without voices, collapsing twin towers without noise. It was like Edward Munch's "The Scream": we see a person screaming, we hear the picture screaming, but the yell gets stuck in the throat. Without any control, powerful images well up inside me: the crying girl with clothes burned off running from a

napalm attack in the Vietnam War; Rudi Dutschke with eyes like fire giving a speech on a demonstration in Berlin 1968; the advertisement of the Hollywood movie "Titanic". I realised that the pictures of the foggy and collapsing towers in New York were already becoming part of this world of collective images.

After watching television we went to Berlin's main cathedral for a spontaneous commemorative service: More than a thousand people had gathered to face the terror with calm, prayer and hymns. Flowers and candle light everywhere, light in the darkness, old ritual signs of peace, hope and reconciliation. The purity of the moment calmed my heart. Images of resistance in the third Reich and images of the peaceful revolution of the GDR emerged in my consciousness. This moment aroused a concentration and a reminder of what is essential.

And as I would like to enforce, not only did people look to the media much more than usual during the following days, the churches too were filled much more than usual.

Reality of films and films of reality

In the following days the newspapers were filled with cinematic metaphors, life became a film, a horror film became reality, reality became worse than every film. The inner film, the cinema film and filmed reality melted together, grew into and out of each other. Life became unreal, and reality became unbelievable. This is because we have nothing in reality to compare with the event, yet we have a lot of action movies, especially about New York being attacked. These movies can give us a framework and an orientation to find words to express the emotions that come as result of the catastrophic event. But watching action movies provides the nice feeling that they are *not* reality. This security changed into fear, knowing - this *is* reality.

The author Kathrin Röggla (tageszeitung: Sept. 14th 2001, p. 7) wrote about her experience in New York: "The visual and the soundtrack have actually become disconnected in their effect on the psyche." And the journalist Detlef Kuhlbrodt (idem: p. 22): "While continuously watching these scenes, familiar to us from action movies, we were waiting for more escalation, because a rising plot is part of dramatic films. ‚A Hollywood nightmare has become reality', one news reporter said, and the unfolding events

of this reality did not differ from a movie about the beginning of the third world war. Only the pictures of dead people were absent."

But the difference between an action movie and the day of the attack on the World Trade Center is actually the chaotic presentation of information by the media, the mistakes in the presentation, the same camera angles over and over again - and the consternation and confusion in the faces of journalists and eye-witnesses. All these elements, especially the personal ones, make us realise: this is no film, no production.

Worldwide media performance

But we realize: This was a production, there was a script, a secret script of the assassins - the stage was the world. This unique performance was to be the biggest media show the world had ever seen. The script was so secret, not even known by the secret service. The performance was excellent and a total surprise, brought everywhere by the media. As we see by the number of spectators and the vehemence of public reaction, it was a real "success".

For a moment in time the entire world was connected, focusing on the same thing, on the same picture, the picture of the collapsing World Trade Center. An unprecedented wiring of international discourse onto one theme occurred, an extraordinary creation of a worldwide community, simultaneously virtual and real, media-based, active and varied. Stemming from a multitude of communities, this community was based on a picture, on the global experience of the pictures of the collapsing "heart" of the modern capitalist world. For indeed, the shock of the attack changed the world into a village for a moment in time, everybody centred on the same subject, everybody discussing the same subject. Never in history had an event triggered a collective worldwide consciousness of such magnitude.

This new kind of international gathering and centring, rendered possible by the media, was brought about by the constant influx of information - pictures and words - about the attack, but in addition, the information released a profound need to be together and to speak together - by body, telephone, worldwide web... This inconceivable attack created never imagined signs of solidarity between humans, in neighbourhoods, cities, and all around the globe. At the same time, the world was divided in two: the bright versus the dark side, the good and the human fighting the dark

and evil. But it is only this division which defines the identity of the separate.

However, the attack not only forces the coming together of communities and community, it also elucidates the international worldwide information system. The worldwide flow of media information accommodates the worldwide economical and political network. This flowing network of power and information does not stop in front of crises, but is part of their creation, development and expansion. If the world is a body and the electronic network its nervous system, as McLuhan said, then everything is connected and the results of these interactions are only just beginning to emerge everywhere.

The symbolic power of pictures

The picture of the collapsing World Trade Center went on and on on television for days. The image of the modern cathedral crashing down like a house of playing cards, four hundred meters of capitalist security, twice the height of the rest of the skyline, went down like a vertical play of dominoes by two petty and tiny airplanes, hijacked by even more petty and tiny knives...

The World Trade Center was the symbol of an economic system of power, an economic system which, at least after the Berlin wall came down, was not only on the way to victory, it was victory itself. The twin towers were the shaping of the dream of freedom by money and world wide capitalist trade, the condensation of the dream of success, the ascension to the heaven of money. A double phallus in the sky of possibilities. By *deflowering* America as a never before wounded country, and by the *castration* of the twin phallus of power and money in the capital of the country of "freedom" and capitalist trade, the assassins in one move struck two well placed and deep reaching cuts into the symbolic body of America.

By attacking the two outstandingly similar towers, one next to the other, by producing the giant explosions and succeeding in making the towers collapse with a time lag, the assassins produced not only a worldwide shock, but the *feeling of a never ending shock*. It was this repetition, the choreography of the collapsing towers, which was to enforce the real horror in the heads and the depth of the worldwide shock. This never ending shock was then increased and prolonged by the never ending repetition of the media re-presentation. A set of pictures about an up to now uni-

maginable event in one part of the world, transformed by media into something never ending, going on and on, collapsing and collapsing over and over again, everywhere in the world. The pictures went around the world bringing the dark Gospel everywhere with missionary zeal. In so doing they presented and produced the shock around the world like an explosive wave, growing bigger and bigger by reaching everywhere. With the collapsing towers symbolic power collapsed, with the symbolic power, securities collapsed around the world. In the mirror of the equally collapsing stock market we see collapsing power-towers bringing insecurities, insecurities bringing fear. This picture of the collapsing symbols of the success of the modern capitalist world has become a symbol for the insecurity of the modern and global world. These pictures have tremendous power on the inner world of images, this inner world, which creates the outer world - or at least so much of the outer world. Watching these collapsing towers of power over and over again on television has had a considerable impact on the collapsing towers within, the collapsing towers of beliefs in one's own imaginary world. Collapsing towers in oneself *destabilise inner securities,* that is, one's imaginary securities, bringing up the reality of insecurity and the dirt and dust of the unconscious. Seen in this way, the explosion in and of the World Trade Center has released giant fireworks in the personal and collective consciousness.

The assassins made us feel the power of images. For indeed, apart from all the civilian lives lost with the material of the towers themselves, by producing a collapsing symbol they have *destroyed an image.* An image, which was three-dimensional and very living, an image, which now is in ruins and death. The image of America being invulnerable, a place of security and shelter, the image of world trade being untouchable, the image of the modern world being secure, at least for the white and the rich. But already now we can see a lot of pictures *trying to help up against the fall.* If the *collapsing* of power, money and success has destroyed powerful images in ourselves, we see the American flag held up strong, the fireman and the president standing up on the ruins, reminiscent of the lost vertical. But the film has not ended yet. As usual in American movies, the end has to be a happy end; the cowboy has to win; the civilized have to destroy the barbaric... Yet America can wage a thousand wars, build a host of new symbols - it will never be able to heal this destroyed picture. We can imagine her reaction being resolute, but it cannot be triumphant. The vic-

tory is already lost, for you can't cancel a castration, for you can't cancel a deflowering.

In fact the attack has shown a new way of making terror. For media presentation around the world is part of the game. Assisted by television the assassins were able to work directly on the inner world of images of every community and person around the world. This was a brilliant move by the assassins. As the media has brought the American way of life all around the world, so too has the media now brought the news of its fall all over the world. The assassins could never have found a better way of showing how shaky the modern world and the global system are, how easy it is to shake them out of balance. This experience was materialised in the way the event was shown. The world went out of balance by the weight of the crashed World Trade Center. The emperor has no clothes.

II

Ethnographic Research and

Educational Practice

Britta Högberg

The "Institution Inside" – Aspects of Studying Relations between Individual and Society

Background

In institutions providing care for children with disability and their parents legal rights to service plans structure the relation between the receiver of care and the carer. The idea of planning is well intended and can be seen as an attempt to make relations between the carer and the receiver of care more democratic. But it also contains a normative tone. Research results often claim that society is not providing a good enough service to its disabled citizens. Professionals providing the service feel that their work is never sufficient, and never will be. When I was working as a clinical psychologist in child rehabilitation I often asked myself if genuine and equal encounters between the receiver of care and the carer were at all possible. This question developed into a research question. The question is highly related to the public discourse in which equality and co-operation between the receiver of care and the carer is emphasised. However, from the disabled child's point of view, this public discourse becomes the child's social context and hence parts of its self-images, or expressed in a phenomenological way, it's life world. Disability transforms into handicap at the interface between individual and society. The life world of the disabled child is thus created by the views on children, on families and on deviance at a given time. In other words, my interest was "the handicapped child in the adult world". I found that encounters in child rehabilitation could be seen as encounters between individuals as well as between institutions. Hence, the "institution inside" is seen as an important aspect of what happens in clinical practice and in the daily lives of the families with a disabled child. Both practitioners and researchers often neglect this aspect.

Therefore my research interest required an approach that captured the cultural or the institutional influence on the daily practice of child rehabilitation. This article focuses on methodological aspects of that problem.

My research question emerged from my clinical practice. Similarly, my methodological questions emerged from problems I had to solve in my empirical work. In a way, my quest for knowledge has always been linked to practice. Maybe, this is what Schön (1995) means by reflection- in-practice. In the midst of solving practical professional problems, the seed of research questions appears. Reflection-in-action is thus connected to the "institution inside". Therefore, it is important to be aware of how "institutions inside" influence the collection and interpretation of data.

Issues of research and practice

My research question, as mentioned, emerged from my work as a clinical psychologist in child rehabilitation. My research was financed by the organisation that I worked for. Therefore my field of research had to be reasonably related to the main task of this organisation. Also, my research took place in the field where I had spent more than a decade of my working life. Yet, there were unavoidable transformations. One was the transformation of role. This was most obvious when I interviewed parents of disabled children about their experience of services. In a way I was asking them about my own practice. The similarities of the situation, i.e. visiting parents in their homes and asking questions about rehabilitation, forced me to recognise the difference between the clinician and the researcher. This difference drew my attention to the inter-subjectivity of the interview and made me question what kind of data is actually produced through semistructured interviews. It seemed to me that data were created in the situation and shaped by the context of the interview and by the intentions of interviewer and interviewee. Relating data to the research question, three institutional discourses could be identified: that of the family, of child rehabilitation and of the university. But how could they be addressed? The first step, as I saw it, was to externalise the institution. Since the focus was child rehabilitation, this was the institution to externalise. The discourse of the disabled child could be traced in different texts on disabled children and their parents. Such texts are mostly used as pre-understanding and presented as the background to research projects. Another possibility was to treat these texts as data. This was the way I chose. Selecting texts was the next question. By using the notion of the "institution inside" data could be framed pragmatically: texts reasonably available to an interested public. Hence, texts in different genres available at the libraries in Stockholm were used. The data consisted of three main categories: *general texts* (legends,

novels, biographies), *research reports* (empirical studies, psychoanalytical studies) and *official documents* (legislative acts, memoranda of Stockholm County Council). The other kind of data consisted of semi-structured interviews. Professionals in child rehabilitation and parents using child rehabilitation services were interviewed. The interview guide was structured by using such ideological concepts that, at the time, were directive for the services. Memorandums and my own cultural familiarity with the field helped me to choose relevant concepts. The interview guide also reflected the structural difference between professionals and parents. This difference could be described in Habermas's (1988) terms of system world and life world. Professionals were approached from a systemic perspective, starting with how they interpreted the meaning of the concepts and moving towards how they enacted them in their daily work. Parents were addressed in their life world as "experts" at using the rehabilitation services. For parents, the direction was the opposite. The start was in their daily experience of living with a disabled child and moving towards framing their daily life by using the concepts. Habermas's division of system world and life world is a sociological one. But with an educological perspective one has to acknowledge that there is a life world within the system world and a system world within the life world. In other words, it becomes a gestalt of figure-ground, which means when a life world emerges as a figure the system world appears as its background and vice versa. My interviews were based on the same structure, but interviews with professionals were conducted with a system/figure – life/ground perspective while the interviews with parents were conducted from a life/figure – system/ground perspective. By using the idea of "institution inside" I ended up with two levels of data, texts and interviews. Each level consisted of different aspects or genres related to my research question. Hence, the complexity was only slightly reduced by externalising the "institution inside".

Meta theory and theory

Asplund (1987) has pointed out that social psychology is a science about the virgule in the formula: individual/society – it is a science; not being about the wall, not being about the cracks, but being about the cracks in the wall. Man's social being is about both how he experiences himself as such *and* how he takes part in creating and maintaining social order. Palmer (1999) proposes that it is more useful to think of 'grouping' as something people do, rather than of groups as objects. According to Palmer

groups do not exist independent of our perceptions. Rather it is a useful construct – an object in the social world like organisations, communities, associations, tribes and nations. Groups come about through human activities like defining and recognising. Here, a link between educology and social psychology can be established.

Wulf (2000) has pointed out that assumptions of human nature are inherent in education and that they are related to their historical time and context. History occurs in the interplay between structural conditions and structuring practices. Hence, he claims human beings are found within the diversity of their historical and cultural expressions, rather than 'behind' them. Consequently, as a researcher studying human beings or social practices, you have to make your own anthropological ideas explicit. Relations within the social practice of child rehabilitation were the focus of my study. These relations are, in my view, located on the virgule in the individual/society formula. So in order to be able to interpret my data, I had to articulate my ideas about this virgule, i.e. how the area between individual and society is constituted. This is a constructed area. In other words, it is an area in the mind and it is purely theoretical.

Meta theory is, according to Reeder (2000), located above practical theory and it helps us avoid the ideological categories of daily life. It is grounded in thought processes proper. In this sense it approaches the boundaries of our understanding and its primary task is to formulate concepts that can take part in a narrative. Seen in this way, meta theory is a serious speculation, only available if you indulge in theory and search for its breaking point. This, according to Reeder, is to turn inwards towards pure thinking. Eneroth (2001) argues for the opposite. He asks if our attention to details has caused all forms of direct, holistic knowing to disappear. By turning to the Renaissance, he claims that man has an ability to experience a "factual wholeness", and therefore has a "holistic reason". This ability is viewed as the quality of an immediate insight, expressed as a conviction of "how things are". When working meta theoretically, I oscillated between these directions. First, by turning inwardly to pure speculation, I formulated a meta theoretical understanding of how the area between individual and society could be structured. Secondly, by applying it to the empirical data I used my ability to sense "factual wholeness" to identify the social structure hidden in the empirical data. In this way I could approach the different levels of data in a consistent way.

The next step was to bring out the content or meaning within the data. Now it was a question of finding theoretical concepts that were related to my research question. These concepts can be seen within the notion of "there is nothing as practical as a good theory" and in this way the theoretical concepts link the empirical data to the meta-theoretical level. Thus, the meta theory provided the form or structure of interpretation while the theoretical concept helped in exploring the content of the data. The articulation of the area between individual and society was then constructed as a dialectic relation between form and content. This is consistent with my view of the social human being, as both creating and created by his/her surrounding social institutions. This theoretical articulation also corresponds to the two levels of abstraction in the empirical data. This opened for the identification of the "institution inside" as it was constructed or appeared in encounters between carer and the receiver of care

Individual/society – a meta theory on the virgule

This speculation has been developed from a bio-psycho-social perspective on man. At its base there are the biological constraints of man. Edelman and Tononi (2001) has emphasised that using the computer as a metaphor for the human brain is inadequate. Rather, he claims, the brain should be described as a jungle. This means that the brain is constantly changing in a dynamic relationship with its surroundings. Processes of integration and differentiation are basic to the human consciousness. Being and selection comes first, learning and logic second. This means that a human consciousness is embodied. Before the construction of knowledge, a selection related to the organism's survival has taken place. As Edelman and Tononi puts it:

the selectionist principles apply to brains and that logical ones are learned later by individuals with brains... (s. 16)

The organising principle of human psychic and social life is seen here in evolutionary terms. In its deepest sense, this principle is related to the survival of the individual as well as the species.

My view on the area between the individual and society, which I have outlined in Högberg (1996), is thus connected to this evolutionary perspective. I see the area constituted by four basic forms. Two forms are related to the individual, two are related to social order. The individual is seen as speaking from two basic positions, as a psychic subject or as social

subject. While doing so he is addressing either material or existential social order. Human acting and thinking takes place in a constant circulation between these forms. Vitality and language are the driving forces. Vitality corresponds to the selection principle mentioned above and language to the logical principle. The two forces are intertwined and like the four forms they can only be separated as theoretical constructs.

The psychic subject is outlined as follows: this is a creature who knows himself only to a limited extent, and who lives in a continuous uncertainty about what he is. He is constantly busy trying to understand himself and his world. This he does with quick, emotional interpretations and cognitive discourses. When he speaks, his desire appears, and through his desire he reveals his being for himself. He is looking for the predictable and is passionately engaged in creating and maintaining an unchangeable self. He will also, just as passionately, distort what he experiences if it disturbs his sense of self. But he must also look for the Other, as it is only through the Other that he can find meaning in his life and understand himself.

The social subject is outlined in the following way: he is constantly occupied with and oriented towards the Other and its otherness. This he finds deeply disturbing because of his wish to unite with the Other and at the same time remain uniquely separate. He interacts with the Other on different levels at the same time, the cognitive and the emotional. The cognitive level appears in communicative acts, which simultaneously involve exchanging facts and establishing intersubjectivity. This level is mutually confirming and is of a practical/moral nature, dominated as it is by the cognitive interpretation and the narrative. These create new discourses in a constant stream. At the emotional level the Other is experienced as an object upon which the social subject projects his meaning. The Other presents itself mainly as a lived experience at a bodily level. This happens spontaneously through emotional interpretation and understanding.

The social subject is prone to becoming a part of groups - to build institutions – which offers him a way to deal with the Other and its disturbing otherness. When he is in a group or in an institution, two different forces capture him. He strives to maintain the group identity and order, yet at the same time to break it, in order to leave room for something new. In other words, the social subject must handle the relation between freedom and institution without which, according to Ricoeur (1971) no meaningful act can take place. But the social subject is also struggling internally with his inclination to distinguish himself from his surroundings and appear

unique. At the same time, he wishes also to merge with and find refuge in his surroundings. It is in this way that his anguish surfaces in social life, adhering to his words and directing his actions. Much of his internal struggle has to do with these mutually exclusive forces and being able to meet other social subjects in what could be called a genuine presence.

The basis for social order is seen as either material or existential. *Material social order* is recognised by the material conditions in the world around us. We assign meaning to things, meaning that is connected to figures of thought. Childhood, individual and development are examples of such figures of thought. From them different kinds of discourses originate, discourses visible in theories, ideologies and institutions. Within material social order questions of power and responsibility are handled.

Existential social order is recognised by the desire to possess "the good", an image of paradise. This means that social life is organised by this desire. "Possessing the good" can be projected into different ideas or social positions. Fundamentally, it has to do with our awareness of death and the creation of social systems as a defence against anxiety.

The meta theoretical speculation can be summarised as follows: Our understandings of individual and society are only indirectly accessible through language and hence, are situated in time and a social context. They cannot be directly derived from each other but have to be considered as different levels of abstraction. But both levels have the same origin, i.e. in man's drive to create coherence and order. Four basic forms and two driving forces constitute the area between the individual and society. These are seen as fundamental elements of the "institution inside".

Socio-dynamic educology

The meta theory discussed above constitutes the foundation for a theoretical/practical perspective on relations between the receiver of care and the carer. This is a relationship situated on the boundary between individual and society. Here, the individual's interests confront society's intentions. In my view, it is at this level that the relation between theory and practice is enacted. Lipsky (1980) called the organisations in which this takes place "street-level bureaucracies". He argues that the structural impact of the street-level bureaucracy forces its employees to develop defensive work strategies. It becomes an issue of survival. Ragneklint (2002) points to the need for an epistemological theory of the street-level bu-

reaucracy. The caring relationship and the educational relationship consist of a special kind of human knowledge and empathy. But it is also around this relationship that politics and administrations revolve. Ragneklint defines four separate activities or life-forms: the abstract knowledge of politicians, the mixture of abstract and experience based knowledge of the administrators, the professionals' knowledge based on daily work experience and the clients' knowledge based on existential experience of being a client. These forms of knowledge are based on language and are inherently more or less normative. According to Ragneklint, knowledge and discourse are interrelated and become a tower from which the contingencies of existence can be viewed.

Socio-dynamic educology could be seen as an epistemology of the caring relationship. It is based on three assumptions about the relationship between the receiver of care and the carer: it is a social relation, it is a communicative relation and it is an educological relation.

In the *social* aspect the notion of institutions and citizenship dominates. Here the professional and the client meet on a common ground, as citizens in the same society and as role-takers in the same institution. The "institution inside" could in this sense be described as an inner object, i.e. a subjective society carried inside the individual. Lawrence (1979) believes that the society " in the mind" are the internalised experiences, the introjected and projected experiences of the object we call society. The "institution inside" is in this sense unconscious and creates a split between the knowable and the unknowable institution. Hence, the *communication* between the receiver of care and the carer takes place both at a conscious and an unconscious level. Power, self, meaning, responsibility, authority etc. become issues within it. In other words, it is a matter of constantly negotiating actions and reactions in relation to the Other and his otherness. The *educological* aspect concerns the condition and roles in the caring and educational relation, learning that takes place on several levels, both manifest and immanent. The educological aspect is close to Bateson (1972), an ecological view of learning. At the first level, Learning I, something happens and changes behaviour. This level of learning presupposes a context in which the learning takes place. At the next level, Learning II, learning involves recognising and inhabiting this context, i.e. it is a question of learning how to learn. Here, habits and the development of a worldview are established. In this way, the "institution inside" is learned and becomes an unconscious part of the personality. Learning III is the process of gain-

ing control of and changing the habitual ways of seeing the world, i.e. questioning and changing the learning that has been established in Learning II.

Working with the "institution inside"

In encounters between the receivers of care and carers "the institutions inside" become the "institution between". Socio-dynamic educology offers clinical practice a way of dealing with this. Basically, it is a question of finding a position between the personal and the institutional. In other words, it is matter of relating politically to both the "institution inside" and to the work organisation as a manifestation of the institution as such. Political relatedness is understood here as Lawrence (1979) describes it: "a reorientation from having/not having power and authority as some kind of social possession towards taking authority for the nature of one's being as a system interrelating with other systems, be they other people, families, enterprises, institutions, or society" (p.243). The starting point is in the individual's enacting of roles in and relating to institutions where he or she lives and works. In the professional management of the carer role, four different aspects can be identified: understanding the institution's history of ideas, critically investigating the present ideological ideas, interpreting the meaning of daily experiences and developing an ability to relate to receivers of care and colleagues. The main method of doing so is by reflection. Reflection is seen here, both as an active search for answers and passive reception of what is reflected. Since Schön (1995) influential work, The reflective Practitioner, reflection has become fashionable in working life. To my mind, reflections without meta-theoretical and theoretical concepts are pointless. However, with such concepts, reflection opens up for Learning III and with it emancipation and empowerment of the carer as well as the receiver of care. Here qualitative research methods can contribute to clinical practice. But the opposite also holds true. Clinical practice is, according to Toulmin (2001), a logical paradigm for cultural sciences. Hence, socio-dynamic educology also applies to research activities. Here, the role of the researcher is at stake. When addressing the university as an "institution inside" new questions related to research design, data collection, validity, reliability and the choice of theoretical and meta-theoretical constructs surface. Or as Liedman (2001) puts it, when he comments on the power inherent in the social role of science that has developed during the last four hundred years: "described in this way, the scientific activity seems

elevated to Olympian heights. At the same time it is quite an ordinary part of a society. A scientific discipline is practised by a group of researchers, who relate to each other in ordinary human ways. A researcher belongs to a genus, a race and a class and is not free from those superstitions that are part of the contemporary society" (p. 277, my translation), and, I would like to add, for the researcher the university is an "institution inside". By this I mean such things as identification with the elevated position, competition for funding and publication, role relations between students and professors, systems of graduation and promotion. In the informational society the expectations on research is higher than ever before. New alliances between politics, university and business are being established. Research is nowadays a natural strategy in the competition for prosperity and wealth. This will probably have a profound effect on the university as an institution as well as on the autonomy of the researcher. Most probably, it will also influence research methods in the future. But that is another discussion.

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Kathrin Audehm

On Authority and Recognition in Family Conversations. And On Education and Culture in Families

Introduction

My collegue, Jörg Zirfas, and I work on the importance of rituals in creating the family as a *community*. This empirical project is part of a case study on „The production of the social through rituals", which is taking place within the centre of excellence „Cultures of performativity" at the Free University of Berlin. Our work focuses on the patterned interactions during family meals in four different families. Our analysis concentrates above all on the various relations between the ritual processes or the construction of rituals and the performances of the families as communities and processes of education and learning.

With reference to the *Grounded Theory* (Glaser/Straus 1967) my research follows the model of cross inquiry and interpretation. The talks, which are taped by the families themselves, allow us to analyse performative aspects *of verbal communication.* Observation adds elements relating to *material, symbols, nonverbal interactions, scenic arrangement* and *room.* Methods of group discussion make it possible to analyse both *implicit* and *acting guided knowledge* as well as to follow directly the community production process in our presence. The results of the interviews supply the aspects of knowledge, symbolism and *temporality* and incorporate the question of *tradition* into the investigation. My theses about education in family rituals is based on this material and its interpretation. Theoretically I wish to connect our analysis with a critique of Bourdieu's notion of *performative magic.* This notion is critically related to Austin's concept of speech acts and Derrida's notion of iteration and performativity.

Firstly I will present a few main ideas about the community production process in family rituals in order to prepare the presenatation of a conversation sequence during a family meal and its interpretation. I will include reflections about the correlation between rituals, learning and education (formation) in families, which is based on the scene. And secondly I will

develop questions about the correlation between culture and education, which have been unsolved in theory, but still are important for my investigations. For this I will refer to the theories of Bourdieu, Butler and Eagleton.

I Conversation rules: The construction of authority during a family meal

1. The creation of the family as community (Gemeinschaft) in rituals

The term *Gemeinschaft* has a lot of definitions and a plurality of meanings not only in education. In *ritual studies* as well as within ethnography, the concept of community tends not to be distinguished clearly enough from the concept of group. Many theoreticians of community have understood the term above all as an idealized opposite to the notion of society.

My point is this: Family as a community is characterized by two aspects: it is a room of shared experiences (Mannheim 1980) and a system of interacting persons (Burgess 1926). Rituals take up a special position within family interactions: (as Buber has noted,) family as community "happens" (Buber 1997, 185), where ritualized forms of integration exist. I am not concentrating on the creation of transitions or passages, but on those relations within the construction of the ritual, that present the strategies of calling expectations, normative demands and dispositions, of creating borders in and outside the family (roles, tasks, personal and communal identity) and strategies of recognition. Rituals do not serve to organize only the collectively shared symbolic knowledge (Douglas 1986), by staging this knowledge they verify the family order and integrity. Families, as community and institution, are dramatic fields of action. In ritual and ritual sequences families perform the fundamental problem of creating themselves as a unity with differences. Rituals are symbolical performances, which work on the differences within a family (Audehm/Zirfas 2001).

For a first step to analyse the complexity of a family ritual we have focussed not on a whole ritual but on ritual sequences[1].

2. A ritualized sequence of recognition processes

The following passage is chosen from a breakfast conversation of the Zobel family involving mother and father, the twelve-year-old twins Anna and Björn and the nine-year-old daughter Carolin. Breakfast takes place in the kitchen between 7.00 and 7.45 a.m.

After 35 minutes, and shortly after the father has left breakfast, the mother has started to prepare packed lunches for the children and a conflict is beginning to escalate.

1	A:	Guess what. At school now we have to write a weekly task
2		sheet. We have to write in what we've done and then evaluate
3		ourselves, and then write a plan for the next day either to
		work...
4	M:	Carolin!
5	A:	...faster or at the same pace.
6	M:	I see. And what are you like? Are you within your time-limit?
7	C:	Mummy, have you made...
8	B:	...our packed lunch.
9	M:	Hang on, I'm still busy speaking with your sister. Everyone
10		keeps interrupting. It's a really bad habit of ours. It really is
		awful.
11	A:	Of ours??
12	M:	Yes, we all do it. And yes, I include myself. But it's still a
13		terrible habit. We must really try to get out of it. We must all
14		try and think about it a little. So tell me now Anna, are you
15		doing alright with the planning, are you working faster or
		slower?
16	B:	The butter, please.
17	A:	I think I'll make myself another sandwich.
18	M:	Are you always within your time?
19	B:	Mummy...
20	M:	Björn, I just said something about butting in, Anna has hardly

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[1] A ritual sequence is a part of the ritual and defined by arrangement and presentation of verbal and nonverbal interactions (conventions, procedures) which are locally and temporally delimited, which suggest scenic-mimetic reproduction and represent normative demands in which the community (and institution) can be described as both a medium and a result of this process.

started and he starts up again with butter and bread.

21	B:	Mum, I'm the only one at school who hasn't ever forgotten to do their homework yet.
22	M:	Do you mean in the term or in the whole year?
23	B:	In the whole year.
24	C:	Mummy ...
25	M:	Wow, Björn, that's really great. I'm so glad to hear it.
26	C:	Mummy...
27	M:	Look it's really not funny. Are you all making a hobby out of butting in?
28	B:	Ha ha ha, why are you making such a fuss, Mum? Just stop nagging.
29	M:	My dear son, I am allowed to voice my own opinion, aren't I?
30	B:	Yes.
31	M:	Well, that's all I'm doing.
32	A:	I had a bad dream.
33	M:	Anna, do you *have* to!?
34	A:	But why not?
35	M:	I don't want to talk to you anymore right now.
36	A:	You don't have to.
37	M:	Right so you're going to make the sandwiches yourself now are you?

The mother now turns to Björn and asks him what he wants in his bread.

Interpretation

The topics of the scene are communication rules in the family and the recognition of school norms. The first guiding question of the interpretation was: Why does Anna not answer to her mother? Although she started with her school-report. It was her conversation with the mother, which was interrupted by her younger sister and her twin brother, and although she started with her school report and would have had several opportunities, Anna never answers her mother's question. Instead Anna demonstrates solidarity with her sister and brother. It became not clear, why she did not answer, there are few possibilities left, but still the dramaturgy and character of the sequence show an act of learning and education.

Lines 1-15: Throughout the whole breakfast time, it is mainly Carolin who disturbs the conversation by singing, interrupting and playing tricks. The mother becomes increasingly irritated. At the end of breakfast, the

conflict escalates when Carolin and Björn disturb a conversation between Anna and her mother about school. The mother makes use of the distur-bance to present her problem as a family problem, including herself in the criticism. The oldest daughter's subsequent question shows that she sees through this attempt. Her critical comment could open a space for a discus-sion about the rules and about how they should be acknowledged. But in-stead the mother again attempts to present her personal desire as a norm of behaviour for the whole family. In so doing, she presumes and reaffirms her authority to set rules. And although she asserts as a conversational norm that one should not interrupt, we may wonder, why this should be so. Her persistent attempt to pursue her conversation with Anna leaves no room for the problem and her suggested solution to be discussed. Instead it is assumed that she should just be obeyed. The mother's appeal to the community in fact implies an implicit request that the children recognize the mother's authority. The way in which the mother justifies her appeal would seem to imply that the children ought to be able to voice themselves in answer to her. Otherwise the invocation of the community makes no · sense, for although the others are explicitly requested to recognize the norms of the community, they have no say in its development.

Lines 16-25: One of the functions of the breakfast is to organize and control the children's school behaviour. It is a particular characteristic of the Zobel Family that the parents support and encourage the norms of the primary school that all three children attend. This is apparent within the conflict in the mother's reaction to the task plan at school that Anna has told her about and which is obviously designed to teach the pupils self-control and discipline. In repeatedly asking the daughter how she is getting on with the task plan at school, the mother implicitly supports the strategy in question. But Anna never answers. The younger twin brother Björn un-dermines the mother's authority by breaking the rule again, but at the same time he picks up on the topic of school and turns it onto the level of a fam-ily discussion that he shifts from a (pseudo) "discussion" about communi-cation rules to a conversation about school. In presenting himself posi-tively with regard to the school norm of doing homework, Björn relies on the positive acknowledgment of this norm by the whole family, thus reaf-firming the family as a community after the mother's dangerous explosion. Although Björn, like Caroline, implicitly rejects the mother's authority claim, in attempting to pursue as a family the conversation that he inter-rupted between mother and daughter, he actually confers meaning to the

rule of letting others speak, even though he breaks it. Implicit acknowledgement of a communal norm functions here despite its explicit infringement. Moreover, Björn recognises the mother's authority when it comes to supervising and controlling achievements at school. In shifting conversation in terms of its participants and in recognizing the mother's authority, Björn is in a sense offering her a compromise. The mother yields this even though at first she reacted negatively to being interrupted. In the family conversations about school, there is often a certain competition in the air between Anna and Björn. Here, through his interruption, Björn picks up the mother's praise instead of Anna. Yet Anna seems to support his compromise because she doesn't protest against his breach of the rule. Anna and Björn seem united in their reaction to the mother, and their usual rivalry disappears behind this union.

Line 26 – 37: However, if Anna and Björn have managed to re-establish a fragile union within the family, it is immediately disrupted again by Carolin. This results in the mother criticising all the children and claiming that they amuse themselves in being disruptive and annoying. In so doing, she draws a barrier between herself and the children and shows that she is not prepared to have her authority undermined. Thus, she gives up her own legitimation strategy for now it is clear that the children alone are accountable for the disruption. As a consequence even Björn is no longer prepared to compromise with the mother; he changes the conversation again to criticise the general way the mother imposes her authority when it comes to the legitimation and acknowledgement of family rules: he says she makes too much of a fuss and nags them! The mother becomes defensive. Björn's short "yes" shows recognition of the mother's claim to voicing her opinion, but the mother has to have the last word. Anna tries again to relax the conflict by changing the subject, but the offended mother rejects this attempt. Now that her strategy has failed, the mother feels unable to welcome the shift. Thus, the mood remains dampened until the end, yet the mother does not step out of the breakfast circle. She carries on making the kids' packed lunches, that is, caring for their well-being.

The mother's assumed right to define the rules fails. Björn and Anna show proof of their ability to compromise by shifting the conversation. The mother's authority is partially recognized: a) through implicit recognition of her care for the children's well-being, and b) through implicit communal recognition of school norms in the family, which the mother enforces and controls. On the other hand, the children see through the mother's strategy

and reject her claims to authority. It is not the communication rule as such that the children refuse to acknowledge, but they refuse to follow the rule when the mother attempts to turn what amounts to a personal problem into the breaching of a *supposedly* communal rule. The children do not legitimise this authority and at this point the mother becomes the one to threaten the unity of the family. Yet through her care for the well-being of the children, she manages nevertheless to keep the unity of the family intact.

3. Education and learning in a family meal

Rituals and ritual passages highlight the normative demands of family. An important result of such processes is mutual recognition (Bourdieu 1990) of the "basic principles of the institution". Family as an institution constitutes itself fundamentally by implicit and unconscious processes of recognition. The ritualized sequence can be seen as a ritual of institution (rite d'institution), because it is connected with the realisation of strategies of legitimation and acknowledgment. Ritual(s) of institution legitimate the normative demands of institution in a performative or magic way (as Bourdieu would say). It is possible to speak of education as the process of institutionalising rituals (rites d' institution), which produce social identity by calling lasting dispositions. In order for the calling to "succeed" (Austin 1994) the community needs there to be consensus over the related processes of recognition. Community can be defined as the relational space, where differences and contradictions within and between expectations, normative demands, strategies and dispositions can be combined in a creative and productive network.

My example shows the complexity of recognition processes in family communication and the power of implicit and indispensable recognition. It shows the failure of authoritarian strategies and their disruptive potential for the unity of the family. From an educational point of view, the twins are not learning to recognize non-legitimised authority, but they are learning implicit recognition of normative demands. And they are learning to accept the calling of behavioural dispositions at school. They are starting to develop competences to realize the problematic of recognition processes and they are showing competence in organising the unity of the family within differences.

II. Education and culture in families – open questions

4. Bourdieu's notion of performative magic – on language, rituals, education and power

The term education is mostly closely linked with the educational state system, that means i.e., with institutions. In *Language and Power* (1990) Bourdieu connects the working on education in rituals with the institutional aspects of authority, with acts of belief and power. He analyses language as a means of social action and an instrument of power, and he points out the structural correlation between ritual, language and education. And, in a certain way, he writes about culture. First, he is interested in the performative magic through which mere words, passwords, commands and slogans constitute real action, that is, not only influence people's perception of the world but effect real consequences. In Bourdieu's view, the power of language is not founded in an inner language logic or in the logic of an appropriate language use. Rather, it involves a certain faith, on the part of the actors, in the legitimacy of the authorized speaker, a state of believing that results out of habitual dispositions, which define the recognition of such authorities. For Bourdieu the power of words lies in the power of the speakers. Delegation of power is most visible in the ritual(s) of institution (rite d'institution), in which, out of a linguistic competence, it becomes the legitimised speaker's competence to directly define, through words, the behaviour of social actors. Not only do rituals of institution define the speakers as representatives of social authority, they provide the appointed with a social identity. The incorporation of this identity, the hard work on and with body, is what Bourdieu calls education (Audehm 2001). Austin was the first to connect language with rituals, and Bourdieu describes language (and education) as an institutional ritual.

Bourdieu's *Language and Power* is based on his concept of symbolic power, which he developed in analysing the French educational system, and in which he describes the legitimation of cultural and symbolic domination as one important function of the educational system. But in *Language and Power* social positions, differences and contexts occur as rigid and fixed. He describes power as being visible in the rites of institution but going without notice because of the faith that is grounded in generated dispositions only. He loses the productive force of invisible power as discipline and the habitus becomes a one-way street, where power can only be reproduced. He does not connect the generating force of habitual disposi-

tions with his concept of language and power (Butler 1996, 1997). In his investigations, analyses or theoretical conceptions Bourdieu never fully eliminates the generating force, but in *Language and Power* he has no systematic explanation for its existence, and he leaves them out. The reasons for this loss, are on the one hand, Bourdieu's one-dimensional description of the body, and on the other the hand, the fact that he links the dispositions of habitus too strongly to a belief in power in rituals, a belief that is incorporated *before* the authorities' calling. I would suggest, that the problem is the "before", and (in contrast to Butler) the theoratical connection of this "before" with the (logical) "after" in Bourdieu's use of the term "capital" (Kapital). The "after" in the accumulation of capital corresponds theoretically to the "before" of incorporated dispositions and faith[2]. And here lies the reason why Bourdieu is not able to combine his concept of language with the generating force of dispositions, why language and body as actions occur as fully dominated and (over-)ruled. Consequently every social position and difference is fully determined and fixed. Bourdieu here fails to explain the conditions or foundations on which autonomy, critical competence, self-development, and personal and social changes could be based.

Within my investigation it becomes quite clear, that families are special kinds of institutions, because here the aspects of community and institution are closely linked with each other. My research shows, as many other projects too, that there are no fixed positions of authority and power in families, especially not in family with adolescents. Education and learning in family is no one-way track, where the positions of the educators and the educated are fixed or always clearly defined. And it is shown, that rituals are not only working on differences between groups of social actors, but in creation and construction of differences within one group. How is it possible to think rituals *both* as means of working on differences between *and* within groups, family as institution *and* community, authority *and* auton-

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[2] First he separated the capital as a social and historical relation into three dimensions: the economical, the cultural and the social. This model Bourdieu used successfully to describe the fact of reproducing social positions within the French educational system. But later on he separated ownership from value and accumulation. He characterizes the three kinds of capital, but value and accumulation are produced "after" ownership with a forth element: symbolic capital. In the end, symbolic power and struggle lead to the creation of social classes. Class constitution, social positions and symbolic power are part of the superstructure. And this model Bourdieu transformed to analyse the power of language, which is based in education and incorporation. Language (and education) becomes an epiphanomenon, a copy of the social differences in ownership, which are the "basis" of the social system. Language, rituals and education as cultural activities are separated again in a special sphere.

omy as both sides of the same process? And how is it possible to describe education as process of constructing a network, which opens the room for autonomous formation and development *as well as* for incorporation and reproduction of power and social order?

5. Butler's notion of the discursive competence of action – on subjectivity and performativity

In the final chapter of "Hate speech" Juliet Butler (1997) tries to combine the concept of habitus (Bourdieu) with the concept of performativity (Derrida) to answer the question whether some language regularities should be overviewed or controlled by state power and censorship. She therefore makes use of Foucault's general concept of power as a productive and formative force. Here censorship resides not only in state power or a question of law, it becomes *the* main force which makes language use and subjectivity possible. By entering into this realm she leaves the frame of her first question. For, in this general use of the term "censorship" she no longer speaks of state power only, but asks more generally about the discursive competence of the subject(s). Her profound belief in the performativity of speech acts, bodily actions and contexts as a guarantee for changing meanings, effects, and results leads her to construct performativity theoretically as the condition or the determining force of the autonomy of subjects. But this conviction raises a string of questions. I regard as the main problem the fact that Butler does not seem to hold any notion of collective identity, and – in "Hate speech" – she ignores the question of political hegemonies. Even though she is writing about the importance of performativity in the political sphere she has no politics of subjectivity. Butler produces an American version of a completely French connection: "Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, and Bourdieu United". Social actors are to be saved as autonomous individuals. But to what extent does this connection actually work? And what does Butler leaves out?

Following (post-)structural analysis, language provides a scenario for the formation of subjectivity in defining the limits of its space. Subjectivity is defined by language, by that which it is possible to say. But this structurally entails the realm of the unspeakable, a region of exclusion, of difference and danger. With the acquisition of language, this danger is removed. Butler explains with reference to Lacan that language reminds us of the primary exclusion which threats the subject in itself and is at the

same time the condition for its existence. She claims that this is the reason, why certain speech acts are able to produce fear or reactions to avoid threat. Butler suggests that language acquisition is not a single act, but that it is recalled and confirmed again and again. The power of language is based in the constitution of difference, which is forgotten, but comes back. Language thus works like a rite of institution as Bourdieu characterised it.

The structural difference (or *differance*) in(side) language becomes obvious, when language is analysed as text. The differance of signs, as the main characteristic of textuality, enables iterability. The break with context and the ability to attract new contexts guarantee the effect of signs (Derrida 1976). In contrast to Austin, Derrida does not explain the power of language with reference to a former use. The power of language is based on rupture. Derrida sees the structural level of language in contradiction to the semantic level. The structural level always infringes the semantic one, and as a result, the sign is structurally independent from a given context. Moreover, the contexts themselves are not fixed or fully determined. Butler critically remarks that the iterability of convention – that is, performativity - in Derrida's version has no historical or social status or background. But if subjectivity and language are grounded in differance, and if the creation of subjectivity is characterized as instiutional rite and based in habitus, than a connection between performativity and habitus must be found.

Butler regards the habitus as central for subjectivity as the language that calls the subject into existence. In her opinion, both are sedimented, ritualized activities (defined by convention, pattern and repetition). Butler recognizes the habitus as the structure that brings the body alive. The dispositions, as generated and generating, are the results of power effects. Butler considers here the theoretical connection between Foucault and Bourdieu, without explaining it. For both, power is a productive and formative force, which works at and with the body. Foucault describes the microphysics of power as a hierarchy of techniques of space and time, and examination is the big ritual of discipline. But he has no concept to explain how power comes into the body. Bourdieu, on the other hand, does. However, in generalizing investigations about the examination ritual of prestigious French *Écoles*, he describes power as being visible in the rites of institution but going without notice because of the faith that is grounded in generated dispositions only. (Not only) to Butler, the notions of a fixed and ideologically produced habitus and language are inacceptable. Butler

started by transmitting the habitus theory to language, and therefore she needs the generating force of dispositions to construct the body as the guarantee for the connection of ritual and performatvity as a foundation for language use, but in retrospect she develops the idea of the performativity of the body and combines a structural characterisitc of textuality with a structural element of corporeality. Of course, she knows the difference between textuality and speech as bodily action. But like as Derrida sees a contradiction between the structural and semantic level of texts, Butler considers the incongruity of body and speech. Speaking does not only mean to communicate language, speech communicates a certain physicality (behaviour, attitudes, attributes) as a rhetoric expression. There is a bodily (physical) surplus in speech, which nevertheless works as language. And incorporation of power effects is as possible, as are infringement and rupture. If this is accepted as a fundamental condition of subjectivity, then it could be transformed to describe educational acts and processes.

The performativity of habitus (body), language and contexts guarantees the permanence of structural ruptures and individual autonomy, which are necessary to develop the practical skills and theoretical knowledge to handle (not only) social changes, for example such as fast and rough changes of knowledge, meanings, fields or systems. If individuals are thought of as able, flexible, and socially intelligent beings then the success of educational strategies is based also on infringements. Nevertheless, Butler produces problems. She misses the importance of collectively shared practical knowledge, her subjectivity is only a subjectivity of individuals, and she does not differentiate between state, institutions and social groups. She also fails to consider the importance of hierarchies in Foucault's concept of power, as well as the importance of social hegemony in Bourdieu's analyses of educational institutions. Butler does not explain the conditions of rupture or iterations, which offers autonomy and resistance. Indeed, what kind of microphysics of performativity could be resistant to the microphysics of power? Butler's critique of Bourdieu names the problem, but does not solve it.

Language and rituals in their relation to power, the questions of habitus and faith, the questions of practical and reflexive knowledge are closely linked with hegemonies and ideologies, because there is no learning and education without the dialectic of individuality and collectivity, autonomy and domination, of recognition and authority. Subjectivity and (individual) development in themselves are dialectically constructed between ritual

(convention and repetition) and performativity. One of the main theoretical questions is still the combination of the terms "habitus" and "performativity". But in what direction could a solution go? I would like to close with a reference to Terry Eagleton's *What is Culture?*: A combination without reproducing the naturalization of the social effect, that creativity and spontaneity are regarded as only to be found in the special fields of arts or education - as an indifferent or disinterested capital, which is related to the reduction of "culture" to an aesthetical question. A combination without reducing cultural practices again to superstructural phenomanons[3], and without reproducing the separation of "culture" from "nature" and its effects for various concepts of education and culture. And how could this be possible without the creation of a useless concept, in which culture(s) and education are to be found everywhere (Eagleton 2001)?

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[3] With regard to my critique of Bourdieu's notion, one way could be to combine his concept of habitus and education with a more productive and flexible notion of capital. But this is not the place to develop this.

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Jutta Balldin

Free to Learn? Young Pupils' Stories of Temporal Freedom

School in other times

In to-day's society, freedom of the individual is an ideal condition, especially freedom to choose *when* and at what times you are to do this or that. To be able to move in time in a free or flexible way as well as to use time in an individual way are mental states strived for in the late-modern community. Individual freedom and freedom to choose *when* to work is also an aim in the local school plan. In Sweden the selection of various types of schools constantly increases. Many of these schools challenge traditional ways of organizing time; and learning. Of course, much is due to Internet and new techniques, but it is also due to other prevailing demands and expectations in the social and economic field. In a society that values individualism and flexibility, schools try to cope with those demands in different ways, introducing individual plans of studying, distance education, individual mentors and so on. This way of learning raises a lot of questions how children and young people *experience* their time and how they manage to *use* time in a way that suites themselves *and* the prevailing curricula, because school still decides when you have to finish your studies. School also decides when you are supposed to have completed learning different subjects. It measures school result and gives grades according to conventional curriculum time. The question is if we can talk about freedom at all or if this *discourse* above all is an expression of the individuals' *different* experience of time and various *abilities* to plan and organize time; both working time and leisure time and other, not yet established signs of time.

This article raises the question how young people in school manage to organize and use their own time - in a suitable way for them *and* for school - when no one tells them how. A girl from a school working with distance education gives her story, focusing on manifest vs. ideal comparing conventional school time with time at a mobile school.

My site, methods and prior assumptions

The aim of my thesis is to grasp the individuals' (here: pupils at the age of 16-18) stories of "free" time in school. The use of distance education and individual time schedules as a way of learning is in many ways still at an experimental level, at least for the teachers, headmasters and school politicians. What about the pupils at these schools? What drives them to choose this way of learning and what conditions do they identify in this "new" school discourse? What positions in time are they trying to master and which are available? Those questions should be important and highly relevant to expose in a time when several schools strive for flexibility and a decomposition of the traditional time schedule. My interest lies in the stories of young pupils trying to organize themselves and their time at school with a temporal discourse far different from the one they are used to. How do they express time and how do they organize it, when previous tracks and positions in time no longer apply?

As I search individual experiences I use qualitative techniques to collect data and I also try to analyse interviews and stories, by looking at *how* they express time and what signs/concepts they use in constructing it. The stories first of all give me the possibility to see how the youngsters express their experiences, but they also include *pedagogical conditions* that the pupils themselves identify and express. The design is formulated according to theories of narrative in a methodological perspective and to *pedagogic ethnography* as Birgitta Qvarsell (1996a) describes it. Pedagogic ethnography is a way of working abductively and in an open way and it focuses on transformations and movements in the "gap" between the individual and the surrounding structure; between ability and external socio-cultural expectations. The development of the individual becomes interesting from a cultural and social rather than a psychological perspective. The conditions identified by the individual are related, not to inner psychological movements but to movements *between* the inner and the outer sphere. In an aim of grasping this gap in interviews as well as in the analysis of data I use a couple of theoretical and sensitizing concepts. The concept *developmental task* relates to challenges in the life of the individual and is brought up by the individual himself from different passages of life. To be able to cope with and get on with everyday life the individual must work on these challenges or tasks (Qvarsell 1996b). The concept *positioning* is supposed to show the individuals' way of being in relation to the surroundings; how he actively positions himself in society by identifying and trying out different

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ways to be and act. The concept offers a way to understand, both how the individual is subject to discourses, and how this relation is a result of negotiation in the inter-subjective life (Burr 1995). Both these concepts are selected because of their possibility of showing conditions identified by the individual in the gap between action and structure.

In my research I will observe three different *working universes*, though only one of them is represented in this article. Those working universes are carefully and strategically chosen as I believe they can all contribute to the searched picture of the actual phenomenon. They are all upper secondary schools that practice distance education in different ways. They are also interesting and relevant places because of their reflection of contemporary ideals. The working universe is chosen in the light of the *general universe* or the theoretical dimension of research (Sjoberg & Nett 1968). In this case the general universe represents young peoples' dealing with temporal freedom while the working universe constitutes the concrete school situation where young pupils in upper secondary school take responsibility for their own time of study and draw up their own syllabus. If general universe has its grounds in individuals' experience and coping with contemporary ideals as individual freedom, flexibility and independence, the working universe above can be the strategically chosen discourse within which such experiences exist and can be retold.

A working universe - Mobil@ gymnasiet

The school selected for this article is an upper secondary school in Stockholm, called Mobila gymnasiet (the mobile school). The school calls itself "a school of the future" and it offers pupils the possibility to decide *when* and *where* to study. The idea of the school has its grounds in a belief in self-regulation and an inner motive force of the individual. The school also has an aim to mirror and encourage temporal ideals in today's society (Balldin 2000). The pupils here live *with* and *in* time on other conditions and therefore they sometimes express time in other ways. At the same time they have to deal with traditional and tough temporal structures, still prevailing in our society. Pupils at the mobile school express a situation quite complex, difficult and new to them. Meanwhile, it is probably a situation applicable to other workplaces and other schools as well. A changing or pluralistic time and transformations among signs of time is a reality for many people in today's society.

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The school is owned by a company called K-world, and is run as a private company, though the students are paid for in the same way as in regular upper secondary schools. It is a school fundamentally based on Internet and virtual communication, but settled physically in two learning centers in Stockholm, one in Göteborg and one in Malmö. The arenas of study are thus several, both physical and digital. The physical environment is not conventional school-alike, instead school is settled in office blocks in business-areas in Stockholm. At Kista learning center the walls between the classrooms are transparent and the teachers' rooms are mixed with classrooms in a strive for an open learning environment and an easiness to reach and to get in contact with teachers and supervisors at the school. The main educational program is Media, but you can also choose to take courses in social science and natural science. In Stockholm the mobile school has about one thousand students, three hundred in each age group. Education at the mobile school combines teaching in classrooms with studies at distance. The learning at distance is facilitated thanks to portable computers, one for each student, and individual plans of study. The youngsters also have their own personal mentor or supervisor with whom they meet every second week for support or guiding. Two to three days a week the pupils also have conventional lessons fixed in schedules (Balldin 2000).

The individual plan of study does not include *individual* time for examinations or flexible deadlines for various tests. The education is in other words not free or individual in temporal terms. It is freedom within conventional frames in time and learning. In fact it is only the in-between time that can be used as the pupils wish. Except for that they must all in the end adhere to the same type of performance measured by the tests they take. The time in-between lessons and final exams is free to be used due to individual preferences and at places preferred. The syllabus and the types of testing are similar to those of other upper secondary schools in Sweden, though the way to these tests and final examinations may differ from pupil to pupil – it is the choice of their own.

Types of data

Data from the study at the mobile school consists of 11 interviews (individual and in two cases groups of two) with pupils in the third year and in one case from the first year, two interviews with teachers and regular e-mail communication with some pupils. In written material data consist of

20 pupils´ definitions of the concept "freedom" and 95 pupils´ description of how they planned and worked with an examination paper from home for about two weeks of time. Five pupils have also borrowed my recorder for a week and they have then reported during the day what they have done and what they planned to do next. This way of collecting data is an ongoing process so the final number of reporting informants will probably increase. I also plan to do group interviews with pupils who perform on their own. As this school does not offer their pupils room for studying, they are not as physically available as pupils at conventional schools. They spend most of their time at other places. To do a lot of observation *at* school is therefore not relevant. The mobile school is in fact mobile and therefore the techniques of collecting data have been the result of a reflective attitude where I constantly try to find new and different kinds of techniques. Various types of data will therefore be the result of the fieldwork, but together these data will form a text filled with words or *signs* ready to be analysed.

Signs as both specific and general

Pedagogic ethnography combines ethnography with the semiotic tradition represented by C S Peirce. Peirce's semiotic focuses on action and change and studies the use of signs in different social contexts. Peirce maintains that reality consists of, or even *is*, signs, because the human consciousness cannot understand or have knowledge beyond her notions of the real. Consequently, the human being lives in a world constructed by herself and expressed by means of different symbolic signs. Our material world can be described as a net of signs where semiosis is the transformations between these and their mediate relation with human consciousness. Semiosis also results in still new signs. When we describe our reality we translate one sort of signs (indexical) to another (symbolic). This translation makes it possible to transfer knowledge and to communicate, but it also makes it impossible to prove the essence of reality. What reality and time is cannot be understood in other ways than through describing it by means of symbolic signs (Peirce 1985). But though symbolic signs are translations from a more abstract *feeling* of something, they should be able to be analysed as signs of something underlying, as expressions of experiences in the gap between action and structure. Above all, semiosis and changes in and among signs should indicate new experiences and knowledge beyond the symbolic signs.

The symbolic signs with which we describe our reality are both specific and general. Various cultures use different concepts or metaphors to describe a phenomenon, which means that the individual understands and experiences the phenomenon in a special way. For example: Islamic culture has two various concepts relating to our concept time. One of them, *waqt* is measured in seconds, days and years, while *zaman* measures the values included in waqt. Zaman defines the difference between happiness and unhappiness, justice and injustice and is, in the Arabic world, seen as the most interesting dimension in time (Morra 1996). Western culture has other specific concepts for time that indicate their importance and place in the ordinary lives of individuals. For example: the expression *time is money* shapes our daily activities, thoughts about time and how we use it. Time in Western societies is described in terms of a valuable commodity, something that can be wasted or saved or even paid for; you're *wasting* my time, that road will *save* me some time, that flat tire *costs* me an hour, do you have some time to *spend?* and so on. Work in our society is closely related to *the time it takes*, and time in its turn is related to money, which makes us pay and be paid per hour, weak or year. Even if this way of expressing and using time is evident to us, it is not the only way of understanding time (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Burr 1995). There are other cultures (see examples above) imagining and thereby using time in different ways. At the mobile school the traditional way of classifying time in working time vs. leisure time does not apply. The pupils´ time of studying sometimes feels as free as leisure time though leisure time is often disturbed by thoughts of studies (Balldin 2000). When you can decide for yourself how to use and how to divide your time it is not evidently the traditional division that is most suitable. The metaphors or symbolic signs used by the pupils at the mobile school are specific for that discourse. Those new signs can however be theorized and used to describe a general phenomenon and a temporal situation prevailing even in other places than this specific school.

About passing borders - a voice from the mobile school

In this article I will analyse parts of an interview with a girl 18 years old. The primary aim is to examine *how* she expresses time and temporal freedom in some scripts from the interview. I also look for *developmental tasks* or possible *positions* identified and expressed by the girl. The interview is filtered through a narrative and pedagogic eye and I have used an

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analytic method that proceeds from the story and its form, though it divides the sections in thematic units (*stance*) and search for units of meaning (*coda*). I have chosen scripts that I maintain reveal different, but fundamental, experiences of the phenomenon and that are expressed by several youngsters at the school. The way of structuring the scripts is taken from James Gee (1991). He maintains that stances are universal units used by everybody in structuring of ones speech. The stances consist of lines with parallel structure and they stick together because of their tendency to be uttered in the same pace and without pause. By structuring the text in this specific way you reveal the story's rhythm and form, *but* the presentation of the scripts also brings out and makes its meaning and themes more visible (Mishler E.G. 1997).

Dead time vs. effective time

In the script below the girl begins to tell me that the mobile school can be good vs. bad in diffrerent ways for different people. Her sister has just attended the mobile school and she´s doing better (according to the interviewed) because she has always studied a lot at home, while the interviewed girl never had to do homework or study at all (she managed anyway). The script ends up in a thought about the difference between the mobile school and traditional schools due to the use of time and the opportunity in the mobile school to render time more effectively in favour of the "dead time" in conventional schools.

> Stance 1: different techniques/preferences of study
> I **think** that this works better for her
> **because** she has always studied a lot at home
> and then had **dead time** at school
> while I had **dead time** at school
> without studying at home...

> Stance 2: opportunities (to be effective) in school
> Now she doesn't have to suffer dead time at all
> and is able to study **effectively**
> at school (which she is used to)

> Coda
> I don't think there is as much **dead time** here

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Stance 3: manifest conventional school and dead time
In conventional schools
there it is a lot of **dead time** at lessons
whith teachers just talking bullshit
and you sit sleeping
and do nothing

Stance 4: effective ideal
Here it is more of **important** information
because they can't go through it all

The theme in this section is effective time vs. dead time and how you can be excused from dead time at the mobile school, while conventional schools force you to go through this meaningless time by their strict schedules and prescribed lessons. The girl uses the metaphor "dead time" as time when you just have to remain in class, without doing anything. Dead time is useless time but the mobile school offers you the possibility to keep time "alive". Her story indicates that time has a life of its own. It can be alive and kicking and full of meaning, but it can also be dead and useless. She describes lessons at the mobile school as more informative than in conventional schools. The teachers don't have that much time to teach, so they will have to be more informative, less widening and pro-found. Could we understand this in the way that informative and effective time is alive while other time is dead? If so, this mirrors a social and late-modern ideal of the constantly moving and active individual who never rests or does things that are meaningless to society. Further, if lessons at the mobile school mediate important information, what kind of information is implied in dead time or ordinary curriculum time?

At the mobile school deeper knowledge is not taught at lessons but will have to be found, read and learned by the pupils themselves. The lessons at school are informative, not necessarily dealing with the current syllabus, but about *how* and *where* to find more information. The time in-between is the responsibility of the pupils. It is free to be organized in an individual way, or organised *as time goes.*

Curriculum time vs. switching time

The in-between time is organized in many different ways, though commonly it is treated in a spontaneous and unstructured way – from a

conventional viewpoint. At the same time it is flexible in favour of what you feel that you like to do.

Stance 1: possibilities to choose
At home you can study math
and "yes now I understand this"
and then **you can go further** to the next task
or do something else

Coda
In a way **decide for your self**

Stance 2: manifest conventional school
Instead of school telling you that
now **you are supposed to** do
this or that

Stance 3: switching
And when you feel
that "now I cannot manage any more"
then **you can switch**
and do some other subject for a while

Stance 4: manifest curriculum time
You can't do that in the ordinary school
when it is said that
"now you do that and now you do this"

Stance 5: manifest conventional schedules
If you attend a lesson in math
and have something else to do
you are not allowed
because you are supposed to do math

Stance 6: possibilities in a free time
At home **you can switch**
and if you suddenly come up with a good idea
you can do it

This section expresses possibilities related to freedom and flexibility in the mobile school; it is about switching back and fourth from one subject to another. It is also about the possibility to follow your own desires and preferences in time and be able to implement ideas that come up; to be spontaneous. Again the girl illustrates this by comparing with conventional ways of learning and predetermined curriculum time. She seems to enjoy the possibilities not to plan in advance and the possibilities to be flexible and spontaneous, and this feeling of having time as her own project is an ideal *position* at the mobile school, and a manifest against traditional time planning.

How to get started or how to finish?

The major challenge in this discourse, as she describes it, is the force of motivation behind *getting started* as well as to deal with those subjects or tasks more difficult or less enjoying. As a result you always do the "best" parts first.

Stance 1: situation
You sit at home with something
and then you think
"oh God this is boring so I'll do some on this task instead"

Stance 2: working all the time
And so **you do something all the time**
but you never finish

Stance 3: organizing the work
You always do the best parts in all subjects
and that's maybe a negative thing
but in the end you have to deal with
and do the difficult parts as well
but **you do the easier parts first** maybe
and then you go for the difficult

Stance 4: sense vs. reality
or maybe it really isn't so difficult
but it looks tough to deal with
and then when you get started it isn't as hard

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Coda
It is just about **getting started**

Stance 5: sense vs. reality
I will have to make an effort to sit down and do it
but when I then get started it isn't hard

Coda
It is just about **passing that border...**

To begin with the less enjoyable and to stop watching television, to stop chatting on the Internet or on the phone and so on, seems to be a fundamental task in this discourse, here expressed in verbalizing terms as a way of *passing a border*. The mobile school demands a great deal of self-reliance and independency as well as the pupils´ ability to cope with an unstructured time: a floating time that is neither working nor leisure time. And they are supposed to get things done in their own – though measured – time. This may not be surprising in any way but it brings up a temporal discourse new to most young people. A possible and also expressed experience is the feeling of insufficiency. When time is yours and no one tells you when to work or when to rest you can actually work all the time and you never finish. One example of *positioning* is the girls description of learning in an unpredictable way. When she is studying on her own she does things when occasion arises, and again, she also switches among various subjects without finishing one of them first. When you constantly switch between subjects and never finish one you do not experience any natural pause for rest - between two works - because the work never ends. The possibilities expressed have to do with the opportunities to do things you feel for and leave the others behind (for a while or for another day) and also the possibilities to do things in your own pace. Time follows the mind, daily preferences and feelings instead of the opposite.

Coda – learning in time

From the scripts above you can tell that time at the mobile school is not conventional, nor structured. The *positions* expressed by the girl are switching positions, spontaneous and flexible following instant desires rather than a conventional curriculum order. You see as time goes what happens and what you will do. Nothing is planned in advance, things just

happen when you feel like it. She studies different subjects in her own order and in her own time – though her knowledge is measured within conventional frames. So, which are the *developmental tasks* described here? One fundamental challenge expressed is to get started, to finish one task or subject and get on with another. Another challenge to deal with is the sense of constant demands and work. When your education is your own responsibility you can actually work all the time – no one will tell you when to take a rest. Conventional signs in time as working time vs. leisure time do no longer exist, at least not in mind.

Schools as the mobile school in Stockholm are increasing, and working as well as studying at distance and in your own way are ideals spreading in our society. The mobile school is still experimenting and trying out new ways of combining temporal freedom with the current curricula and their temporal deadlines. In this new and changing discourse the youngsters strive for an education and acceptable grades. They too must be flexible and constantly accept new ways and new demands from the school. From a research point their stories are of great value and give us insight into a changing society with changing values and ideals. Their learning in time, either it is their own, curriculum time or society time, should be noticed and observed – above all in times of change.

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Michael Göhlich/Monika Wagner-Willi

Peers on the Threshold to Lessons

Making and Dealing with Differences in a School's Everyday Life

Our empirical study considers the ritual establishment and negotiation of communities in three classes of the 4th – 6th grades at a Berlin elementary school within peer group, class and lesson communities. We concentrate on everyday transitions as main processes in everyday school praxis and investigate those micro-rituals shaping the transitions between different school contexts. The question central to this study is: *Which themes and forms of micro-rituals can be found in these school transition phases and how do they contribute to establishing communities?*

We are able to further delineate the focus of our study by reference to the work of the anthropologist Victor Turner (1989a), who has paid particular attention to the phenomenon of *liminality*, the threshold phase of transition from one social group to another. Within the liminal phase Turner locates the ludic, the playing with the symbolic means of expression, with meanings (e.g. status reversal), and with dramaturgy – in brief, playing with potentialities and the horizon of possibilities.

We inquire into the *performative* element in ritual. On one hand this term describes the notion of "cultural performance", as found in Victor Turner (1989b) and Clifford Geertz (1983), as physical performance generating and establishing community (cf. Göhlich 2001, Wagner-Willi 2001). For this reason, we are interested in questions relating to scenic arrangements, dramaturgy, stylized gestures, and the fixed props, or the use of fixed props, in rituals (cf. Wulf 1998). On the other hand, we are able to use the term of the performative as a conceptual tool – grounded, above all, in the work of Gregory Bateson and Erving Goffman – to tackle the referential character of actions and interactions. In this way, we understand physical performance as a statement and, where appropriate, as a framework (Bateson 1985; Goffman 1977).

We obtained our empirical material from three sources: videography, participant observation and group discussion. The evaluation of the material was carried out in a multi-layered process modeled on documentary

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interpretation (cf. Bohnsack 1999). Our initial evaluation concentrated on the video material, but it proved extremely difficult and time-consuming to carry out what would, in the case of audiotapes, be called transcription. To capture in words all the changes in mimic, gesture, spatial position or atmosphere requires making an initial interpretation already at the level of description if one does not want to produce an incomprehensible text (cf. Panofsky 1980). Nevertheless, at this lowest textual level of interpretation we made an effort to favor detailed description to keep open various options of further interpretation. Consequently, we were confronted with a vast amount of text. In the following stage of interpretation we elaborated the 'how', the patterns and context of the interactions described, using a basic methodological approach of comparative analysis, establishing homology and contrast. Comparative analysis was applied in the particular case, as well as - and increasingly so in the course of the research – to generally similar cases.

In the wide variety of material we collected during our fieldwork, the transition from break-time to lessons within the classroom proved to contain a wealth of information. In this situation, the liminal phase is marked by a specific, developed matrix of action which clearly highlights the area of tension between the children's culture and institutional order constitutive of school reality.

In the title of the text, our reference to making and dealing with differences in a school's everydaylife expresses our experience of the complex range of differences to be found precisely in such threshold phases as the temporal and spatial transition from the 'break' to 'lesson' context. The threshold phase opens up spaces for possibilities with undefined complexities which then require a process of reconstructing order through differentiation and the establishment of borders and differences ("Draw a distinction!"). Against the backdrop of such reconstruction, it becomes particularly apparent how individuals or small groups try to maintain a specific orientation or order which is otherwise in dissolution.

Differences found in single instances are reminiscent of general distinctions found in sociology, socialization research, and developmental psychology as well as those specific to certain fields. Aside from ethnic differences, which finds expression in our research as membership of German, Turkish or multi-ethnic peer groups, or differences – including negotiation of differences – between boys and girls, the following areas strike us as worthy of mention:

- differentiation between children and youths, which served as a feature of class-internal order among the 10-13 year olds in the classes we observed;

- formation of borders between school-internal peer groups, class or lesson communities – distinguishing members and non-members;

- and last but not least, the difference between an affirmative or an anti-school orientation among the pupils.

The examples from our empirical material are intended to illustrate the performative generation and treatment of the last three points above, focusing on how the children deal with small objects (i.e., ones which can be held in the hand) owned by the (individual) children. In the first example, the object in question is sweets, in the second, it concerns a pair of scissors, and in the third an exercise book.

Jeanette's sweets

Class 5x, 19.3.1999 (seating order 2) transition break – lesson (10.26:15 – 10.27:41)

Jeanette comes back to her seat with a bag of sweets in her hand, sits down, places the bag on her desk and takes something out of it. Tacim goes past her, turns around, rapidly waves his hand up and down in front of her face, grabs quickly over her shoulder into the bag and helps himself to some sweets. Jeanette forcefully shoves him away and shouts loudly: "That's mine!" Tacim stands, legs apart, a meter away, leans his head backwards and with an exaggerated gesture puts the sweets into his mouth. Ömer comes up to Jeanette's desk, followed by Ulak and Ayla, and says: "But I get some!" He taps on the bag that Jeanette is tightly gripping and holds out his wide-open hands. Ulak and Ayla copy him. Ömer says to Jeanette "Hey, let me have some!" takes a handful of sweets and leaves. Jeanette picks up a piece which has fallen onto the desk, puts it into her mouth, wipes the desk and looks at Ulak who is still standing there with his hand out. Jeanette shakes her head and says: "You've already had some!" Ulak replies "That's *really* nice!" as he's going. Ayla claps her hands, playfully begging, and, smiling, holds them out to Jeanette. Jeanette gives Ayla some sweets. Ayla turns around and calls out triumphantly to Ömer: "I got all the....!" and shows him her full hands. Ömer waves her

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away and sits down at his desk. He has put down the sweets in front of him and is eating them. Ayla goes back to her place next to Ömer, where she gradually eats up the remainder of the sweets she still has in her hand. Jeanette stands up and brushes off the crumbled bits of sugar from her trousers and sits back down. Finally, Uzman comes up to Jeanette and asks for some of her sweets. Jeanette refuses to give him any and Uzman replies: "Okay, you've (...choice), that was it!" Jeanette packs the bag of sweets away in her school bag.

The sweets Jeanette has brought with her back from break lead to a whole chain of interactions with a range of different pupils. Initially Tacim uses his skill to snatch some of the sweets, hence allowing him to acquire a part of Jeanette's possessions expressly against her will. He then stages his conquest with a theatrical performance of devouring the sweets. Unlike Tacim, other children attempt to persuade Jeanette voluntarily to part with some of her sweets – Ayla's attempt here being the most obvious. While Ömer, having initially made the gestures associated with asking, then helps himself, albeit with Jeanette's acceptance, Ayla 'begs' some sweets for herself, even if she uses an exaggerated and ironic form to obtain them. However, Ulak and, later, Uzman receive nothing despite their begging gestures. Giving does not seem to be bound to some specific behavior from those wanting some of the sweets.

It may be worth asking at this point what relevance the sweets have for the children in this scene. There appear to be two main aspects: firstly, the sweets as a medium for initiating and expressing relationships, and, secondly, the sweets as the expression of and potential for continuing a set of actions relating to pleasure and enjoyment.

In the former case, we can distinguish both a positive aspect (the act of giving, begging gesture) and a negation (refusal, dispossession). Taken in its totality, this scene makes quite clear that there is no single accepted routine of giving and taking between Jeanette and those trying to obtain some of her sweets, i.e., we cannot detect here any common, shared actions based on friendship. This aspect becomes especially clear when we look at the different forms of refusal shown to Tacim, Ulak and Uzman. In contrast, Jeanette shows a certain willingness to give to the others – Ayla and Ömer – and hence shows a readiness to initiate a relationship, even if merely a rudimentary one; however, Ayla and Ömer only show limited interest in reciprocation. On the other hand, Ulak and Uzman's reaction to being treated differently demonstrates a statement of distance to Jeanette

who is then excluded from a potentially shared community by a withdrawal of friendship („That was it!") or negative attributes („That's *really* nice!"). Tacim's territorial attack, in turn, contains elements of a provocative (ritual) penetration into private female territory and the attempt to use activity in initiating a girl-boy relationship, which Jeanette uses physical force to reject.

This scene can simultaneously be read as a specific form of processing the difference between break-time and lessons. As an object, sweets belong to the break. As became quite obvious during other observation sequences, food and sweets have no place in regular lesson time nor lesson space. Bringing sweets into the classroom, consuming them there and the almost collective participation in these processes performatively demonstrate the pupils' orientation as at least ambivalent if not in contradiction to the disciplined behavior required in the coming lesson. It is precisely interactive entanglement like this, so distinct in this scene, which delays completing action patterns directed towards the organisational system of lessons, like hanging up jackets and coats or putting all the things needed for the lesson on the desks (pencil cases, exercise books). Looked at in this way, the sweets as markers of pleasure and enjoyment rescue a part of the context 'break-time', importing it into the classroom and, hence, make the context change to the discipline demanded in lessons more bearable.

Ulak's scissors

A further frequently observed everyday mode of ritualized treatment of lesson objects is the use of a fellow-pupil's object as provocation, usually in a way combining two aspects. Provocation can, of course, be directed towards an object as the personal territory of a pupil; such encroachments usually aim at determining peer relations and produce a specifically shaped hierarchy between two pupils or, where an audience is involved, a hierarchy within the class community. On the other hand, provocation can be directed towards the object in its function as a tool used in the lesson. Rather than this being an encroachment on personal possession, it's target is disturbing or attacking the school order and the routine contextualizing and locating the object specifically (e.g. pencil cases on the desks, pens in the pencil cases).

We can principally distinguish two types of processes within this particular form of interaction: non-resisted taking and resisted taking. The following example serves to illustrate the former, non-resisted taking:

Class 5x; 16.03.99; transition break-time – lesson; 10.25

Dursun is going slowly towards the cloakroom area. As he comes past Ulak, already settled at his desk, Dursun says something to him and laughing, pulls Ulak's woolen hat over his head from behind. Ulak pulls the hat up again, leaves his place and joins the group at the neighboring desks. Dursun takes a pair of scissors out of Ulak's pencil case, plays with it, turns laughing to Ulak, holds the scissors up to him at chin level and gesticulates with them. He then goes back to Ulak's desk and bending over the desk towards Stephan, clicks the scissors open and closed level with Stephan's hair, turns around and briefly holds them up towards the camera. Ulak slowly comes back towards his desk. Dursun puts the scissors back in the pencil case. Ulak sits down in his place again.

The formation of vertical differences within the class - from both above and below - and the production of power already perceivable in the treatment of the woolen hat is continued with the pair of scissors as a lesson object. Dursun, the physically larger of the two, takes away Ulak's scissors, and Ulak offers no resistance. The interaction as a whole demonstrates to those involved and any potential audience that there is a 'higher-lower' relationship between these two not merely in size but in social aspects as well. This higher-lower aspect applies even more to Dursun's movement of the scissors towards Stephan or, more precisely, towards Stephan's hair – as is supported by an extract from the transcript of a group discussion with the pupils on the topic of "Transition from Break to Lesson". In this extract, the children report earlier attacks on Stephan's person.

Transcript extract from the group discussion with former pupils of class 5x

Yussif:	Mhm, I had Stephan's hair ( ) [Laughing (1)]
Several:	[Laughing (4)]
David:	Yes and then
	he cried, then I'll tell you (.) Fuat, carry on.
Fuat:	And (.) once
	once one time something happened that (.) [laughing:

	Stephan] came upstairs with a piece of cake and Dursun
? (Boy):	[Laughing]
Fuat:	stopped him (.) against the desk and [laughing: shoved] his cake in his mouth
Several:	[Laughing (2)]
Fuat:	And (1) Yussif (I think) cut his hair of- -er (.) well, everyone (.) had [laughing: cut off] other bits of hair and (2) that was it.
? (Boy)	[Giggling]

In contrast to the video scene, we are not dealing here with some threat as fun but with the actual performance of substantial encroachments on Stephan's personal and physical space. (Stephan was a fellow-pupil who was not present during the discussion). In one case, he has the piece of cake he has brought with him shoved into his mouth – and hence any enjoyment of it destroyed – and in the second instance, cutting off his hair is a (short-term) irreparable infringement of the body's territorial area. Seen in this way, hair is not simply a part of the body's protective shell but can be viewed as a part of an expression of personal image (in Goffman's sense, 1971) compromised by the other pupils. The humiliating act of cutting Stephan's hair leaves traces visible for everyone in the victim's physical territory. That this is no longer just a question of fun – in contrast to the video extract - is quite clear here when we consider the victim's reaction: he cries.

One difference which becomes obvious is the way such physical infringements mark the children among themselves. Stephan does not belong to the same peer group as Dursun, Yussif, and Fuat, and the tricks and pranks these 'bigger' ones play on the 'smaller' ones form a part of their peer group's shared experiences: The infringements into physical territory are related as a jointly experienced story and the group comments as a whole by laughing intensively about it. At the same time, both the transcript and the video extract make it apparent that the children in this peer group are far from showing a readiness to create a lesson context in the transitional phase. In this way, their activity indicates a further marking of difference – rejecting the attitude of the pupil prepared for the lesson.

Both these differences are interconnected: Establishing peer-related differences simultaneously provides a way of dealing with the difference between an affirmative or an anti-school orientation among the pupils. Ulak and Stephan belong to those pupils who are not only among the first to re-

turn to the classroom after the break but also hang up their jackets straight-away and sit down at their desks. To that extent, in the video example it is no coincidence that Dursun chooses Ulak's scissors to take from the pencil case; this is not simply encroaching into Ulak's territory but attacking the way Ulak normally behaves when entering the classroom, attacking those visible signs of a well-ordered pencil case and tidy desk which are directed either towards a lesson community or specific behavior and presence of objects that, in this context, comprise elements of order in the lesson.

However, the last part of the sequence described might be interpreted as showing that, in the final analysis, Dursun accepts both possession (he places the scissors back on Ulak's desk) and the order required for a lesson (he puts the scissors back in the pencil case). The scene shows provoca-tion, not rebellion.

Jana's exercise book

Following the internal logic inherent in the approach to the order needed for lessons – without wanting to claim there is some underlying chronological structure in the forms of how pupils deal with the small ob-jects already discussed – we turn finally to an example of a type of every-day ritualization that shows an affirmative orientation to school.

Class 5x; 24.03.99; transition break – lesson; 12.17

Jana goes over to Jeanette's desk with her exercise book in her hand. Mr Becker is sitting at the desk, talking to Jeanette while Nina is standing beside them listening. Jana stops half a meter away and follows what's go-ing on. When David goes past, Jana takes a step back, looks to the right for a moment and then back to Jeanette's desk. Mr Becker carries on explain-ing to Jeanette, nodding his head and maintaining eye-contact with her. A little later David joins the group around Jeanette, stops next to Jana and looks over Jeanette's shoulder at the desk. Jana uses both her hands briefly to lift her exercise book up to her chest then lowers it again, continuing to look at the desk or at Mr Becker, and moves a pace forward as David comes up to her. David bends over Jeanette and talks to her. Mr Becker sits back upright. Jana talks to him and holds out her exercise book. Mr Becker glances at the exercise book, shakes his head, suddenly stands up and

walks back to his desk with a steady, rapid step, followed by Nina. Jana goes back to her desk with her exercise book.

The liminal phase between the break and the lesson leaves space for dyadic processes between individual pupils and the teacher. Prior to the start of those processes officially opening the lesson, we can distinguish the specific dyadic processes of presentation, handing over, handing out and collection of materials for the lessons (including exercise books, work-sheets, and books), whereby the directedness of the interaction in each case needs to be taken into account. In the transition between break and lesson, it is almost always the children who present something to the teacher or hand something over. The pattern appears to be familiar to all participants and the teacher's part in nearly all cases is merely to offer a brief verbalized response (yes/no) or a gestural acceptance or refusal of the presentation or transfer.

Our interest in the scene described above is the way the performance takes place, i.e., specifically how Jana presents her exercise book. Despite this scene taking place prior to the official start of the lesson, Jana, approaching Mr Becker with her exercise book, finds him in a situation already characterized by elements of teaching, involved, as he is, in an explanatory interaction with Jeanette. Jana only approaches the situation very gradually since she moves both towards and away from the interaction. She is involved in a balancing act between approach and distancing, her body language expressing respect for the teacher-directed situation in front of her; in this way she reinforces the stabilization of structures similar to the formal lesson prior to the official start of teaching. We could compare features of this scene with a pupil raising their hand during the officially started lesson where 'raising one's hand' signalizes not merely the wish to express something but also the acceptance of a lesson structure which only allows expression with a teacher's permission and prompting. In a similar way to a pupil raising their hand, Jana raises and lowers her exercise book, seeking eye-contact with Mr Becker – but it is a comparatively weak signal and does not elicit any visible reaction. Jana might have used stronger signals as a response on her part to this non-reaction but her not doing so underlines her acquiescence in accepting that the sole decision-making power rests with the teacher. Only after Jeanette is contacted by another pupil with Mr Becker's consent and his sitting upright signals the end of the communication centered on the text lying on the desk in front of him, does Jana talk to the teacher and hold out her exercise book. Hence, the pre-

sented exercise book does not only function as an object in a lesson but the initial structure of the presentation itself proves to be an affirmation of the teacher's authority and the rules demanded for school and lessons. Jana does not even control the way the presentation ends; by getting up and walking away after rejecting the presentation, the teacher dissolves the dyadic structure and hence ends the presentation. Jana going away then herself can be understood as her acceptance of the teacher bring the presentation to an end and, indirectly, as her accepting his rejection of her presentation.

Whereas in the scene we have discussed here and in similar cases there were no further steps beyond presentation and examination, this was not always the case. In other scenes we observed, such a presentation did conclude with the lesson object being handed over to the teacher. Presentation, transfer or the fact that pupils involved generally return to their desks immediately after obtaining the teacher's comments or handing over the lesson object, all performatively establish a teacher-oriented atmosphere and routine, and hence the structural preparation of the lesson context.

We can thus differentiate between the pupils acting in this way from those whose behavior and interaction we looked at in the first two examples. In conclusion, we can say that the three examples specifically (beside other differentiations like the differentiation between children and youths) represent the performative establishing of a difference characteristic of everyday school life – the difference between pupils with an affirmative and pupils with an anti-school orientation. This is a cultural difference. The analyzed ritualizations perform differences not only with regard to the school ethos, but in the same time also with regard to categories of peer culture as ethnic, gender and age. Everydaylife ritualizations, as shown in the examples, are ressources not only to perform, but *by performing them* to constitute and to handle (to confirm or to diminuish) such cultural differences.

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Anja Tervooren

Children Dealing with Racist Name-calling: Play and Performance as Peer Culture and Peer Politics?

Racism and racist-motivated violence in Germany is one of the most urgent themes in political debates in the 1990s and into the beginning of the new millennium. Educational practitioners and policy makers have been forced to get in touch with discussions about racism and multiculturalism. Three levels of pedagogical intervention in schools have resulted: increasing the students knowledge, developing their mediation skills and using sanctions. This focus locates students as the targets of pedagogical aims. How do children themselves respond to and deal with racism? Over the last twenty years peer culture research has been able to show that a great deal of learning during childhood and youth is managed in and by peer groups. I will argue that children have their own skills to deal with racism and often have higher levels of competence in this field than their adult teachers and parents. In the era of globalization many children, especially in elementary schools, are confronted with a variety of differences in languages, economic and cultural capital, origins, talents, homes, etc. The student bodies of schools in densely populated inner city quarters - often labeled as problem schools - comprise pupils born all over the world or with parents or grandparents who migrated to Germany. Most present day adults did not experience such manifold differences within their school communities or have forgotten what this situation was like. Their segregated professional, public or private spheres seldom provide them with opportunities to become accustomed to dealing with diversity. Children who attend schools with a very mixed clientele learn to deal with a new form of *hidden curriculum* and may in their own ways develop a new form of intercultural competence. What constitutes this competence is the main question considered in the following. An example of a racist speech act and reactions to it by different children will be presented and discussed in terms of their various qualities and effectiveness. One of the childrens reactions, a ritual insult between two boys, will be analyzed briefly with regard to the power of ritual performances. The deployment of play and performance leads to the question whether a culture among children exists and

how it can be described. The conclusion will address the ambivalence of the strategies of play and performance in relation to power.[1]

Being marked as a stranger

One morning at around eight o'clock in an elementary school in the inner city of Berlin: Two boys, both twelve years old, are fighting in the school corridor. Boris and Martin are hitting each other; "ugh" and "ahh" can be heard. Several children, who are standing around in groups, playing, talking or just waiting for the beginning of the lessons, begin to watch the two fighting boys. Suddenly Martin very clearly shouts a racist swearword at Boris - in the original German language used: "Kanakenarsch". Fatma, Binol and Murat, who attend the same class as Martin and Boris, are immediately alerted and start watching what might happen. A second later Boris chases Martin to the end of the corridor, succeeds in hitting him and departs.

What is special about this scene? For a start, Martins is no ordinary name-calling. The German word "Kanake" is not easily translatable into English[2]: It derives from a Polynesian word for human beings. Using this word in the context of the German language transforms it into an insult that connects the person denoted with the status of a total stranger and uncivilized human being. In using the word Martin refers – consciously or unconsciously – to a long tradition of colonization and racist name-calling that succeeded in transforming a word that was originally neutral into a term that signals degradation. In German discourse it is mostly used as a name for persons who are not white. Nevertheless Martin adds the word "Arsch" – "arse" to the swearword "Kanake" and creates a double negative context. On the one hand this does not allow any ambiguity on the level of language and on the other the suffix exaggerates the meaning so much, giving a signal that it is eventually not meant literally.

The chase that follows inhabits exactly the precarious place between play and seriousness that Martin prepared. This ambivalence is revealed in the opposing facial expressions and gestures of the two participants: Martin, who is being chased because he called Boris a name, is smiling and laughing, while Boris remains quite serious and concentrates on hitting

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[1] I would like to thank Gabi Rosenstreich for her excellent reading.
[2] Similarities to other racist swearwords exist, for example in the word "wog". This word is dependent on its genesis in the context of the former British colonies and even difficult to explain in other English-speaking countries.

Martin. Martin is interested in showing that everything that happens is in the framework of play and has nothing to do with "real life", while Boris takes the content of the name-calling seriously. He is indeed insulted and tries to take revenge. The boys interpretations of the fight and the effects of Martins speech act differ considerably: While Boris believes its content, Martin tries to demonstrate that he does not and exploits the ambivalence of play instead. It offers the possibility to split reality and illusion.

Dealing with how language can harm, the philosopher Judith Butler argues that discriminating name-calling can never be localized in the sovereignty of one speaker alone. The effectiveness of the insult is, in contrast, based on its history, in this case the ritual repetition of a colonial, racist tradition (Butler 1998). When Boris chases Martin he shows his personal vulnerability to the racist discourse and looses part of his personal sovereignty as a result. Because of the power of ritual citation Boris cannot get real revenge by hitting Martin. His revenge implies that the effectiveness of the speech act refers to Martins person alone and the illusion that he can be punished for that. But Martins power derives – very much in contrast to this interpretation – from the fact that he is *not* the master of his own speech and is only orchestrating a ritual repetition of well-known racist speech. Boris is called a name and in chasing Martin he accepts it as a possible name for himself. The swearword hurts all the more because Boris accepts the interpellation. Martin thus fulfils a performative act[3] that has the effect that Boris indeed becomes the despised stranger. Butler adds that the speech act must work on both sides: the effectiveness is also dependent on the readiness of the named person to accept the interpellation.[4] In reacting to the interpellation "Kanakenarsch", Boris accepts it and reveals that Martin seems to have reasons to call him this. His history is visibly located in the context of migration, which is framed as a devalued field by the pejorative content. Boris did in fact migrate with his family from Russia to Germany only a year before this scene took place. When Boris reacts to the call "Kanakenarsch" he risks being hurt deeply. What possibilities to react do the other children reveal? After all their scope is wider since they were the ones to have been called that name.

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[3] John L. Austin introduced the notion of a speech act that brings into being what it names. His best-known example is the marriage ceremony: The judge cites the law with the phrase "I pronounce you..."and creates qua authority a couple (Austin 1985).

[4] Butler uses the term "interpellation" with reference to Louis Althusser. According to Althusser it is the police who initiate the call by which a subject becomes socially constituted. Because the policeman represents the law his address "Hey you!" has the effect of binding the law to the person who is called by him.

De-playing the status of the "other"

The scene happens in the morning before lessons start in the elementary school. The school building opens very early every day, enabling children to wait inside. In this school it is usual that a lot of children begin to show up half an hour before classes. To be in school early in the morning together with peers is more attractive to a lot of the students than staying at home. The children who together here have a lot of time to spend: Some of them talk, some are just hang around waiting for something to happen, others play a game. This place is warm, protected and densely populated with other children who are potential participants in conversation and play. Nevertheless, waiting in the corridor is usually boring and in this atmosphere every shout, quick movement or game gains a lot of attention. From the beginning of the fight the interaction between the two boys immediately grabs the childrens curiosity, especially of those who are in the same class as the two fifth-grade fighters. Attention increases even further when the swearword resonates along the corridor. Five of his classmates react to Martins speech act. Four children counter with different practices. Right after the insult one girl asks indignantly, "Did you hear that, Kanakenarsch?" When the whole scene is over and Martin is far away from Boris a second girl sings, "Boris, I love you". Somebody replies outraged, "Oh, now that it is over, you say something like that!" A third girl, Fatma, does not speak, but reacts by putting her leg out. Martin sees the obstacle and jumps over it. These three reactions *sanction* the insult and act in a similar way as Boris did. Referring to the realm of morals, they show that Martins behaviour was not acceptable within the context of this crowded school corridor. What the three reactions have in common is that none of them are able to get any control over the content of the insult. While marking it as unacceptable they cannot help but confirm it at the same time. They question the ethics Martin demonstrates, not the reliability of the content of the speech act.

Binol and Murat choose a different technique in response to what they have seen. Some seconds after the end of the chase, they begin to play with each other, mimicking a singer and some animals. When Binol performs an ape, his finger hints in the direction of Murat, showing that the content of his play is meant as a nickname for his friend. To be called an ape is a very common swearword in the Western hemisphere, but instead of punishing Binol, Murat performs a similar animal. Though increasing the insults and referring explicitly to the theme of cultural differences - Murat repeatedly

calls Binol a "camel driver" – the two boys are laughing. The reciprocity of action gives way to some fun together. Beneath the reciprocity it is the power of the ritualization that is characteristic of the situation. The power of ritualization comes into being through restricted codes of communication to heighten the formality of movement and speech. Verbal and gestured combinations that evoke or purport to be the way things have always been done and a special form of concentration could gain a lot of power over discourse, as Catherine Bell formulates:

> "The deployment of ritualization, consciously or unconsciously, is the deployment of a particular construction of power relationships, a particular relationship of domination, consent, and resistance. As a strategy of power, ritualization has both positive and effective aspects as well as specific limits to what it can do and how far it can extend. While it may be an effective way of acting in certain places at certain times, under other conditions it may be useless and counterproductive." (Bell 1992: 206)

Binol and Murat set up a form of restricted communication, the ritual insult, which is well documented for youth and childrens culture. Already the one of the best-known theorists of play, Johan Huizinga, pointed out that ritual insults have been part of many different cultures over the centuries (Huizinga 1981). In 1970 the anthropologists Dundes, Leach and Özkök described a practice of ritual insults between boys in Turkey between 8 and 14 years old. The boys speak in rhymes and increase the degree of hurtful contents with the aim of forcing the opponent into the passive, female role. Those who are not able to find an original reply or simply hesitate, loose the battle. Duels mostly start with relatively harmless nicknames, often the name of an animal, and go on to the themes of power and sexuality (Dundes, Leach, Özkök 1970). Hermann Tertilt, a German ethnographer, described a similar tradition of dueling rhymes taking place in a gang of 50 boys of Turkish origin between 13 and 18 years old in Frankfurt (Tertilt 1997). The ethnographers of US-American middle schools, Eder, Evans and Parker, have analyzed ritual insults between boys. They found that a battle of ritual insults could be won as long as a boy controls his own feelings. They conclude that the boys learn to know not to be responsible for the feelings of the others and experience insulting and humiliating as acceptable means and as key competences of masculinity. They consider the effects of ritual insults to be very problematic in the field of gender - in their opinion they stabilize the status quo (Eder, Evans, Parker 1995). But does a ritual insult always have to stabilize a status quo?

Murat and Binol seem to demonstrate - at least for a short moment - the contrary. They perform a ritual insult that works on the theme of colonialism and post-colonialism. They take up the framework they have heard beforehand: the theme of discrimination and racist insults. Though they do not repeat the swearword Martin chose, they gather words with similar racist meanings that could potentially be used against both of them. The term "camel driver" points directly to the Arabic world to which Turkey - though it is a threshold between Europe and the Arabic states - belongs. The parents of both children moved from Turkey to Germany twenty years ago. The mimicking of an ape also refers to colonial tradition: To call somebody an ape means that he or she is only half a human being, does not participate in Western civilization. Due to their origins, both Binol and Murat could have been subjected to racist insults like this. This fact and their own use and performance of the same kind of words transforms the situation. Together they are very clearly staging the message "This is play!" In replaying the interpellation as un-liked stranger the two children de-play the potential effects of the interpellation. They present a performance that shows that the interpellation can take place without *necessarily* causing an injuring effect to those who could be meant.[5] They show themselves invulnerable to insults of this kind. The two children restage the situation and in performing it, they do something else with the ritual so that its revivability as a speech act that always has to hurt is fundamentally questioned. While doing it the two boys show their subject positions as unstable and unfixed: They must not always inhabit the sphere of the victim, though they do not deny its content. In changing the performance and the content of a hurting speech act, the two boys perform a scenario of invulnerability. Though racist words are at stake, Binol and Murat are able to suspend their content, at least for a little while. In their performance they thus deconstruct the stable polarity between the insider, who has the power to harm, and the outsider, who is wounded. They show that subject positions are fluid and changeable. Could their deployment of play be described as specific to childrens culture?

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[5] The potential of ritual performances to master violent situations in a permanently menaced society is discussed by Werner Röcke for the case of the court jester in the Renaissance. The jester or fool provokes the rules of the court and is at the same time able to distance himself from his deed with irony and joking. He produces a balance between seriousness and pleasure, in which the real violence can be stalled. The court fool replays scenes that could destroy the court and offers himself up as scapegoat (Röcke 2001). Binol and Murat do very much the same thing: They show the menace of racism as virulent among the children and by presenting it in a funny way, they create a way of distancing themselves from it.

Play and performance as childrens culture?

The concept of culture has become very prominent over the last twenty years, and has at the same time been increasingly criticized for giving way to essentialist ideas of identity. Since the nineteen eighties when the sociology of childhood emerged, the actions and skills of children have been observed and interpreted in such a way as to leave behind the notion of deficiency. This is largely due to the input of a psychological concept of development in discourse about children. To mark the fact that children have their own practices and values, children's activities have been demarcated as *childrens culture*. As James, Jenks and Prout point out, this concept of childrens culture is now being questioned because the approach tends to play down the contexts of social lives outside of relationships with peers and is in danger of exoticizing childhood as something totally different from the adults world. Children appear as a romanticized, vivid, natural tribal culture, whose purity is threatened by interventions from the media, from adults or youth culture. In such an essentialist conception, it is easy to lose sight of differences between children (James, Jenks, Prout 1998: 81ff).

Homi Bhabha, post-colonial theorist, calls the described way of dealing with the concept of culture "pedagogical".[6] This pedagogical version of culture is based on an "imagined community" that tries to bring together a shared history, but is permanently haunted by the performative.

> "The scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into signs of a coherent national culture (...). In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative." (Bhabha 1995: 145)

The performative is, according to Bhabha, all that which is not programmatic, the unforeseen events, coincidences, things nobody wants but that nevertheless happen. Culture is situated between the pedagogical and the performative, in the "split", the liminal space that is internally marked by differences.

Childrens culture in itself is characterized by liminality and could never be "pure". Amit-Talai, focusing on youth research, speaks about the "multi-culturality of youth". Her interest is the cultural production that "occurs at home, at school, at work, at play, on the street, with friends, teachers, parents, siblings and bosses, draws elements from home-grown as

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[6] Bhabha developed his concept *DissemiNation* for the description of the nation in times of post-colonialism, but simultaneously developed a theory of culture in general.

well as trans-national influences, and intertwines with class, gender, ethnicity and locality..." (Amit-Talai 1995: 231). To mark cultural liminality within childrens culture means to describe its relationships to other forms of culture. The event that happens before school starts is related to the school, to the class, to the concrete peer groups and to its relation to discourses in society. The school is not only the location of the childrens actions, it is the reason for the children to come together. When the described scene transpires in this densely populated place no staff member is at hand and the children manage the situation by themselves. But the rules of the institution have important effects on the childrens actions. One effect that could be seen is solidarity among children in the same class. Five children from the same class display their solidarity with Boris, demonstrate that their values are alike, but act in different ways. Their intentions might be similar; the effects of their action still differ. Their effects are not driven by the intentions, but by the special styles in each action. While Fatma tries to sanction by tripping Martin up, the others fight with words. Every person or group has their own style. Binol and Murat combine words and performance and gain for a moment considerable symbolic power. Their strategy might be the most effective one, but it is not the only one to deal with the discourse of racism that is virulent in society. An ethnography of children in school should not focus on their culture, but on their friendships or cliques with special styles or activities. *Micro-cultures* like this might be positioned between the pedagogical and the performative and reveal their own liminality.

The other side of the coin: The cost of the ritual insult

The politics of performance calls into question its power to mark people as outsiders, but the form of ritual insult constitutes a very serious play with power. In the end it always involves sacrificing one of its participants.[7] The ritual insult leaves the friends Murat and Binol as winner and looser in the end, because the symbolic power is transformed into a more

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[7] In my opinion the embrace of play and performance as a means of politics indicated by Judith Butler in an interview goes too far: "But I think a politics that begins and ends with that policing function is a mistake, because the question for me is how is that person, as it were, renewing and reinvigorating racist rituals of speech, and how do we think about those particular rituals and how do we exploit their ritual function in order to undermine it in a more thorough-going way, rather than just stopping it as it's spoken. What would it mean to re-stage it, take it, do something else with the ritual so that its revivability as speech act is really seriously called into question." (Butler 1999: 166).

concrete one that has effects on the relationship between them. When after Binol has tried to leave the situation several times, Murat goes on with "camel", "camel driver" and "village idiot", Binol increases the tension, no longer referring to the category "strange and uncivilized person". He counters and calls Murat "scum", thus increasing the discourse to the level "despised and rejected person in general". The very strong and quite general swearword "scum" disturbs Murat so deeply that he no longer reacts on the level of play and instead asks "What scum?" But for the two friends posing a question already means that the balance of power in the ritual insult is lost. Asking the other boy rather than replying to the previous insult means loosing the battle, because the rules are no longer followed. When Binol indicates the corner of the corridor with a very clear arm gesture while saying "Go to your corner!", Murat's question "Which corner?" merely confirms his defeat. Binol is the one who invests his whole body in the ritual insult. With his dance and showpieces he clings very closely to the character of play, in which Murat, when he is called "scum", can no longer adhere. Though both of them managed to control the power of racist discourse for a while, in the end Murat accepts the interpellation "scum" instead of responding. The balance of power between the two friends ultimately collapses, leaving Murat as the looser and Binol as the winner.

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Cecilia Löfberg

The Meaning of Culture -

A Discussion about Results and Methodological Dilemmas in Understanding Ethnic Culture and Peer Culture as Aspects in . Everyday School Situations

This article is based on my master thesis The Children and the school. About conditions for creating meaning and for developing peer culture among children in multicultural school setting. The purpose of the essay was to illustrate children's ways of creating meaning in a school setting signified by diversity in ethnic and cultural backgrounds among the children. I carried out my fieldwork in a suburban school with about 99% of the children having ethnical backgrounds other than Swedish. My intention was to find out what phenomena the children pointed out as important . for them in their everyday school situation. Peer culture and Ethnic culture were both given importance in their own ways.

In a new paradigm for the study of childhood, children's relationships and cultures are areas of study in their own rights. This paradigm is a reflection of seeing children as social actors that actively take part in constructing their own experiences. Doing research in this field points out methods that engage children as active participants. The methods focus on doing research with the children rather then on the children (O'Kane 2000). In my study, during field observations, I focused on reflections of the emic meanings. An emic perspective means the perspective of the informants. As a researcher my ambition was to fully understand the world of the children from their point of view. To do this I excluded the ethic perspective during the period of field observations. The ethic perspective can be explained as "the external, social scientific perspective on reality" (Fetterman 1989:32).

This article is in two sections. The first section deals with my results. In a later part of the article I explore some methodological dilemmas that may occur when doing research with children and having the emic perspective as your ambition.

Definitions of culture

Before I go further in a discussion around my results, I will clarify my understanding of the concept culture in its general form and the concepts peer culture and ethnic culture in its specific forms.

Culture can unite people. It is through culture that we find a meaningful existence together. From this point of view culture is a common ground. Individuals in a group/society/ or nation can meet each other in agreement on which norms and ideas shall be fundamental for their social development. But culture can also separate. Using the concept culture makes some people different. Identifying certain behaviours as something that belongs to a specific culture places estrangement in a focus position. It all depends on the view of the observer. Culture in its general form, the way I see it, is the norms, ideas and expressions that develop and manifest in a group of people whose ambitions are to create a social common ground for understanding reality. The phenomena that appear in the study of culture you can capture in the moment, but you can't expect them to remain unchangeable. Culture is variable. Therefore the study of culture is the study of a process.

Ethnic culture is the common norms and ideas that are connected with ethnicity. That is, the common frame of reference for people of a nation. Of course ethnic culture has a wide perspective including several variations built from the original social structure.

Peer culture is a more limited concept. It concerns the common values and proceeding actions that manifest a lifestyle for one or several groups of children within a society. As a base for my understanding of the concept I use these two definitions.

"A stable set of activities or routines, artefacts, values and concerns that children produce and share in interaction with peers" (Corsaro 1997:95).

"Specific patterns of culture, varieties of being together and exchange of experiences, norms and values in the culture of children as a lifeform. It is about co-actions, games and exchanges that the children themselves answer for." (Qvarsell 1998:95, my translation from Swedish).

Constitution of ethnic belonging in a Swedish school

In a diverse modern society as Sweden there are suburbs close to bigger cities where few Swedish people live. These suburbs are multicultural in

the sense that a variety of ethnic belongings are represented. The schools in such an area hold children with different ethnic backgrounds. These children meet one ethnic culture in school and most probably another within their families. Several researchers in the ethnic field point out that children and young people in these multicultural areas have to find a way to handle their double ethnic identities (see for example Alsmark1997, Ahmadi 1998, Nyberg 1993, Ålund 1997). Some focus on this as a problem for the young people. They mean that the difficulties in harmonising two ethnic identities lead to criminal behaviour and de-socialisation. Others have a more positive perspective and mean that these young people are experts in how to hover between two different ethnic cultures and, in some cases, create a trans-cultural lifestyle (Ålund, 1997). There is an opinion that criminal behaviour and de-socialisation are connected to discrimination in work, segregated living and political marginalisation rather then ethnic background (Ålund 1997).

In the class (fourth grade), in which I carried out my study, there were approximately fourteen different ethnic cultures represented among twenty-eight children. The children were ten or eleven years old. The study has an ethnographic orientation. I spent two days a week in four months at the school, socialising with the children. The last month I also carried out group interviews with the children and their teachers. Throughout this period I never observed that time during classes was used to investigate or even to talk about situations, or habits, or ways of thinking that these children shared and were a part of in their family relations.

Swedish researchers with a data material concerning children and young people in a Swedish multicultural setting, mostly point out that children and young people don't consider their ethnic culture or background as important. Instead they create an identity as school children or teenagers (see for example Evaldsson 2001, Franzén 1999, Pripp 1996). One (Franzén) believes that other qualities such as the Swedish pupil characteristic come to the forefront. Another (Pripp) means that young people in a multicultural environment find other markers for group co-ordination than ethnic belonging and cultural distinctive features. These markers would have been interesting in an environment where the ethnicity was more homogenous but in these areas ethnicity is far too diverse to be interesting as a marker. One researcher (Evaldsson) points out how the children she asked for ethnic belonging didn't want to answer her question, they meant it wasn't interesting. She also presents data where a girl involved in

play expresses a wish to be seen as a pupil instead of an immigrant pupil. Neither the children I spent time with answered that ethnicity was something important among them. But the ethnic culture was always there as a background. In conversation they referred to their home country, to customs and to family. My understanding was that the ethnic culture was of great importance for the children, not as a marker for identity, but as background experiences when it comes to understand everyday living. The problem is that because of the great cultural variety in school the children are homogenised into immigrants independent of their ethnic identity.

So, in the Swedish school there are Swedish pupils and there are immigrant pupils. In this kind of generalisation hides a hierarchic aspect where the Swedish children have the higher position. In the school I visited this hierarchy was even made stronger because of the teachers' opinion that immigrant children have to behave extraordinary good. The teachers' understanding was that immigrant children were already labelled as troublemakers in the society. Because of that they ought to be even more polite than Swedish children are. The teachers probably meant well but the segregation became even more obvious. If room was made for discussions about ethnic culture within the frame of school children, it would probably be more secure in creating own identities. Also, I suggest that the lack of interest for ethnic identities among children and young people in school connects to the generalising of ethnic background into immigrant pupils. Identifying with other markers than your ethnic background is a way to get a higher position in society. Because of the denial of ethnicity in the Swedish school system, ethnic culture is an important marker in school settings. Maybe this is not important among the children in play and in socialising, but for their position in society and for their possibilities to create a cultural identity. Ethnic cultures constitute all the time through the children in their everyday life. But as long as other forms of culture are not accepted in the school context the children will look for other, accepted, identities.

Peer culture as a way to communication and learning

Peer culture makes children develop within their own group. It is through peer culture children can associate to each other and build learning situations together. The base for this is a group of children that can develop mutual conceptions for their understanding of the world. Among the

children I met, the group continuously tried to create valid rules. This was a hard task because of the movement in the group. New children were entering or leaving the school rather frequently. During the time I spent in the class four children left and four children started in the class. The situation was not stable. Besides this the children had different fundamental values and different experiences of reality, also their skills in the Swedish language varied. This made it hard for peer culture expressions to develop in the bigger group of children. Instead of negotiating the children were battling about who's perspective was the correct one. This doesn't mean that there were no peer cultural expressions at all among the children. When they were in smaller groups or in groups divided according to sex, the children did meet and create knowledge together.

There is research (Qvarsell 1998) pointing out how important peer culture is for children's possibilities to create experiences and connected knowledge. Children need the exchange of experiences among each other to develop socially and cognitively. For children in multicultural school settings where the group of children is unstable because of the movement in the group, and where language skills and life experiences differ considerably, the development of peer culture seems to encounter impediment.

To restore peer culture as a dominating phenomenon at the schoolyard, my opinion is that adults have to be more actively participating with the children. I don't mean as authorities but as guides who can support teamwork and negotiating among the children. If peer culture could be restored as a dominating way of socialising among the children, my belief is that the children would be given a key to their own creativity. This won't necessarily mean that they will succeed better in school curricula but it would give them an easier time socialising and finding their own path.

Challenges the children identified and took on

Finally I will give you a glimpse of phenomena I identified as important everyday occurrences of the children's school day. These were phenomena where the children had similar understandings of the fundamental values and communicated from the same frame of reference.

Ambition to "succeed"

A big topic among the children was how to get good grades. Good grades would give them entry to the Swedish society. These children were

well aware of that they lived in an area ranked lower than other areas around the city. Daily conversations among the children dealt with criminal actions that were taking place in the area. These actions scared and fascinated them. In most of my interviews with the children conversation about when and how they were going to move from the area came up. They also talked a lot about changing school. Many children actually changed school and there were also children coming to the school from other schools. So the children seemed to be constantly moving, if not physically they did the movement in their minds. To get good grades in the school in which they were didn't seem to be an option. To succeed was a manifested phenomenon among the children that held them together. You could say that it was a peer culture phenomenon, but you could also say that it damaged the development of peer culture. To succeed you had to leave. Because of the coming and going, children were not interested in unifying bonds.

Language

The children in the school had very different skills in the Swedish language. In an inquiry made at the present school 1998, about the pupils understanding of Swedish as a second language, 31% were registered as beginners, 53% on a medium level and 16% were registered on a native level.

In classes there were no consideration taken to children's varying knowledge in the Swedish language. My experience among the children was that they didn't speak up if there were situations, or words, or meanings they didn't understand. Instead, during classes, they all looked as if they understood. Even in my relation with the children it took some time for me to understand that I wasn't always understood. One of the consequences of this during classes was that the children didn't participate. They talked to each other in smaller groups and some boys could make a lot of verbal disturbance, but most of them didn't participate in the topics the teacher presented. My understanding of this was that they actually couldn't follow where the teacher was going. On the schoolyard there was another situation. First, there was a mix between different languages; the children picked up meaning of words from each other's mother tongue. Second, there were confrontations between the children based on harsh verbal expressions. The confrontations were mostly between boys, but also girls used the harsh language to confront each other. The use of this kind of lan-

guage, that most of the time included insults of the children but also of their families, was a rather dominating feature at the schoolyard. I'm convinced that there is a connection between the children's limitation in expressing their experiences and show their abilities in class, and the harsh language at the schoolyard. In class the children were limited in their expression, and this goes badly with their wish to succeed and get good grades. As a complement to their difficulties in class they developed the schoolyard language. This is an expression they could follow and in which they could develop skills and keep in control. Therefore I find it most important to take the children's different language skills into consideration in planning of curriculum.

Relations

The children met each other in different ways. When they were in bigger groups or playing in the schoolyard, they were fighting for positions. That is, they seldom negotiated. Instead different perspectives were battled against each other, only one could win. Unfortunately play was often interrupted and even destroyed by these confrontations. These kinds of relations between the children could be seen as relations marked by verticality (see for example Frønes 1995 and Janson 2001). This means that the children focused on who was right and who was wrong instead of focusing on play itself. They were looking for a vertical structure where two or more couldn't be situated on the same level. When children were socialising in smaller groups, mostly homogenous, the relations had a different character. It was marked by horizontality. The children saw themselves on the same level, as peers, and focus was on play itself and on development of mutual discoveries. The domination of vertical relations in schoolyard activities could be understood as an expression for a need of safety. To hang on to the own perspective and not accepting others' suggestions could be a way to feel secure in a place or setting that makes you insecure.

The children's relations to adults were also vertical. This vertical relation was not questioned. The children accepted adults as authorities. Almost never there were children questioning an adult opinion.

Family

During my interviews with the children, family came up in all interviews. Discussion about family matters was a source that established hori-

zontal relations between the children. The interviews were all different, some were heated, the children were trying to get on top of each other. Others were calm with all the children waiting for their turn to speak. Independent of how the children handled the interview situation, they all started to listen to each other and to communicate from a base of give and take, when family came up as a topic. Family was something they all could relate to and something they talked about proudly. The children were very interested in each other's experiences and knowledge regarding this matter. During my time in the school I found discussions about family to be the subject that most developed the children's ability to socialise with one another.

Discussions about family matters in school settings, that is in class, could be an entrance to integrate ethnic culture and peer culture into the Swedish school system. An integration of these two cultures into the school system would probably transform the system and support children's possibilities to assimilate education.

A researcher dilemma when approaching peer culture phenomena

Vertical and horizontal relations (See for example Frønes 1995 and Janson 2001) are a pair of concepts that need explaining in this context. Vertical relations are related to the interplay between children and adults, there is a structure of norms and rules that give the relation an ascribed status. In the vertical relation there is inequality among the participants. They have, for example, different life situations, different social positions and inequality in level of development. Besides that there is a transmission of experience and knowledge from the adult to the child (Frønes 1995). Horizontal relations are signified by the agreement of equality. The children can identify each other in the same social positions, for example as schoolchildren or the same age. In horizontal relations there are no rules structuring the relation in advance. Instead you have to negotiate to achieve and maintain friendship (ibid). Vertical relations can also appear between children. Janson (2001) discusses vertical relations in play between blind and sighted children. He means that in play, when one child (the sighted) becomes superior, it's because focus is on who's right and who's wrong instead of my view and your view, there is no co-operation. In this kind of vertical relation the play cannot develop. For a development of play the horizontal relation has to dominate.

The children's possibilities to create peer culture among them were connected with their ability to produce horizontal relations between each other.

My ambition as a researcher was to establish horizontal relations with the children. Through building horizontal relations I could gain an emic (inside) perspective of how these children socialised among each other. To be in interplay with the children, using their perspective, it was necessary not to hold a superior position. Of course this ambition couldn't fully be realised because I was, in spite of what I tried to be, an adult. This ambition was not unproblematic. To enrich this discussion I will give a few examples from my field notes.

> Half of the class is having lessons in an area close by. I don't know how to get there and on the teacher's order Adam escorts me. While walking he tells me he has an uncle that lives in Chicago, - that's why my English is so good, he tells me. We walk silently. Adam has a problem with his new trousers, they slide down over his sneakers and he's afraid he will step on them. Because of that our walk is progressing very slowly. I suggest that he should fold up his trousers. Adam doesn't consider that a good idea, instead he looks at me as if he, in this minute, discovered that he's dealing with a very strange person.

> It's the last hour's lessons of this school week. We will finish up with watching an episode of a popular TV-program. The children are making themselves comfortable. A fight starts about the seats behind the piano. Ruth and Mirya chases Rachel away. I step in to defend Rachel. She stops me and begs me not to interfere. In my effort to see that justice is done, inspite of Rachels request, I demand that Rachel has to be given a seat. Ruth and Mirya accept and make room for Rachel, but she no longer wants the seat.

These are examples, which give a glimpse of the difficulties you can find yourself in as a researcher with the ambition to interplay with the children on their terms. The first example illustrates how Adam and I become aware of our different belongings socially. As a researcher (adult) I don't consider the way Adam is wearing the trousers as important. My view focuses on a practical solution not on the trousers as a marker of identity. Adam's response to my solution shows that the trousers and the way he wears them are important parts of who he is. This response also shows that I'm "in the blue" regarding clothes as a way to show belonging among the children. As a researcher with ambition to interplay as equals my comment is a mistake that separates Adam and me. The other example is more complex. In this situation I'm the only adult in the classroom. From my own

point of view I have a moral responsibility, a kind of responsibility that is a part of being adult in this society. The responsibility I myself identify in this situation is based on the ideology that every child has the right to be equal with others. As an adult I have to maintain this norm and show the children how they should treat each other. Rachel doesn't want my help, but I cannot let the other girls chase her away without me as an adult reacting. My interference is not helpful, Rachel no longer wants the seat. To get the respect from the other children Rachel has to show that she can cope with the situation herself. The only thing that comes out of my interfering was clarifying that Rachel couldn't cope by her own. Even if Mirya and Ruth let her sit they probably wouldn't interplay with her. Now, we can see that my ambition to interact on equal terms is exactly an ambition. A lot of my interaction with the children was on equal terms, but what I'm trying to show is that this was a hard task and that I didn't always succeed.

My role as a researcher, with ambition to interact on equal terms creating (hopefully) horizontal relations, was a kind of "in the middle" position. This attitude created dissociation from the world of the teachers at the school but that didn't make an obvious entrance to the world of the children. The context in which I was situated together with the children was in some parts created by me. This context wasn't completely separated from the usual every-day appearances but a little different. This is not unusual in ethnographic work but it becomes even more obvious in doing fieldwork with children. Children don't expect adults to take positions as equals, and adults (like myself) seem to have a hard time taking the position of a child. This dilemma was standing out also because I was the only adult on the schoolyard playing with the children.

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Anna Lindqvist and Annick Sjögren

Cultural Encounters over an IT- Course

A classical sequence of events: two young inexperienced female teachers set up a course in computing for young men with social problems in an ethnically diverse suburb. Soon the teachers are totally discouraged and consider giving up. But, after a reappraisal of their teaching, the course is completed according to the plans. Three years later, and to their surprise, the youth centre where the course took place presents this experiment as a turning point in their activities.

This article addresses the development of the teaching performance and the lessons to learn from it. Of the two authors of the article Anna Lindqvist is one of the two teachers involved in the course, whereas the other, Annick Sjögren, has been a guiding voice in the background throughout the whole process. First, a description of the course is presented, followed by some reflections on diverse paths to learning and the help IT can represent for youth in difficulty.

Computing basics at the youth centre

In a suburb of Stockholm characterised by a high degree of ethnic diversity, housing segregation, and social problems, financial support was obtained to start an evening course. The target group was young people with problematic social backgrounds and poor school records. The aim was to initiate them to the basics in computing, mainly by an introduction to Internet and a local conference system. The participants were aged between 16 and 27, their number varying from week to week, between three to ten at a time. Nearly all of them had Turkish or Kurdish parents but were themselves born and educated in Sweden. They had gone through compulsory school, a few had started at the gymnasium. Several of them had dropped out of school. Criminality, major social difficulties, and unemployment were parts of their daily life. A few of them were working in special employment projects.

The two teachers were university students at an educational programme of Stockholm University called *Multimedia: Education – Technology*.

Those young women had a Swedish middle-class background, had spent two years at the university, and had some experience of youth care. But they had no knowledge at all about the environment and the conditions of life of the young people they were going to teach. They met the staff of the Youth Centre and were simply told that there might be problems with language and discipline.

A description of the course is as follows. The form "we", meaning the two teachers, is used to illustrate the profound experience they encountered.

We started planning the course according to the principles learnt at the university, associating theoretical presentations and practical exercises and designing a simple structure for the conference system. We took it for granted that the students wanted to learn digital communication and that they could speak and write Swedish.

The reality was far from expected. The young men coming to the course had great difficulties at expressing themselves in proper Swedish. Most of the time they talk either in Turkish, Kurdish, or some other foreign language. We felt excluded from their communication. The notice on the wall "HERE WE ONLY SPEAK SWEDISH" was totally ignored. The students could not even spell the password "Welcome". The atmosphere was chaotic. The exchanges between the young men mainly consisted of pushing and hitting each other. They could not listen. They could not concentrate for more than a few minutes. It was a fruitless teaching situation. Another distressing aspect was that these youths mistrust all Swedish official people. We, the teachers, were the intruders in their territory. They were not interested in changing their way of life. They had given up hope of succeeding. They felt safer without us in their environment.

Still, we perceived an interest in what we wanted to teach them but we could not reach the students. None of our previous teaching experiences were of any use, we just did not understand one another. It was pointless to talk about the future and the benefit they could gain from IT-knowledge. If they wanted to learn anything it was what they could use now, immediately, on the spot. Nothing more.

We considered interrupting the course. We were near breaking down. To give up was tempting but depressing. Instead we received a strong support from our chief, Erik Tängdén, who would not consider defeat. He sent us to an ethnologist, Annick Sjögren. Several long discussions gave us an

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opening. We started to take into account the cultural dimensions of the situation, the ethnic, social, and educational distance between us and them. It became obvious that we should not expect a model elaborated for well educated, socially well adapted Swedish students to work for young people marked by failure at school as well as by social and ethnic segregation. Our disturbing encounters began to get their explanation. We regained courage and the will to continue the course.

We understood that the best way to get at these disturbed learners was to leave them to communicate in their own way, i.e. in whatever language that came to them, searching for the topics and, especially, the music they were familiar with – and unknown to us. At the same time, we accepted that we had to set limits in a much more explicit, at times even sharp, way. This was not easy for us, educated with the Swedish ideology of self-discipline and with the use of understatements to correct wrong behaviour. We realised that to demand that they submitted to strict rules of behaviour was a way to recognise their value as responsible adults, capable of meeting a challenge and of learning. It was a question of establishing mutual respect. It was our role to discover their frame of references and the previous knowledge they had, even if far from the expected norm. We had to give them the opportunity of learning by building on the already mastered fragments of knowledge they possessed.

Here are some examples of the operations they wanted to do and which gave results which they could use immediately:

- download music from the Internet, mainly Turkish pop music;
- fetch signals for their mobile telephones, usually Turkish melodies;
- chat on the Internet, often with girls.

The lesson during which a young man for the first time succeeded in downloading and playing music from the Internet was a turning point. He downloaded music which we, the teachers, had never heard before, Turkish music. It was played at high volume level. All the other students in the classroom started to sing. They knew the lyrics of the song. We accepted the unusual situation. From that time onwards, the atmosphere of the course became much better. We no longer minded the students talking to one another in their own language. We began to find a way to communicate with them. One of the students, who had a high status in the group, helped to keep the discipline by stopping the disturbing exchanges of

physical violence. We gave up the theoretical presentations as well as the planned assignments. We let the students express and decide the aims they wanted to achieve, and then gave them our full support to realise them. The more we learnt about the students, the better we could help them.

Both teachers and students learnt a lot in the process. At the end of the course all students managed to search on the Internet and to send mail. We, the teachers, knew that planning such a course needed an initiation to cultural and social perspectives. Proper support and some basic appropriate knowledge in a rather desperate situation made all the difference between shattered teachers and teachers with a renewed curiosity and wish to solve a tricky learning situation in the future. As Jim Cummins advocates, for the students to learn, the teachers also must have something to learn.

> If educators are not learning a lot from their culturally and linguistically diverse students, it is probable that their students are not learning a lot from them... Students need to feel that what they bring to the classroom in terms of home culture and previous experience matters. Any genuine multicultural/anti-racist education requires the students' voices, their expression of self, be encouraged and heard in the classroom.... If culturally diverse students feel their identities are affirmed and their contributions valued in the classroom interactions, they are much more likely to feel a sense of belonging and commitment to the broader society which this classroom and this teacher represents. (Cummins 1997:100)

Now, nearly four years later, one of us, Anna Lindqvist, has been asked to come back and repeat a similar course. The Youth Centre has increased its activities. The previous course was the starting point of diverse IT-activities. One of the original students who had appeared a quite hopeless case had continued to learn computing and now has a certain responsibility for this at the Centre. For many of the youths of the area with no computer at home, the Youth Centre offers the only opportunity to learn computing. But this teaching still has to be adapted to the social and ethnic context.

Various paths to learning

This experience was followed by two other courses set up for the students at technical classes in an upper secondary school in the same suburban area. The students had a very low motivation for learning in general. A course in computing basics was organised during free hours. Despite the gloomy predictions of their ordinary teachers, the course was completed and the students repeatedly asked for a follow up course, which they did

not get for financial reasons. Another course taught the students to use computing as a help in Swedish, a discipline which they considered of very little interest. The results were patent. Again it was music which was the main interest. The students worked on their Swedish with the help of computers by treating the subject they had agreed on and which was *Music and Power*. The motivation increased enormously and unusually good results were achieved for nearly all the students.

Of all those experiences, the two teachers became aware of three driving forces in the development of the students: the will to communicate, the will to learn, and the wish to be acknowledged. If teaching stimulates those forces, the results are manifest.

The need of communicating was impressive. There was not a single student, however low his level of knowledge, who did not search communication. It could be by mail, chat, music, presenting results, or just by talking, but it was constantly present. Scholars remind that the need of communication is already patent in pre-school children:

> To create meaning and establish connection is today seen as a driving force in the child from the very beginning, as well as as to actively search for contact and interplay. The child are competently and actively searching for knowledge. (Brodin & Hylander 1997: 19; The authors' translation from Swedish)

When the basics of computing could not be decoded by the youths, they communicated in their own languages, clearly excluding their disturbing teachers. When words did not come well enough, they kicked and pushed.

But as soon as they found a common denominator for communication, a form of music well known to them, a sense of community was established in the classroom. The teachers had accepted the deal and they were included.

The need to learn was no less pervasive. Small fragments of already acquired knowledge were used as ground stones. It corresponded to the zone of proximal development as advocated by Vygotsky (Bråten & Thurmann-Moe 1998). The teachers had to build scaffoldings to hold the previously acquired knowledge within limits and give to the students a chance to develop it further. Knowledge on music which appeared of no value could in fact be used to learn new domains of computing. In that way they improved their means of communication, which represented such an important domain for them. The students concerned at the upper secondary school were in classes with a professional orientation towards printing and

media. They surprised their class teachers by devoting their free time to learn computing.

It is obvious that learning outside the given tracks of official schooling is extremely important for the youths who have dropped out of school or are on their way to do so. Shirley B. Heath, who has done much work in this domain (Heath 1995; Heath & McLaughlin 1993), explained how the biggest obstacle for getting a recognition of this essential field of learning is to find a proper name for it (seminar, Department of Education, Stockholm University, 21/9-2002). She suggests: extra-learning, learning communities, learning out of school, over institutional learning. She states how the "beyond learning" at school and in the family has to be acknowledged. Much of this learning does not have permanent forms and does not fit into a long-term planning of life. As Heath remarks, those acts of learning are carried out with the feeling of "life as entertainment". The students from the Youth Centre feel no need to learn for the future. They want to have fun. Their narratives, in music or in pictures, do not follow the patterns of the Western society and of the school. It is a part of themselves, for the moment, and disappear as soon as they get tired of it. If they are not recognised as learning beings within the accepted frames, they will do it in form of protest, within the gangs and against the members of the institutions. Nobody can prevent them from learning.

The third demand of the students was their need to be acknowledged. In Sweden, youths of diverse ethnic backgrounds in suburban areas are gathered under the term of "immigrant youth" whatever their place of birth or number of years spent in the Swedish school system. They, on their side, very much feel a sense of community, but it is a community of outsiders, a community of exclusion. This is one of the factors that nourish their mistrust of the others, of the Swedes, and, even more so, of the Swedish establishment. As soon as the teachers accept their music, Turkish pop, as an appropriate way to learning, they feel more at ease and can communicate with these representatives of the Swedish society. They feel respected as individuals, with their own personality and their own background.

The two young teachers met some further examples. A student at the upper secondary school expressed how much she wanted to be seen as a unique person with a life outside school. She wished that the teachers could be interested in her so that they would know more than just her name and her class. Another time, during an in-service day about digital culture, some teachers expressed their fear that the use of mail between them and

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the students would cause a disruption of their work with far too many unnecessary exchanges. But some of their colleagues who had been using mail with their students witnessed of the huge gain it was to get to know them on a much more personal level.

In the different courses on computing mentioned above, it was interesting to see how important it was for the students to find their name printed by the machine. They loved to imagine which name and address they could adopt for their personal mail.

A socio-anthropological study made in the same area as the youth centre (Karlström 1999) reports on especially disturbing boys in an upper secondary class. The reaction of several teachers was to pretend to ignore the perturbing elements. To get recognition, whatever it could be, the boys behaved in an even more provocative way. They complained to the author of the study of not being seen by the teachers. They wanted to be acknowledged on their own terms.

IT promotes learning

Communication technology invites to new ways of meeting and communicating. The cybernetical space creates communities independent of the traditional links to space and time. Arjun Apadurai (1997) ranges this revolution of communication as one of the major factors in the disappearance of the nation-state and the apparition of communities based on reconstructed links. This technology is a most effective medium for creating new links over borders. It can use history, religion, and language, a traditional basis of knowledge contributing to forming communities (Anderson 1983), but it does it independently of territories and physical borders.

How does this work for the young people concerned in the study?

The Swedish teachers were disturbed and felt excluded when their students used foreign languages in front of them. But when the students downloaded Turkish songs and the teachers accepted this way to learn some computing, the balance was restored. The students were accepted as Turkish youths. The computer was a mediator. The teachers felt they had achieved something valuable with the students.

IT gives rise to communication with another logic, one of the characteristics quoted by Shirley B. Heath for the minority youth she studies in the USA (seminar 21/9-01). Another characteristic of this youth, as noted

by Heath and quoted above, is the immediacy required to become interested. Computing favours this characteristic. On the screen, the youths can create, quickly and effectively, and then, just by pushing a button, make their creation disappear. It is only for the beauty of it, for showing the products of an instant to peers or unknown partners in the digital dialogue.

Communicating through IT implies anonymity and freedom of choosing topics and partners, two aspects very valuable for youths at risk. But they learn something in the process. It requires of them reading, writing, categorising, and following the rules of the game. It gives them an opportunity to dare to try new ways of learning, to test their own limits and to challenge different sides of their personality.

One of the students remarked that for her it was very stimulating to see that the pictures and texts which she produced for school with the help of digital media reflected the information she got from a world-wide net of data. She felt it motivating that for once her school work had a clear link to the outside world. Birgitta Qvarsell (1988) shows that students associate the culture presented by school, e.g. literature, with constraint and homework, while they associate the same activity, when categorised as leisure, with freedom and entertainment. The fascination of the Internet ranges computing as leisure rather than as schoolwork. It might be even more so in socially deprived environments where the access to a computer is a luxury.

Another interesting benefit of the computer is that the screen sets very definite limits. In this way, once the basic rules of the technique mastered, it favours concentration. Students who cannot listen for more than a few minutes in a class can sit in front of the screen for hours, once their interest is caught.

IT is a hazardous medium by the scope of its possibilities and the difficulty to control them. It can be misused. But within definite limits and under proper supervision it can open new paths to learning for students who have failed at school. It is highly responsive to the strong needs of such students, to communicate, to learn, and to be seen.

Some final remarks

In educational situations characterised by diversity and new technology, the teachers have to decipher the tiny signs of valuable resources the

apparently most hopeless students detain and from them start to build up a basis for further knowledge.

It has been most rewarding for the two authors to reflect on the development of courses on computing in socially deprived environment, on the difficulties encountered and on the possible solutions, not least in relation to other scholars' work on minority youths excluded from the normal ways of learning at school.

Young people do learn, whatever the environment. But obviously it is more constructive for them, as well for society as a whole, if they learn within the accepted frames rather than in protest and against the rules.

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About the Authors

Birgit Althans
Dr. phil., Department of Education and Anthropology, Freie Universität Berlin, works on the project „The Desire of the Female Educator – Early Relations between Gender, Social Work and Management". Publications: Der Klatsch, die Frauen und das Sprechen bei der Arbeit (Frankfurt/M. 2000). balthans@zedat.fu-berlin.de

Kathrin Audehm
researcher, Department of Education, Freie Universität Berlin, research interests: family education, philosophy and anthropology of education. Doctoral thesis: Learning on the table. Performative aspects of a family ritual. kathrin_audehm@web.de

Jutta Balldin
MEd, doctoral student, Department of Education, Stockholm University, writes a doctoral thesis based on high school pupils' stories about how to use and plan time in temporally mobile schools. jutta@ped.su.se

Constanze Bausch
researcher, Department of Education, Freie Universität Berlin, research interests: Media in education, ethnographic research. cbausch@zedat.fu-berlin.de

Michael Göhlich
Dr. phil., professor of education, Universität Erlangen; last book: System, Handeln, Lernen unterstützen. Eine Theorie der Praxis pädagogischer Institutionen, Weinheim und Basel 2001.

Katrin Goldstein-Kyaga
PhD, associate professor, Department of Education, Stockholm University, engaged in research concerning the Tibetans under Communist Rule and their Culture of Non-violence. Another project concerns Identity and Globalization. katring@ped.su.se.

Britta Högberg
PhD, research leader at Stockholm County Council and adjunct lecturer at Department of Education, Stockholm University, main research interest concerns the relation between individual and institution, especially in encounters between professionals and clients. britta.hogberg@oms.sll.se

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Benjamin Jörissen
researcher, Department of Education, Freie Universität Berlin, research interests: Media technology, anthropology, philosophy of education. joeriben@zedat.fu-berlin.de

Karsten Lichau
studied education at the Universität Tübingen, Freie Universität Berlin and Université de Paris VIII, doctoral student. lichau@gmx.net

Anna Lindqvist
BA within the program Multimedia - Education and Techniques, master student at the Department of Education, Stockholm University. Presently working with adult educational development at the Swedish National Board of Education. anna.lindqvist@eden.grace.se

Cecilia Löfberg
MEd, doctoral student, Department of Education, Stockholm University, mainly interested in child and youth cultural development and manifestation. Writes a doctoral thesis on children's and young people's expression of gender positions and sexuality in Internet communication. cecilia@ped.su.se

Birgitta Qvarsell
PhD, professor of education at Stockholm University. Research interests concern conditions and processes in childhood and youth cultures related to new media, and to marginalized children and youth in a comparative perspective. birgitta@ped.su.se

Andrés Klaus Runge Peña
Dr. phil., Department of Education, Freie Universität Berlin, assistant professor at the University of Antioquia, Medellín - Colombia

Annick Sjögren
PhD, associate professor in ethnology, dean at the Faculty of Education, University College of Södertörn, Sweden, in charge of giving an intercultural orientation to the University College of Södertörn, has studied the relationship between language learning and the social and ethnic environment. annick.sjogren@sh.se

Anja Tervooren
researcher, Department of Education, Freie Universität Berlin, works in the fields of Gender Studies, Ethnography of Childhood and Youth, Disability Studies. anjaterv@zedat.fu-berlin.de

Monika Wagner-Willi
researcher, Department of Education, Freie Universität Berlin, works on a project entitled "School and Rituals". Focus of research: reconstructive qualitative research, video analysis, ritual and school research, integrative pedagogics. monwa@t-online.de

Christoph Wulf
Dr. phil., professor of general and comparative education, Freie Universität Berlin, research interests: anthropology of education, historical anthropology, ritual studies, mimesis in education. chrwulf@zedat.fu-berlin.de; www.christophwulf.de

Jörg Zirfas
PD Dr. phil., research and teaching interests: historical anthropology, educational anthropology, philosophy of education, ethnographic research. juzirfas@aol.com

European Studies in Education

edited by Christoph Wulf

The political, economic, and social developments in the European Union pose new challenges to education in Europe, where each country has its own system. Under these circumstances, the relation between national, regional, and local traditions on the one hand and supraregional, transnational aspirations on the other must be conceived. The field of education is seeing the rise of new issues, responsibilities, and research requiring scholars from different European cultures to work together.

European Studies in Education constitutes an international forum for the publication of educational research in English, German and French. The multilingual nature of this series mirrors that of Europe and makes it possible to portray and express cultural diversity.

Christoph Wulf (ed.): Education in Europe. An Intercultural Task

1995. 554 S. DM 48,- (Euro 24,54). ISBN 3-89325-258-4.

Dieser Band enthält die Materialien des Budapester Kongresses des Network Educational Science Amsterdam vom Herbst 1993. Das Netzwerk umfasst mehr als 30 erziehungswissenschaftliche Fakultäten aus allen Teilen Europas und aus einigen außereuropäischen Ländern. Die Materialien enthalten kurze Positionspapiere und Diskussionsbeiträge zur Theorie und Geschichte der Erziehung, Medien, Lehrerbildung, Sonderpädagogik, Transitionsprobleme in Mittel-Ost-Europa, Interkulturelle Bildung, Frauenstudien, Europäische Perspektiven.

Sjoerd Karsten, Dominique Majoor (eds.): Education in East Central Europe. Educational Changes after the Fall of Communism

1995. 180 S. DM 29,80 (Euro 15,24). ISBN 3-89325-259-2.

Dieser Band umfasst drei Fallstudien über die gegenwärtige Situation des Bildungswesens in Ungarn, der Tschechischen Republik und Polen sowie eine Vergleichende Analyse. Die einzelnen Studien sind äußerst material- und informationsreich und erarbeiten Perspektiven für zukünftige Entwicklungen.

Stephan Sting, Christoph Wulf (eds.): Education in a Period of Social Upheaval. Educational Theories and Concepts in Central East Europe

1995. 174 S. DM 29,80 (Euro 15,24). ISBN 3-89325-260-6.

Hier wird ein Überblick über die aktuelle Problemlage der Erziehungswissenschaft in Ostmitteleuropa gegeben. In einer Situation des gesellschaftlichen Umbruchs werden aus der Sicht der betroffenen Gemeinsamkeiten sowie historische und kulturelle Differenzen in der pädagogischen Tradition aufgespürt, die neue Perspektiven für pädagogische Theorien und Konzepte bieten. Die Beiträge beschäftigen sich mit den Entwicklungen in Bulgarien, Deutschland, Estland, Litauen, Polen, Rumänien, Russland, Tschechien und Ungarn.

Bernhard Dieckmann, Christoph Wulf, Michael Wimmer (eds.): Violence. Nationalism, Racism, Xenophobia

1997. 332 S. DM 38,- (Euro 19,43). ISBN 3-89325-487-0.

The escalation in violence over the last few years expressed in xenophobia, racism and nationalism in several European countries is analized in the contributions of the book. Representatives of disciplines of the various social sciences dedicated to understanding violence attempt to determine possible causes and motives for this increase. The European aspect, with its particular economic and sociopolitical problems, is examined using case study results from several countries. In addition, an analysis is presented that investigates the question wheather violence is a problem specific to youth and therefore an issue to be addressed by educationalists. The book seeks to contribute to research in the fields of nationalism and racism by dealing predominantly with anthropologial considerations. But it also wishes to address the questions of the manifestation, causes and motives of youth violence being discussed in educational science.

Stephen Lawton, Rodney Reed, Fons van Wieringen (eds.): Restructuring Public Schooling: Europe, Canada, America

1997. 206 S. DM 38,- (Euro19,43). ISBN 3-89325-518-4.

This volume offers an overview of educational restructuring, its aims and possibilities in the European and North American context. A conceptual analsysis of educational policy systems and development in both continnents is provided and empirical cases are presented within this framework. Overviews are given of the national stage in Canada. Problems with the public debt are driving change in Canada, but the issue of developing an internationally competitive work force is the main objective. A synthesis of continental

European development is provided in which the distinctly different perspectives in northern and southern Europe are compored. Assessments of reformas in the United States are presented. Some reforms are driven by a vision of decentralization and democratic localism, and others by pragmatism and a desire to do the least harm to the classroom as cutbacks are made. Analysis of the impact of school-site management complement these system-wide analyses.

Christoph Wulf (eds.): Education for the 21st Century. Commonalities and Diversities

1998. 700 S. DM 48,- (Euro 24,54). ISBN 3-89325-619-9.

The expansion of the European Union in the 21st century will bring with it new tasks in education. Among the predominant ones are issues related to commonalities and diversities found within each nation's own education system. Until now the European states have focused on diversities found within their own national educatioanl systems. The ongoining integration process in Europe will mean transnational perspectives need more attention. Processes of globalisation, economic integration, social mobility, migration and political integration will persist into the next century and produce new forms of commonalities, inside and outside nation states. The relationsship of these processes of commonalities and diversities is a major problem and challenge for all education systems not only within Europe, but in the whole world. This volume deals with issues related to this development in seven fields: History and Theory of Education, Ethnicity, Teacher Education, Youth Care aand Special Educational Needs, Media Based Education, Woman and Gender Studies, Higher Education. The 43 articels are written by more than 50 authors from 15 European countries.

Georgios Tzartzas: Schule im gesellschaftlichen Umbruch. Die Entwicklung des modernen griechischen Bildungswesens (1833-1862)

1998. 491 S. DM 48,- (Euro 24,54). ISBN 3-89325-654-7.

Bei der Konstituierung des modernen griechischen Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens wurden zahlreiche Gedanken der Aufklärung und des Neuhumanismus wirksam. Es verbanden sich Vorstellungen von der Notwenigkeit der Vervollkommnung und Versittlichung der Menschen durch die Macht der Erziehung. Vorstellungen vom Wert griechisch antiker Traditionen und von der Schaffung einer neuen Identität. Die Schule entwickelte sich zu einer Institution nicht nur des Lernens, sondern auch der Überwachung und Hierarchisierung, mit deren Hilfe die Domestizierung des Körpers bzw. Disziplinierung des Schülers bezweckt wurde, um seine Brauchbarkeit und Effizienz zu erhöhen. Die Orientierung an den Bildungssystemen westeuropäischer Staaten erfolgte nicht wegen deren Effizienz, sondern

aufgrund eines ausgebliebenen Selbstverständnisses der, Pädagogik innerhalb des neugriechischen Staatswesens.

Mbukeni Herbert Mnguni: Education as a Social Institution and Ideological Process. From Négritude Education in Senegal to Bantu Education in South Africa

1999. 188 S. DM 38,- (Euro 19,43). ISBN 3-89325-696-2.

The author has attempted to raise some problematic issues and concerns around formal education in Africa and particulary South Africa, which is in stage of creating an inclusive education system. The author argues that a necessary starting point is to first recognize the voices of those who are excluded and marginalized, and then to develop strategies which will ensure their inclusion. Understanding what indigenous people think about education and the knowledge transmitted to their children will ensure their full participation in decision-making.

Beatriz Vélez: Géographie de la chair maternelle. Corps, culture et société en Colombie

1999. 176 S. DM 29,80 (Euro 15,24). ISBN 3-89325-722-5.

Les différences anatomique entre hommes et femmes ont été à la base des systèmes d'échange symbolique dans toutes les sociétés. L'auteur essaie de survoler la constellation de cette problématique dans les cas de la Colombie où l'ordre des rapports entre hommes et femmes a été fortement déterminé par l'image judéo-chrétienne de la Vierge Marie. Même si, au XXième siècle, la sécularisation de la société colombienne a provoqué des changements dans le système sexe et genre, la plupart des femmes engagées dans la politique, l'education supérieure et les sports, demeurent piégées dans la "double détermination" de mères et de travailleuses.

Silvia Hedenigg: Kindheitsbegriffe japanischer Strafkonzeptionen. Zur Rezeption westlicher Modelle der Reformerziehung in der Meiji-Zeit

1999. 170 S. DM 29,80 (Euro 15,24). ISBN 3-89325-724-1.

An der Schnittstelle von Erziehungswissenschaft und Japanologie behandelt die Studie die historisch-anthropologische Fragestellung von Kindheits- und Erziehungsbegriffen in japanischen Strafkonzeptionen. Geleitet von mentalitätsgeschichtlichen Überlegungen sind es Strafhandlungen und deren zugrundeliegende Strafkonzeptionen, die im Hinblick auf Wahrnehmungs- und Verständnisformen von Kindheit als Untersuchungsgegenstand herangezogen

werde. Den leitenden Referenzbezug bildet dabei Foucaults Analysemodell der "Macht zum Leben".

Doug Bougthon, Rachel Mason (eds.): Beyond Multicultural Art Education. International Perspectives

1999. 360 S. DM 38,- DM (Euro 19,43). ISBN 3-89325-783-7

Multiculturalism is a term that has been much used in educational texts in recent years. Its usage is frequently taken for granted in the rhetoric of curriculum literature. However, it has recently become clear that there are significant variations of interpretations of multiculturalism in different world regions. This book takes a new and deeper look at the notion of multiculturalism through the lens of art education. In educational terms art is a unique tool for the investigation of cultural values because it transcends the barrier of language and provides visceral and tacit insights into cultural change.

In order to address the educational interpretations and methods of implementing multiculturalism in different regios of the world, this book contains discussion and analysis of perspectives on art education theory and practice from thirteen countries. The authors of each chapter are respected multicultural experts in their geographic locations who are well equipped to provide unique insights into the particular issues of multiculturalism viewed from the perspective of art in educational contexts.

The book as a whole provides tools for the conceptual analysis of contemporary notions linked with multiculturalism, such as interculturalism, internationalism and globalisation. It also provides strategies for art teaching in relation to these ideas. This book presents conceptual frameworks that should assist educators to examine their own teaching on issues of equity and diversity that are central to the multicultural education debate.

Niklas Luhmann, Karl-Eberhard Schorr: Problems of Reflection in the System of Education, *translated by Rebecca A. Neuwirth*

2000, European Studies in Education, 412 Seiten, br., 48,00 DM (24,54 Euro), ISBN 3-89325-890-6

From the perspective of system theory this text traces the way in which the system of education reflects its own unity and its own position in modern society. Concerning the problems of reflection (autonomy of the system of education, instruction technology and the contradiction between education and selection) sociological analysis and the availability of analytical instruments for system reflection may make a contribution to increase the reflection level of communication in the system of education.

Jan Karel Koppen, Ingrid Lunt, Christoph Wulf (eds.): Education in Europe. Cultures, Values, Institutions in Transition

2002, European Studies in Education, 320 pages, br., EUR 19,50, ISBN 3-8309-1110-6

This book deals with three major fields of contemporary education in Europe: *intercultural education, values in education* and *educational institutions*. In each of these central areas education is currently confronted with rapid changes, related to the process of European unification and globalization, which is considerably altering the frame of reference for nation-based cultures and educational systems. The enlargement of Europe in the years to come constitutes one of the most challenging developments in the European Union. This development will make the commonalities and differences between European nation states, cultures and religions play an important role. How to handle these will be among the central tasks of the future. In the European Union, education is destined to become an increasingly intercultural task.

Christoph Wulf, Christine Merkel (Hg.): Globalisierung als Herausforderung der Erziehung. 2002.

Christoph Wulf, Brigitte Qvarsell (eds.): Culture and Education. 2003.

Michael Gutmann: Die dialogische Pädagogik des Sokrates. Ein Weg zu Wissen, Weisheit und Selbsterkenntnis. 2003.

At a time of profound political, social and cultural change, one crucial question is how to conceive the relation between culture and education. Understanding this relation is at present all the more urgent as the traditional attribution of education to the charge of each respective European national culture is currently undergoing radical change. Although the educational system still fulfils the task of anchoring young generations within the national cultures that make up Europe, the progressive loss of significance of national states, which is connected to the process of unification and globalisation, is creating new challenges to the various European cultures and to the education systems embodied in their people.

Culture is dependent on education just as education is dependent on culture. Cultures are sustained and transformed through the manner in which they communicate with the younger generation; it is at this level that they constitute their particular power and dynamic. Cultures are historical and regional. The blanket term "culture" comprises so many heterogeneous elements and aspects that it makes no sense to attempt to form them into a unified definition which could never do justice to the complexity of what culture is. Thus, not only does a culture consist of a particular language and a range of imaginary, literary, artistic and musical creations, but also social structures, values and attitudes as well as social forms of living and their everyday enactment and performance.